Date: Mon, 14 Jul 1997 09:18:02 +0100 To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU From: ccw94-AT-aber.ac.uk (COLIN WIGHT) Subject: Re: BHA: What must the world be like for facism? Hi everyone, Just a few comments. Marshall asked: >> >> Having finished reading RTS over the weekend, I have the following >> observations and questions. >> >> 1. RB's key strategy is to ask, "What must the world be like for science to be possible?" I think a more accurate reading of his >argument and the book is that the question he really answers is, "What >must the world be like for science's practice of experimentation to be >intelligible?" Any comments? I think this is a plausible reading, but an incorrect one. It might be better to put it as what must the world be like for experiments to be necessary? Also Bhaskar takes science to be right in one vital respect that Marshall's point misses, that is that the laws that it does discover are transfactual; they endure outside of the conditions of their discovery. For Bhaskar, then experiments are only one part of science, hence the two questions are not one and the same. Also, I think you have to place RB's fascination with experiments in context. He deals so much with this because; (i) very little analysis has been done (see also Ian Hacking's book on this); and (ii) it seems to be the cornerstone, or the Achilles Heel as RB would later come to call it, of positivism. This relates to Ruth's point: > I've always thought that he blurs the distinction >in the end, in a way that to my mind does not adequately respond to the >challenge that the scientists are all mad -- or, as my advisor once put >it, "So the scientific community's self-understanding is the scientific >community's self-understanding; so what?" (or something to that effect). Please point out to your advisor, that the scientific community's self understanding is not self justifactory, and I'm sure he doesn't think it is, or at least, let's hope they are not all mad because we seem to devour their outputs greedily (hence if they are mad then so are we and we could never know of their madness). The self-understanding of the scientific community very rarely extends to the kind of philosophical justification that RB engages in. RB's claim is not that scientists know they are transcendental realists, but that their practices are dependent on such a nocturnal philosophy. Also, your advisor reminds me of Loius's, or is it mine, anti-realist. Good thing for your advisor that the self-understandings of scientists extends to the consciousness of the Jumbo jets I presume he flies in, the car he rides in, the TV he watches, and the computers I presunme he uses to claim that science is only sucessful because scientists are deluding themselves (are mad), or every other mode of his being with is infused with science, for that matter. Remember for RB there is no logical or necessary gap between science and us. It is not a prcartice somewhere out there that others engage in. It is part of our mode of being as we reach the century's end (your advisor's as well). >I think not so much of Habermas as of the Horkheimer and Adorno of >*Dialectic of Enlightenment*, or of Marcuse. This is why one needs to >have a fair amount to say, actually, regarding what Bhaskar in my view >brushes over too easily as "rationality at the level of judgement". I have some sympathy with this view Ruth, I myself scrutined the texts for the equation of theory choice. Still, whatever the philosophical absence that confronts us in our epistemological choices we seem to make judgements fairly well most of the time. I think RB's point here is that there is no one method of deciding between theories but many. As Einstein said, 'compare an epistemologist to a scientist, an epistemologist looks for the one right epistemology, a scientist, on the other hand, is an epistemological opportunist.' Enter Feyerabend stage left...... >There needs to be a better account of why any one theory ought to be >preferred over another than the "it explains more facts" of *RR*. And >in particular - obviously - why anyone ought to give any credence >whatsoever to the claims of `science' as a whole. Maybe cos it seems to work. RB is quite explicit about this in SRHE, basically we reach a Wittgensteinian bedrock and all we can do is to throw in our lot, as RB puts it, with science. Unsatisfactory, Oh yes, but then again given the choices on offer, especially when push comes to shove, I know whose advice I generally take, not all the time mind, I weigh up evidence and assess the choices and judge. Now how did I do that? BTW thanks for your paper. It was really interesting, but try to get a look at the POssibility of Naturalism, preferably the 2nd edition. As this will, or should, allay many of your concerns about the "relative intransitivity" of social objects. Bhaskar, also looks at Taylor's arguments from fact to values here as well. Also have a look at Ted Benton's critique of RB on this issue. Thanks, ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Colin Wight Department of International Politics University of Wales, Aberystwyth Aberystwyth SY23 3DA -------------------------------------------------------- --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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