Date: Fri, 29 Aug 1997 12:40:12 -0400 (EDT)
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
Subject: Re: BHA: new dialectics and CR


Andrew,  English Bitter???, dear god, this discussion will surely require
something much stronger, at least a Portor or Stout!!!

Seriously, we will have to quickly get more specific about many issues.  For
example, before i thought that you had much more pragmatic interpretation of
Bhaksar, but now i believe that i simply disagree with your understanding of
the relationship between the non-actual and actual.

Four main points:

(1) is your statement that for CR "'forms' must, paradoxically, define
absolute fixed points".  i completely disagree with this, first it is not my
understanding of Bhaskar himself, nor do i believe this to be necessaited as
a CR.  Certainly Bhaskar is committed to the idea that we come to know of
structure from the 'forms of appearance' or the realm of the actual.  But
this does not necessarily mean that these forms could not be otherwise.  

For example we come to observe the phenomena of a falling rate of profit.  As
CR, among other traditions, we may understand that the falling rate of profit
can only be explained from underlying structures and mechanisms.  Now we have
come to know that the the mechanisms causing FROP has to do with behavior of
particular groups of individuals (btw these are not simply Marxian
commitment, i am talking much more general than specifically Marxian!).  Now
as CR or Structurationist we understand that individual behavior has a
particular relationship with the soical structures and human institutions.  

o.k. in this example i have moved from a phenomena (FROP) toward possible
underlying mechanisms and structures.  Now if no longer is there an empirical
existence of FROP, this does not mean that the structures themselves no
longer exist.  Rather, we could (and should) expect that other structures and
mechanisms are now involved.  We may not have a ready explanation about this,
so must hypothesize about it.  

Moreover, we can come to know of the underlying structures by way of other
phenomenal forms.  

My point simply being that 'forms' do not necessarily "define absolute fixed
points for critical realism".   If this is Bhaskar's position i would
disagree, but i do not believe this to be Bhaskar's position!

Bhaskar's position has to do with a response to the idealist constructions of
the development of science itself (e.g. Kuhn and Feyerabend).  What is
relatively enduring is not the forms, but the structures themselves ... which
leds to (2).

(2) and still very much related to (1) is that the ontological distinction
between actual and non-actual is a philosophical distinction, or as Bhaskar
calls it, a philosophical ontology.  The relationship between the two realms
is very often internally related.  In the non-actual would belong the ways of
acting of specific things or structures.  It is the realm of pure being.
 But, nothing exist by itself, so its tendency will be different depending on
other things and structures in existence, or of course in fact absent!!!

The internal relation between different things, structures and mechanisms and
their respective "powers" and "liabilities" will determine the phenomena that
manifests.  If the structures and mechanisms change, or the "powers" or
liablities" are transformed, so will the forms which manifest or appear.

(3) turns the attention toward new dialectics.  my critique of Smith is not
his Logic of Marx's capital, as i said i do believe that he has discovered
something very important about Marx's mode of presentation.  Rather i am very
critical of this (merely) re-ordering of categories.  Now if a science is
mature, and does not have the existence of too many absent categories, a
re-ordering can very much make sense of the object.  For example, Marx
believed that (Classical) political economy had the all the categories needed
to make sense of the structure he dubbed "capitalism".  Now if Smith is
correct Marx's relatively uncritical accepts the categories of political
economy re-orders them so to make sense of the concrete in ways that
political economy itself had failed.

Now very important is that Marx makes a distinction between vulgar and
classical political economy.  In short,  vulgar pe had too many absent
categories to preform a re-ordering of categories.  

i would suggest also that neo-classical economics also suffers from too many
absent categories, which is not to say that marginalism itself is not a
fruitful scientific approach to understanding particular phenomena.  However,
the new dialectical social theory which Smith insist on, would have great
limitations if one where to begin with neo-classical text books.  Actually
this is the entire problem in economics in the U.S. mainstream!  Which is
also a great limitation for the method of new dialectics in general.

We must introduce new, and sometimes old (i.e. the category of Surplus)
categories to make sense of the world.

But again in short, my point is that the advantage here is toward CR, and its
perhaps its greatest strength, (and also, for Ralph a major contribution of
Bhaskar himself ) the explanation of scientific activity and the development
of science (i.e. the dialectic of science to be found in the pages of RTS, i
can be much more specific if there is interest).

(4) yes, i do believe new dialectics, especially Smith, Murray and Postone to
have Marx right.  moreover, i am very suspect of critical realists you claim
Marx himself is a critical realist (passively Bhaskar) and those claiming
that post-Keynesians are critical realists (Lawson).  This is to give these
traditions to much credit.  But certainly it is the existence of certain
traditions which made the development of critical realism possible.

The point however, is that like Althusser (beyond his lies), Smith, Murray
and Postone are expert scholars of Marx, and have perhaps understood Marx
philosophical commitments and weaknesses better than anyone.  However, it is
a different story to suggest that Marx himself developed the best method to
social science currently available.  For this i believe we must rather rely
on modern philosophy of science.  Now what is quite interesting is the
similarities between Marx's implicit commitments, explicit comments and
contemporary philosophy of science.  But we should still be quite careful on
being too generous toward Marx, this is a tendency of Bhaskar (i think).

that is all for now, i look forward to further discussion, and wish all the
success to a happy and fruitful conference.  i am sorry i was unable to
attend:-(

hans d.


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