Date: Sun, 20 Jul 1997 18:36:23 -0400
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
From: Marshall Feldman <marsh-AT-URIACC.URI.EDU>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: BHA: What must the world be like for facism?


At 01:35 PM 7/20/97 -0400, you wrote:
>I have not been following all of the recent exchanges closely so this may be
>off the mark, but I was left a little uneasy by the way Louis Irwin
>formulated some of his comments on the relationship between the natural and
>social sciences. In particular, he wrote:
>
>"I see Bhaskar as using experimental natural science to decide what a base
>concept of science is and then erecting on that base a broader theory of
>scientific methodology that includes both the non-experimental natural
>sciences and the social sciences."
>
>Independently of whether or not this is an accurate characterization of RB's
>project, it strikes me that it is problematic to make natural science the
>body which frames the 'base' concept of science and then to relate other
>kinds of science to natural science. There is a very great danger of setting
>up the natural sciences as arbiters of 'true' science and replicating the
>old hierarchy of the sciences from the harder to the softer.
>
>It does not seem to me that asking the transcendental question "what must
>the world be like for experimental science to be possible?" necessarily says
>anything about the different kinds of science that are possible. In fact,
>one could just as easily ask the question "what must the social world be
>like for social science to be possible?". This is all the more important if
>one takes seriously RB's comment that the decisive difference is ontological
>and not epistemological. It is the object of knowledge of the social
>sciences, the social world, which differs fundamentally from the object of
>knowledge of the natural sciences. The key difference resides, I think, in
>the fact that our knowledge of the social world is itself a constituent
>element of that world.

This seems correct to some extent, but here's the problem.  RB's critique
of empiricism in sciences like physics leverages his analysis of
experiment.  In other words, experiments are taken as valid scientific
practices, and then he uses them to answer the metaphysical questions via
transcendental argument.  He also then uses this ontology in a somewhat
imperial way to make comments (rather tentatively in RTS) about what good
science is in sciences whose objects do not lend themselves to closure.
This then seems to have two implications: (1) experimental sciences are the
basis for his comments about the non-experimental ones and (2) it
precludes, for instance, using the systematic empiricism of statistical
correlation hacks (you know, the ones who argue for a "variable" in a
sentence or two and then compute regression coefficients) to ask the same
question, "What must the world be like for systematic empiricist science to
be possible?"  I agree with RB's conclusion, but I think this may be a flaw
in his argument; or at least it does give experiment privileged status.

Now if we ask the second question and ignore experiment (i.e., "What must
the world be like for social science to be possible?"), remember we cannot
without circularity use our results to critique social science.  The
question presumes the scientific validity of social science in order to
develop an ontology that makes social science intelligible.  We might take
an undisputed piece of social science to ask the question, but what part of
social science is uncontested?

I really don't think this issue depends on the self-reflexivity of the
human sciences.  We could, for instance, ask, "What must the world be like
for science to be possible?" and use astronomy or paleontology as our
fulcrum.  While RB says, "science," he really uses "experiment" for his.
This tactic is not innocent, and I agree with his results.  Still, I worry
about the tacit assumption that the implicit ontology in the experimental
sciences readily spills across the boundaries of other sciences.

RB argues, largely in PON I think, that societies have the similar
ontologies.  But here his argument, like Giddens', depends on our knowledge
of society as members in it.  It is not so much that our knowledge
"constructs" society (ala Berger and Luckmann), as by being social animals
we know certain things about society.  THIS knowledge is RB's fulcrum to
argue for the possiblity of science in the human realm.
This, it seems to me, is much more like the arguments Marx and others made.
It really doesn't depend much on the argument in RTS except that we can
affirm the possibility of a knowledge of society resembling scientific
knowledge of (the rest of) nature.  Given that this argument is independent
of natural science (except as the model of "science" that motivates the
search for a similar ontology -- RB certainly can't point to experimental
practice to validate his claims about society), we might just say "Who
cares?" if the canonical form of knowledge of society is "science" or not.
RB's argument that knowledge of society requires knowledge of structures
and depth realism stands on its own, even if (natural) "science" different
knowledge and ontology.

Now the problem with this conclusion is that is opens the door for all
sorts of debates about social science.  Interpretive social science uses
the same tactic (i.e., starting with what we know about society) to come up
with a sort of subjectivist methodological program.  Similarly, empiricists
make similar arguments for statistically studying aggregates vs
individuals.  IMHO, the battle needs to be fought over the existence of
deep structures in society whether or not they exist in physics, &tc.
I wish it were not so, because then RB's results for experimental sciences
would resolve certain debates in social science.  Instead, I think the
debates are still with us, but critical realists can just point more
forcefully to analogous practices in the natural sciences.  This may lend
some legitimacy via association, but I don't know how much it's warranted.



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Marshall Feldman, Associate Professor		                marsh-AT-uriacc.uri.edu
Graduate Curriculum in Community Planning and Area Development	401/874-5953
The University of Rhode Island					401/874-5511 (FAX)
94 West Alumni Avenue, Suite 1; Kingston, RI 02881-0806


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