Date: Fri, 08 Aug 97 11:30:42 -0700
To: <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU>
Subject: Re[2]: BHA: Non-experimental science (was "What must the ...



I realized I made some blunders in my reply to Colm.  First, I 
misstated G: it should assert that "genetic factors pertaining to race 
ARE THOUGHT TO differentially determine powers and capabilities."  
Without that correction, T2' becomes controversial because it requires 
the truth of G.  My statement that "we probably all agree that G is 
false" is only correct for the uncorrected version of G.  Presumably 
we would accept the corrected version as applying to the hypothetical 
society under consideration.  The exaggerated version of T2' needs 
similar emendation.

Second, I neglected to make it clear why the contrast between T1 and 
T2 beaks down.  T2 is straightforwardly false, so it is irrelevant 
whether it is ideological or not; therefore the circularity involved 
in trying to compare the ideological T2 with the scientific T1 has no 
chance to arise.

I apologize for inflicting the revised version below on you.
 
CORRECTED AND REVISED VERSION
------------------------------------------------------------- 

Colm,

There are some problems with T2.  It has the form

  (T2) G is true; and G causes R

where G states that genetic factors pertaining to race differentially 
determine powers and capabilities, and R asserts that racism is 
inevitable or likely.  As stated, T2 is plainly false, because G alone 
cannot support the conclusion R.  To see this it is sufficient to note 
that G could be true yet no one knows or believes it to be.  To make R 
inevitable or likely we have to strengthen G to say that genetic 
factors pertaining to race ARE THOUGHT TO differentially determine 
powers and capabilities, and R asserts that racism is inevitable or 
likely.  

T2 is still plainly false, because G alone still cannot support the 
conclusion R. To see this, suppose the powers and capabilities which 
are alleged to be genetically determined are not in any way thought to 
be inferior, or if they are, suppose that all or most have a remedy.  
In that case racism would not be inevitable: perhaps the society does 
not regard the differences as invidious, or if they do, then they try 
to remedy them.  So we need to strengthen G to say that certain traits 
thought to be invidious and irremediable are genetically (and only 
genetically) caused.

Even if G involves genetic differences that were judged (in the society 
considered) to be both inferior and irremediable, racism need not be 
inevitable or even likely.  For example, consider mental 
characteristics of brain-damaged people, and suppose G is concerned 
with such characteristics when they are produced by genetic properties 
rather than brain damage.  I doubt anyone on this list would feel 
brain-damaged people should be subject to discrimination, so why would 
we feel that the alleged genetic cause of similar impairment should 
lead to discrimination?  Our reaction shows that G alone need not lead 
to R.

In many quarters G would indeed be likely to lead to racism, but in order to 
ensure that you have to add other empirical features about society. So you 
might alter T2 to state that

  (T2') G and S are true; and G and S together cause R

where S is some set of social characteristics.  

Now there is no opportunity for racism to arise in the absence of targets, 
which is what G provides.  For if there are thought to be no genetically 
caused inferior and irremediable traits, there does not seem to be a basis 
for racism. So it is difficult to argue that G is not part of the premisses 
of any adequate theory of racism as well, including T1, which we may 
therefore frame as:

  (T1) S' and G are true; and S' and G together cause R.

where S' is some set of social conditions.  T1 and T2 wind up being formally 
identical, since they differ only over the social conditions (S vs.. S').
So it is hard to see how either could qualify as ideological. 

Now why was T2 thought to be ideological at all?  For it now appears to be a 
theory that might indeed be (social) scientific, and even one who deplores 
racism of any kind could accept it as true.  To see this, here is an 
exaggerated version of T2': "If certain traits thought to be invidious and 
irremediable were thought to be genetically caused, and if the values of 
Hitler were to prevail in a society, then that society would become racist."  
We probably all agree that the genetic theory G imputes to the society in 
question is false, nevertheless G itself seems to be non-ideological.  (Maybe 
it is really but not in the gross way we may have started thinking T2 was.)

But if T2' is not ideological, there is a good chance that the original 
version is, namely 

  (T2) G is true; and G causes R

really would be ideological if it did not respond to the kind of argument I 
presented to show it needed to be modified.  The presence of genetically 
caused differences, even if irremediable and regarded as inferior, is not 
sufficient to lead to racism.  Additional social characteristics, with their 
own set of causes, also need to be imputed.  Of course the T2 theorist could 
claim that those social characteristics are in turn genetically determined.

Now if this long-winded analysis is correct, the contrast you were trying 
to make breaks down.  T2 is straightforwardly false, so it is irrelevant 
whether it is ideological or not; therefore the circularity involved in 
trying to compare the ideological T2 with the scientific T1 has no chance 
to arise.  I am curious as to whether the distinction you were aiming at 
can be made with a modified example.

You ask:

>My conclusion, on having scrutinised the above conditions, is that for 
>us to declare an opposing theory 'ideological' we must already be in 
>possession of a theory that is 'scientific'. But is this anything more 
>than begging the question? 

I say there is no circularity, because the criterion for a theory to be 
scientific is not that it fails to be ideological.  Bhaskar lays out a 
broad theory of science first, then afterwards discusses ideology.  His 
theory of science does not rely on a concept of ideology.

You also note:

>Both T2 and T1 possess
>ontological depth so the issue cannot be one of ontological depth but 
>rather of how to determine the superiority of one theory relative to 
>another.

RB is very clear that there can be competing depth explanations, most of 
which have to be ruled out in the process of science.  Ideology can of 
course stand in the way of that progress, but there is no reason an 
ideology cannot be an incorrect depth explanation (such as racist theories 
based on genetics).

You complain about RB's epistemic relativism.  My view is that this would 
better be called "conceptual relativism", but in any case it still does 
seem you are trying to use his epistemic relativism to accuse him of some 
sort of judgemental relativism, which he clearly opposes.

Louis Irwin

------------------------------------------------------------ 
At 01:48 PM 8/7/97 GMT+0200, you wrote:
>Hi again, still harping on the theme of epistemological relativism 
>....
>
>Suppose we have two theories T1 and T2 about racism.  T1 says that 
>racism has been brought about in society as a result of the 
>configuration and reproduction of particular sets of social relations. 
>T2, on the other hand, asserts that racism is inevitable because 
>'race' as a genetic fact really does exist and determines the 
>differential powers and capabilities held by different groups of 
>people within society.
>
>T1 presupposes a supra-individual world in which social relations of 
>ethnicity and class are the key explanatory elements , whereas T2 
>presupposes an ontology of atomistic individuals with pre-determined 
>genetic makeup constituting the basis of its explanatory framework. 
>
>Now Bhaskar's offers the following guidelines for choosing between 
>competing theories on the basis of the principle of judgemental 
>rationality. He argues that we can still sustain the notion of a 
>rational choice between theories;
>
> For we can allow that a theory T1 is preferable to theory T2, even if 
> they are incommensurable, provided that T1 can explain under its
> description almost all of the phenomena T2 can explain under its
> description plus some significant phenomena that T2 cannot explain.
> The possibility of saying this depends on the explicit recognition of 
> a philosophical ontology .... For to say of two theories that they
> conflict, clash, or are in competition, presupposes that there is 
> something - a domain of the real - over which they clash (Bhaskar 
> 1989b: 19).
>
>Now, my question is, whilst it is an article of faith for all realists 
>that there must be some philosophical ontology underlying competing 
>theories about events or processes, given the weak discriminatory 
>potential of Bhaskar's epistemology (ie. his stance of epistemic 
>relativism) how are we to employ the structured philosophical ontology 
>that he has derived from experimental practice in making our choice 
>between T1 and T2? After all, even competing accounts of the 
>experimental practice of physics do not simply differ at the level of 
>their theoretical descriptions of the world, but also in their 
>accounts of its ontological make-up (as demonstrated by Kuhn and 
>Feyerabend). 
>
>This is exactly the case in the example of racism (above) where we 
>have two competing ontologies; an ontology of atomistic individuals in 
>T2, and; an ontology of supra-individual social relations in T1. 
>
>Any judgement as to the 'ideological' nature of T2, however, would 
>have to presuppose the 'scientificity' of T1 - a move which cannot be 
>sustained on the basis of a stance of epistemological relativism. My 
>reasoning is as follows ....
>
>According to RB a system of beliefs may be characterised as 
>'ideological' if, and only if, three types of criteria are satisfied. 
>These criteria he calls 'critical', 'explanatory' and 'categorial', 
>respectively, and his procedure might be enumerated after the 
>following fashion:
>
>1)        One must possess a theory (T1) which explains most, or the most 
>significant, phenomena under its own descriptions, explained by the 
>ideological theory (T2). It must in addition be able to explain a 
>significant set of phenomena not explained by the ideological theory.
>
>2)         This theory (T1) should also be able to explain the reproduction 
>of the 'ideology' in question (T2), that is the reasons for its
>continued acceptance by social agents. If possible, it should also 
>specify the limits of the proposed ideology and the conditions for its 
>transformation. Specifically, it should explain these limits in terms 
>of some generative structure, or set of relations, which it is capable 
>of accounting for, but which is altogether absent from, or obscured 
>within, the proposed ideology.
>
>3)        The proposed ideological theory (T2) must be unable to satisfy a 
>criteria of scientificity (this material is not quoted verbatim, for
>the original see PON, 1989, p 67/8). 
>
>My conclusion, on having scrutinised the above conditions, is that for 
>us to declare an opposing theory 'ideological' we must already be in 
>possession of a theory that is 'scientific'. But is this anything more 
>than begging the question? That is:
>
>'How do we know T2 is ideological?' .... 'It explains less than T1 
>which is scientific' 'Well, then how do we come to explain the 
>scientificity of T1?' .... 'It explains more than T2 which is 
>ideological'.
>
>Before I am accused of caricature let me add that for RB the ability 
>to explain the conditions of the reproduction of some set of 
>ideological beliefs would assign to T1 a specific type of cognitive 
>superiority in that this form of explanation possesses an ontological 
>depth lacking in any ideology (ibid. p 68).
>
>In terms of this fuller picture the above question as to what it is 
>that makes a 'scientific' theory un-ideological would now invoke the 
>answer that;
> 'it can explain more than the ideological theory, and demonstrate its 
> necessity', and what's more , 'it must have ontological depth'. 
>In other words, as I understand it, it must make reference to the 
>causal powers of some underlying structure or generative mechanism. 
>
>But my point is that there will always be more than one theory whose 
>claim it is to do this much. In the example of racism this generative 
>mechanism could be either the micro-structures of genetic constitution 
>or the structures of social relations. Both T2 and T1 possess 
>ontological depth so the issue cannot be one of ontological depth but 
>rather of how to determine the superiority of one theory relative to 
>another. We cannot escape the issue of epistemological judgements and 
>in this regard Bhaskar's articulation of 'judgemental rationality' (in 
>conjunction with epistemic relativism) does not, in my opinion, 
>provide a sufficient basis for asserting the generalisability of his 
>structured ontology, or for that matter, even a defence of the 
>derivation of this ontology.
>
>I think that at least a part of the problem with Bhaskar's weak 
>epistemology has to do with his failure to elaborate a theory of truth 
>consistent with the boldness of his ontological derivations (at least 
>within his earlier works of RTS and PON).
>
>Bhaskar has rightly, to my mind, taken on board the basic insight of 
>post-structural linguistics and post-analytical philosophy that we can 
>only ever speak of our knowledge of the ontological entities of 
>reality in the terms of some language. But this recognition (that we 
>can only have access to reality through discourse) does not, and 
>should not, entail the adoption of epistemological relativism. Nor 
>ontological relativism. It simply forces us to recognise that our 
>knowledge is always open to correction and revision. It is 
>spatio-temporally specific and fallible. 
>
>Yet, the acknowledgement that there can be no final truth does not 
>make the concept of truth itself any less important. It is only on the 
>basis of a theory of truth that we are provided with the normative 
>rationale for posing questions about the degree to which a discourse 
>can be said to convey information about, or knowledge of, the real 
>world. We need a stronger concept of truth, and a stronger epistemic 
>stance than that on offer within RTS and PON, in order to combat the 
>frivolities of postmodernism generally, and specifically (here in 
>South Africa), the reproduction of an ethic of political opportunism 
>under the guise of cultural relativism.
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
~~~~
>Colm Allan                                                Tel: (0461) 318 361 
>Department of Sociology                           Fax: (0461) 25570
>and Industrial Sociology                            e-mail 
scca-AT-warthog.ru.ac.za
>Rhodes University
>Grahamstown, 6140
>South Africa
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
~~~~
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- 
>
>



     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---





     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---