Date: Wed, 13 Aug 1997 23:00:30
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
From: Louis Irwin <lirwin1-AT-ix.netcom.com>
Subject: BHA: Science and witchcraft


I have re-read Colm Allan's recent posts and would like to offer a general
criticism.  First I try to sum up Colm's position in 1. - 5. below, then
say what I think is wrong in 6.

1. You find transcendental realism (TR) with its stratified and
differentiated 
ontology convincing and see how it can be used "to demonstrate how
competing accounts of science (positivist, idealist, etc.) are
unintelligible (or impossible) relative to the actual practice of
experimental science."  

2. However, you are concerned about "the justification for: 1) RB dismissing 
these competing accounts of science as ‘ideological', and; 2) his extension 
of his TR model of science to cover the social world."  Your "reasons for 
being unconvinced are epistemological rather than ontological."  Sustaining 
1) and 2) "presupposes an epistemological framework which is capable of 
demonstrating that the ‘intelligible' practice from which he derives his 
ontology (ie. experiment) really is ‘scientific'."  Put differently, the 
competing accounts are shown by TR to be unintelligible relative to the 
practice of experimental, but it remains to shown that such practice is 
superior to, say, witchcraft.

3. "Only on the basis of a clear epistemological delineation of scientific
from unscientific practice could we come to generalise the ontology
presupposed by the practice of ‘science' to the rest of society."  So we
have to justify the ontology presupposed by science and then to criticize
the competing accounts.

4. "Unfortunately, at least within his articulation of TR, Bhaskar does
not seem to furnish much by way of epistemic guidelines. In fact,
quite disappointingly, he adopts a stance of epistemological
relativism.  This stance, I think, (despite the claim to uphold
judgemental rationalism) can only but have a weakening effect on the
normative force with which many of us would like to assert depth
explanations - particularly of social phenomena - following the TR
model (and supposedly extending into CR)." 

"For instance, how, given a stance of epistemic relativism, could we
defend the structured ontology presupposed by the ‘intelligible'
practice of experiment from competing ontologies presupposed by
similarly ‘intelligible' practices such as witchcraft or astrology? ...the 
actual practice of witchcraft (ie. the consulting of sangoma's and the
casting of bones etc.), would certainly presuppose a different (even
if still, structured) ontology to that of experimental science."

5. "RB cannot defend his decision to subject experimentation to 
transcendental analysis, and derive an ontology from this 
intelligible practice, rather than,  say, the equally intelligible 
practice of Witchcraft (whose proponents claim is successful) on 
the basis of this epistemic stance.  Judgemental rationalism is of no use 
here ... because it offers no guidelines as how best to choose competing 
ontological accounts of the world."

6. The point is that experimental science and witchcraft are NOT equally
successful.  To think otherwise is to ignore a lot of science and
philosophy of science.  The difference in success does not rely on
demonstrating a superior ontology in advance.

Epistemic relativism says that concepts are human constructs, and there is
no fixed, universal set of concepts with which to understand the world and
formulate judgements.  That is epistemic relativism.

Now every theory presupposes some ontology.  However we do not justify 
science by proving in advance that its ontology is superior to that of 
witchcraft, thereby justifying scientific practice over witchcraft.  We must 
first demonstrate the superiority of science over witchcraft in a way that 
connects with our practical activities of predicting, curing, making tools, 
etc.  That is judgemental rationality.

We do NOT refute witchcraft by showing that its presupposed ontology 
is normatively inferior to that presupposed by the activity of experimental 
science.  We cannot refute witchcraft by remaining in our armchairs trying 
to decide why one presupposed ontology is better than another.  We need 
rather to gather information, intervene in the course of things, analyze, 
etc.  Science is a practical activity.

Now before you retort that witchcraft is also a practical activity, let me
say that in a broad sense science and witchcraft are not necessarily
disjunct in their explanatory natures.  Witchcraft is just bad science,
nevertheless it is (at least to an extent) science.  It too offers a depth
explanation for phenomena.  We refute it, NOT by showing that its
presupposed ontology is somehow inferior or unsophisticated, rather by
showing that it is wanting in various explanatory respects.  I doubt that
you are skeptical of the ability to do this, else you would not have
offered witchcraft as an example contrasting with experimental science.
You yourself must have felt that science refutes witchcraft and did so a
long while ago.  

I think you are putting too much weight on ontology in the explanatory
order of things.  It appears you are putting ontology at the base of a
foundational hierarchy upon which our notions of scientificity rest.  I do
not think that is the proper way to understand CR.

There are a lot of difficult issues here, so I hope I have not
oversimplified things too much.

Louis Irwin




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