Date: Thu, 14 Aug 1997 10:54:02 -0400
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Subject: Re: BHA: Science and witchcraft


Hi all,

Lewis wrote, with respect to "science" and "witchcraft":  "We refute it, 
[witchcraft] NOT by showing that its presupposed ontology is somehow 
inferior or unsophisticated, rather by showing that it is wanting in 
various explanatory respects."

As I understand Colm's complaint, it is precisely that the criteria for 
deciding whether a theory is "wanting in various explanatory respects," 
relative to another, are in some sense under-theorized by Bhaskar.  Have 
I put words in your mouth Colm?  I'm sympathetic to this position.

As a side, I would want to add that there is a need to be careful about 
falling into an easy pragmatism, which does not, in my view, provide an 
adequate conception of truth.  

Also, isn't it, in part at least, just by showing the implicit ontology 
to be flawed that Bhaskar rejects certain contending *philosophical* 
claims?  I think I agree that it's not the best way to go after 
competing causal accounts, but I'm not sure.  Would the grounds for such 
a differentiation here (between philosophical and causal arguments), in 
what we might call `protocol at the level of judgement' -- would the 
grounds simply be the difference in type of explanation?  the level 
of abstraction?  How would you work this up theoretically?


R.



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