From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gwi.net>
To: <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU>
Subject: Re: BHA: Non-experimental science (was "What must the ...")
Date: Wed, 30 Jul 1997 12:27:29 -0400


Hi Marshall--

> So this is not a matter of re-demonstrating CR's applicability.  In
> general, it's first a matter of establishing what science is and then
> asking on what basis we think a particular realm is susceptable to
> scientific inquiry.

Yes, that makes sense.  But by the same token, it would seem to follow that
once a new set of meanings for science, causation etc has been developed,
and once we have established that these revised concepts indeed apply to
another field (bear with me for a moment), there is no reason why we must
continue to hold that our new philosophy of science is locked forever to
its field of origin (in the present case, experimentation in the natural
sciences)--it may very well be derived in some other way.  It may even be
derivable without reference to any particular science at all.  I think this
is roughly what RB does in *Dialectic*.  I don't believe this would make CR
an *a priori* theory--for one thing, were that the case, then developments
in a particular field could have little or no effect on CR generally (as
some of you will remember, I've argued that Bhaskar's theory of signs is
unsatisfactory and that a better approach has significant implications for
CR as a whole; and it's clear that feminism has had an impact upon it,
presumably not just Hilary Wainwright).  In any case, one might say my
focus has been on the "next step," but perhaps that's because in the course
of my own research I've already become convinced of CR's merits in social
and cultural fields.  That transition does seem to be the sticking point in
the present discussion, though: do the revised concepts of science apply to
the social realm, and if so, why?  But I tend to think that once we've
obtained our revised concepts of science, the shoe really is on the other
foot: what justification is there for an ontological dualism such that the
natural and social sciences require radically different concepts of powers,
tendences, causality, etc.?

---
Tobin Nellhaus
nellhaus-AT-gwi.net
"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce



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