To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 13:31:48 GMT+0200
Subject: Re: Re[2]: BHA: Non-experimental science (was "What must the ...


Louis

Thanks for your comments. I am trying hard to think through the
implications of RB's epistemological stance for the generalisability
of  his ontological derivations regarding both nature and society. In
particular the contrast I was trying to make within my example
concerns how to compare two theories which entail different
ontological assumptions whilst adhering to the precepts of epistemic
relativism. I suppose the contrast I was trying to effect was that
between a critical realist (T1) and an uncritical racist (T2).

In this vein I can appreciate the modifications that you make to the
logical presentation of the example. However, introducing an element
of logic and (what we might consider) enlightened common sense to the
argument advanced by a proponent of racism (T2) is, I think, besides
the point.  Your restatement of T2 as 

T2' G and S are true: and G and S together cause R

where genetics together with social characteristics would be seen as
causing racism similarly misses the point of my original contrast. One
of the characteristic features of the racist account of differential
group achievement is their collapse of social differences into genetic
differences. In these terms racists would see a straightforward line
of causation between G and R and would be at pains to deny any role to
S. (In fact they would probably assert that genetics cause =91race' and 
=91race' leads differential achievement de facto and would not describe 
these assertions as =91racism').

Coming at the whole issue of racism from a realist point of view, 
however, we would of course want to challenge the notion that 
peoples differential levels of achievement are predetermined by their 
inherent genetic makeup. We could argue from the scientific findings 
of top geneticists that no such connection between genes and 
intelligence has been scientifically established but, this might go 
either way as, the racist might simply retort that this connection 
has not =91yet' been scientifically established. 

I personally would think that the easiest way of debunking the racist 
argument, from a realist point of view, would be to assert that its 
presuppositions are inconsistent with the ontology presupposed by the 
reproduction of any social phenomenon. For any social phenomenon such 
as racism to be reproduced presupposes the existence of social 
relations of ethnicity and class. Any explanation for racism then, 
that fails to make reference to social relations, I would assert, is 
quite plainly false (=91ideological' is another argument altogether - 
I'm not sure I'd even need it given this approach). The assumption of 
an ontology of atomistic individuals would be quite sufficient for me 
to dismiss the entire racist argument.

But this sounds like a self-contradiction, so what exactly is my
problem? What am I claiming to be able to do here that Bhaskar
couldn't, and wouldn't, have done himself. 

My argument is that Bhaskar's stance of epistemological relativism
prevents him from asserting the inevitability of an ontology of
structured social relations in the social realm in exactly the same
way as it prevents him from asserting the generalisability of his 
philosophical ontology (of generative mechanisms and 
structures) within the natural realm. I previously argued that RB 
cannot defend his decision to subject experimentation to 
transcendental analysis, and derive an ontology from this 
intelligible practice, rather than,  say, the equally intelligible 
practice of Witchcraft (whose proponents claim is successful) on 
the basis of this epistemic stance. Judgemental rationalism is of no 
use here, in my opinion, because it offers no guidelines as how best 
to choose between competing ontological accounts of the world. To 
repeat RB's quote

 =91For we can allow that a theory T1 is preferable to theory T2, even
 if they are incommensurable, provided that T1 can explain under its
 description almost all of the phenomena T2 can explain under its
 description plus some significant phenomena that T2 cannot explain.
 The possibility of saying this depends on the explicit recognition of
 a philosophical ontology .... For to say of two theories that they
 conflict, clash, or are in competition, presupposes that there is
 something - a domain of the real - over which they clash' (Reclaiming
 Reality, p 19).

My point is that the stance of judgemental rationalism is only useful
if we assume, RB does here, a single and relatively enduring ontology 
(which I take to be precisely the point of the realist argument - how 
else are we to advance criticisms of competing theories if we are to 
allow them the concession of an alternative and separate ontological 
realm?). The minute we are confronted with the need to choose between 
two competing ontological schemas, then the increased explanatory 
power of T1 over T2 breaks down completely. As I said in my previous 
post this is what I take to be the case in the example of racism  
where we have a contrast between an ontology of atomistic but 
genetically differentiated individuals in T2, and; an ontology of 
social relations in T1. 

I think that the stance of epistemic relativism completely undermines 
the normative force of realist arguments and blunts their critical 
edge. Worse, I think a case can be made out to the effect that this 
stance ultimately concedes ontology to relativism. What I take to be 
some of the excessively charitable consequences of adopting such a 
weak epistemological stance might be something as follows;

> Now why was T2 thought to be ideological at all?  For it now appears to be a 
> theory that might indeed be (social) scientific, and even one who deplores 
> racism of any kind could accept it as true.  To see this, here is an 
> exaggerated version of T2': "If certain traits thought to be invidious and 
> irremediable were thought to be genetically caused, and if the values of 
> Hitler were to prevail in a society, then that society would become racist."  
> We probably all agree that the genetic theory G imputes to the society in 
> question is false, nevertheless G itself seems to be non-ideological.  (Maybe 
> it is really but not in the gross way we may have started thinking T2 was.)
 
There is one other point that you make that I would like to 
comment on. You assert 

> I say there is no circularity, because the criterion for a theory to be 
> scientific is not that it fails to be ideological.  Bhaskar lays out a 
> broad theory of science first, then afterwards discusses ideology.  His 
> theory of science does not rely on a concept of ideology.

This may well be the case, but, as I understand it,  what I was 
arguing is the reverse. RB's theory of ideology clearly does depend 
on the viability of his philosophy of science. What I am concerned 
with is the generalisability of his ontological derivations on the 
basis of the principle of epistemological relativism. If I am right, 
and RB cannot adequately defend the generalisability of these 
ontological derivations this would certainly have a serious impact on 
his theory of ideology and on his claims to 'critical' realism.

Thanks again for your comments

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Colm Allan                                                Tel: (0461) 318 361
Department of Sociology                           Fax: (0461) 25570
and Industrial Sociology                            e-mail scca-AT-warthog.ru.ac.za
Rhodes University
Grahamstown, 6140
South Africa
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


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