Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 21:45:03
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
From: Louis Irwin <lirwin1-AT-ix.netcom.com>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: BHA: Non-experimental science (was "What must the


Colm,

Just a few replies to your comments.  I think your core issue is in 5.
below, but what I say there is short and will not satisfy you.  I need to
ponder thae matter more, but I suspect some others on the list will have
some things to say about it.

1. You suggest that "introducing an element of logic and (what we might
consider) enlightened common sense to the argument advanced by a proponent
of racism (T2) is, I think, besides the point."  I agree with that in so
far as the racist is likely to be irrational.  But if the racist ignores
enlighteneed common sense and logic, why should we think s/he will respond
better to a realist argument?  Who is the audience of the argument?  It has
to be someone who is rational (even if racist) and who therefore would be
able to respond to the logic and common sense I tried to apply.  Someone
who does not respond to those will certainly not respond to an argument
based on CR, where you claim RB is weak.  Being able to argue that racism's
"presuppositions are inconsistent with the ontology presupposed by the
reproduction of any social phenomenon" surely cannot be any more effective.
 Still, I agree it is important to clarify the status of racism in this way.

2. You argue that my "restatement of T2 ... where genetics together with
social 
characteristics would be seen as causing racism similarly misses the point 
of my original contrast. One of the characteristic features of the racist 
account of differential group achievement is their collapse of social 
differences into genetic differences. In these terms racists would see a 
straightforward line of causation between G and R and would be at pains to 
deny any role to S. (In fact they would probably assert that genetics cause 
‘race' and ‘race' leads differential achievement de facto and would not 
describe these assertions as ‘racism')."  My point was that by ignoring the 
social characteristics they would be manifestly irrational.  You would not
need critical realism to argue that.  Incidentally, the role of S would
include CR mechanisms and the like, including explanation of the
irrationality that is manifest in holding on to T2 unmodified.

3. T2 was not intended to be a theory that justifies racism, it was
intended to 
be a theory that explains the existence of racism.  You had T2 assert 
that "racism is inevitable because race as a genetic fact really does exist 
and determines the differential powers and capabilities held by different 
groups of people within society."  Its conclusion that racism is inevitable 
is neutral from a sociological point of view, and I pointed out that simple 
logic and common sense is sufficient to show the conclusion does not follow 
from the premisses.  If you alter T2 to have its conclusion be that racism 
is justifiable, you have a radically different argument that will be 
complicated by the introduction of moral evaluation in the premisses.  
Further, If you alter T2 this way, then the original contrast with T1 is 
lost, since I don't think you were envisaging T1 as a theory that justifies 
racism!  In retrospect I suspect you may have equivocated between these two 
readings of T2.

4. I agree that "Coming at the whole issue of racism from a realist point of 
view, however, we would of course want to challenge the notion that 
people's differential levels of achievement are predetermined by their 
inherent genetic makeup. We could argue from the scientific findings 
of top geneticists that no such connection between genes and 
intelligence has been scientifically established but, this might go 
either way as, the racist might simply retort that this connection 
has not ‘yet' been scientifically established."   I would point out that it 
is important to fight racism at several levels.  We do want to refute the 
claims of inferior traits based on genetics.  But it is also important to 
clarify that even if those claims could be substantiated, the inevitability 
or justifiability of racism would not follow.


5. 

>My point is that the stance of judgemental rationalism is only useful
>if we assume, RB does here, a single and relatively enduring ontology 
>(which I take to be precisely the point of the realist argument - how 
>else are we to advance criticisms of competing theories if we are to 
>allow them the concession of an alternative and separate ontological 
>realm?). The minute we are confronted with the need to choose between 
>two competing ontological schemas, then the increased explanatory 
>power of T1 over T2 breaks down completely. As I said in my previous 
>post this is what I take to be the case in the example of racism  
>where we have a contrast between an ontology of atomistic but 
>genetically differentiated individuals in T2, and; an ontology of 
>social relations in T1. 
>
>I think that the stance of epistemic relativism completely undermines 
>the normative force of realist arguments and blunts their critical 
>edge. Worse, I think a case can be made out to the effect that this 
>stance ultimately concedes ontology to relativism. 

I am only just starting to see what is bothering you in your recent posts.
You are suggesting there might be cases of competing theories, each with
attendent competing ontologies.  While we, adhering to our ontology, see
some T1 as superior to some T2, the other society, adhering to their
ontology, might see T2 as superior to T1.  If the two societies have no
common ontology, or at least have sufficiently different ontologies, how
can judgemental rationality be applied?  Judgemental rationality can be
effective in deciding between T1 and T2 only if there is a sufficiently
shared ontology.  Is that more or less what is driving you here?

Now RB does not use ontology as a starting point and erect theories on top
of it.  Ontologies are presuppositions of theories.  So part of judgemental
rationality in evaluating competing theories T1 and T2 will have to include
consideration of their respectively presupposed ontologies.  In your
original example it appeared that T1 and T2 have disjunct ontologies, but I
believe that my analysis of T2 served to show that the appearance is
illusory.  T2 as originally stated with its atomistic ontology has not a
chance, and what it needs to turn it into even a superficially plausible
theory makes it much more like T1.

In any event, I am going to let others comment further on this issue.

Louis




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