Date: Tue, 05 Aug 1997 22:26:09
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Subject: Re: BHA: Non-experimental science (was "What must the ...")


1. Marshall criticized my statement "Such a theory is labeled ideological 
only if acceptance has demonstrable causes unrelated to its truth."  Aside 
from other defects in that statement, I should have said that a theory is 
labeled ideological only if acceptance demonstably has ONLY causes unrelated 
to its truth.  A non-ideological theory can certainly have causes unrelated 
to its truth, but it should have SOME causes related to its truth.  At least 
that is what I had in mind at the time.  So no question that Capital or any 
theory has causes independent of its truth, and no question that that alone 
does not make it ideological.  Marshall also comments: "It's hard to imagine 
a theory that IN NO WAY is caused by the world as it is."  I completely 
agree; I did not express myself well.  

2. I really wanted to say we call a theory ideological when it is accepted 
for the wrong reasons, where "wrong reason" needs to be unpacked.  But I 
neglected to consider that not just any wrong reaon will make a theory 
ideological.  Accepting a theory solely because you caught a virus would not 
make it ideological, but accepting it solely because you gain power and 
wealth would. So "wrong reason" needs to be doubly unpacked.  I don't think 
I need to do so, because I am not attempting a theroy of ideology, I merely 
believe that any good theory of ideology can be summarized loosely in those 
terms.

3. I'm not so sure "that no account of the production or acceptance of 
science can treat it as strictly a rational activity.".  Rationality is some 
kind of process that links causally to the world (not counting pure logic) 
and is arguably captured by causal analysis of intellectual production.
However, I 
would distinguish between theory production and rationality.  Theories can 
arise from a variety of causes (a dream, a virus, etc.), but the rational 
process of testing them against reality is where I think the analysis of 
intellectual production is important.  In any case, that distinction was not 
present in the remarks Marshall is criticizing.

4.
>If NSF funding plus advances in electronics let you use an electron
>microscope to study the wierd virus I mentioned before, would your
>subsequent beliefs about the virus be knowledge?  If instead, you had other
>beliefs because you used computer simulation rather than the microscope,
>would both sets of beliefs be knowledge?

To the first question: yes, if those beliefs were acquired appropriately 
("appropriate" of course needs to be unpacked).  To the second question: the 
beliefs from the computer simulation might also be knowledge, if you had 
enough antecedent information.  Of course, the two sets of beliefs might 
conflict and force a resolution (the model was faulty, or did not fit the 
information as thought, or the electron microscope was faulty, etc.).

5. 
>I see several problems here.  First, how could we know if the thing
>under study "causes" the theory without having some theory about the thing
>to begin with.  In other words, isn't this circular in some sense.  

Suppose we are dealing with racism and propose that some set of social 
conditions cause racist ideology to be adopted.  What would be circular 
about that (assuming the social conditions are spelled out)?

6. 
>BTW.  What do you mean by related, and how do you know if something is
>related without making reference to the theory?  Since you want to know
>about relatedness to judge the theory's status, it seems you must know
>about relatedness independent of the theory.  But by your account, this
>would render your account of relatedness to be ideological itself since
>your theory of relatedness is now independent of the thing it relatedness
>is about.

A good point.  I think the answer is that one can accuse a theory 
of being caused by things unrelated to its truth only when you have an 
alternative theory (via ideology critique) from which to judge and asses the 
truth of the former.

7.  My comments suffer from failure to distinguish a theory being
ideological from acceptance of a theory being ideological.  Even a true
theory can be put to ideological uses.  One would have to spend a lot of
time sorting all this out.

At 07:22 AM 8/5/97 -0400, you wrote:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
>At 09:46 PM 8/4/97, Louis wrote:
>>Marshll,
>>
>>You quote me
>>
>>>>of which science offers (allegedly) a better explanation.  Such a
theory is
>>>>labeled ideological only if acceptance has demonstrable causes
unrelated to
>>>>its truth.
>>
>>and ask:
>>
>>>Do you mean there are causes that produce the theory or that the theory
>>>causes something else?
>>
>>I am talking about causes of theories, but the question makes sense to me
>>only if you omit the last four words from the quote, namely "unrelated to
>>its truth."
>
>Well, atomic theory might "cause" construction of atom bombs iff the theory
>is true.
>
>>
>>>Either way, it's hard to think of any theory whose own production does not
>>>have causes and that itself does not have an impact on the world.  The
>>>theory in _Capital_ is a good example.  Does this make it ideological?
>>
>>No, a theory having a cause does not make it ideological, not did I say so.
>>Your subsequent statment that "the possibility of causes underlying the
>>production and acceptance of scientific explanations necessarily temper any
>>claims about science's rationality" leads me to think that you yourself are
>>claiming that a theory's having a cause makes it ideological.  Be that as it
>>may, I was not speaking of causes of theories generally, rather about causes
>>unrelated to the truth of the theories.
>
>Well, I think _Capital_ had causes independent of its truth.  For me,
>ideology has to do with the nature of the reasoning rather than its causes.
> A wierd virus might cause me to think a certain way about economics, but
>my economic theory will still stand or fall on its own merits.
>
>My comment about causes of theories tempering their rationality simply
>implies that no account of the production or acceptance of science can
>treat it as strictly a rational activity.
>
>>
>>One thing I have in mind is the causal theory of knowledge, which states
>>that in order to have knowledge, as opposed to a true belief, my belief must
>>have been caused by that part of the world my belief is about (so knowledge
>>is not true belief, nor even justified true belief).
>
>If NSF funding plus advances in electronics let you use an electron
>microscope to study the wierd virus I mentioned before, would your
>subsequent beliefs about the virus be knowledge?  If instead, you had other
>beliefs because you used computer simulation rather than the microscope,
>would both sets of beliefs be knowledge?
>
>
>>  I see the same kind of
>>thing at work with theories: a theory should  be labeled ideological if its
>>production in no way was caused by the way the world is.
>
>It's hard to imagine a theory that IN NO WAY is caused by the world as it
>is.  I see several problems here.  First, how could we know if the thing
>under study "causes" the theory without having some theory about the thing
>to begin with.  In other words, isn't this circular in some sense.  Second,
>a theory might, in some way, be "caused" by the thing it understands and
>yet have other causes as well.  Your original formulation called the latter
>ideology too.  Third, many theories we might call ideology are in fact
>caused by the thing they are about.  Marx's account of value is a good
>example of a theory that explains how certain things, i.e., commodities,
>cause the ideology of commodity fetishism, value, etc.  Similarly, one
>might argue that religion is an ideology caused by humanity's place in the
>world, but religion is about humanity's place in the world.  In short, I
>don't see how to apply your criteria to most examples of ideology.
>
>>I have trouble with the rest of what you raise, because it seems to me that
>>it is concerned with the limits inherent in the process of rationality.  We
>>should not be surprised that our ideas have causes, nor that it may be
>>difficult to produce rational justifications for (or refutations against)
>>them that rise above those limitations.  Nevertheless, that is just what
>>occurs and is what RB's notion of ideology critique attempts to capture.
>>That is sort of what I was aiming at in speaking of causes of a theory
>>unrelated to its truth in opposition to causes generally of a theory.
>
>Well, I'd probably say a theory's truth or ideological status does not
>depend on its causes.  I can imagine a true or non-ideological theory being
>caused by things unrelated to its truth, just as I can imagine a false or
>ideological one being caused by things related to its truth.
>
>BTW.  What do you mean by related, and how do you know if something is
>related without making reference to the theory?  Since you want to know
>about relatedness to judge the theory's status, it seems you must know
>about relatedness independent of the theory.  But by your account, this
>would render your account of relatedness to be ideological itself since
>your theory of relatedness is now independent of the thing it relatedness
>is about.
>
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>---------
>Marshall Feldman, Associate Professor		                marsh-AT-uriacc.uri.edu
>Graduate Curriculum in Community Planning and Area Development	401/874-5953
>The University of Rhode Island					401/874-5511 (FAX)
>94 West Alumni Avenue, Suite 1; Kingston, RI 02881-0806
>
>
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