Date: Thu, 14 Aug 1997 22:56:47
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Subject: Re: BHA: Science and witchcraft


Ruth,

I think your comment on pragmatism is right on the mark.  I deliberately
refrained from using the term, but I do think there are some hard issues
there. It can seem like it is only in virtue of a pragmatically successful
science that a CR ontology is derived.  I would only say that there is an
enormous literature on the philosophy of science, which RB touches on in
trying to defend judgemental rationality.  I don't have anything useful to
say about that, but I would like to make one more attempt at the
science/witchcraft issue, because I think it does not involve the pragmatic
issues taxing you and Colm.  

You ask "isn't it, in part at least, just by showing the implicit ontology
to be flawed that Bhaskar rejects certain contending *philosophical*
claims?"  Yes, you are quite right, he does develop the concept of a depth
ontology to refute competing accounts.  However, the dichotomy here
(realism vs. empiricism vs. idealism) is different in kind from the
dichotomy between science and witchcraft (which I think is a false dichotmy).

The choice between science and witchcraft must be made on quite different
grounds from the choice between realism, empiricism and idealism.  The
first sort of dichotomy is resolved by ordinary science, the second by the
philosopy of science.  CR is concerned with the second sort of choice but
has nothing to do with the first (at least in so far as witchcraft is a
causal theory about the world, as opposed to a philosophy of science).

At the most general level, scientific practice is used to argue for a
critical realist ontology.  It is important to see that adoption of CR does
not of itself rule out witchcraft as unscientific.  Witchcraft is a
specific causal theory which may well be consonent with a CR viewpoint.  CR
only rules out, e.g., a positivist witchcraft based on empirical
regularities.  What refutes witchcraft is science, not philosophy of
science, and CR is a philosophy of science, it is not itself science.

It is a mistake to think that there is, on the one hand, a scientific
ontology presupposed by experimental science and justified by CR, and, on
the other hand, an ontology presupposed by witchcraft and refuted by CR.
Part of the confusion on this matter stems, I think, from the fact that
superseded causal claims tend to appear mystical or superstitious over
time.  This confusion results in a false dichotomy between, say, science
and witchcraft.  In so far as witchcraft makes causal claims, it is
qualitatively no different from scientific theories that have held up.
That is why I think the dichotomy between science and witchcraft is a false
one.

I think this consideration, if accepted, would alleviate some of the
concerns over pragmatism.  For we don't have to think CR has to resolve
specific disputes between competing causal accounts with their presupposed
ontologies.  If you find it hard to choose between the veracity of
witchcraft and some competing theory, don't expect CR to resolve your doubt.

Louis Irwin

----------------------------------------------------------------
At 10:54 AM 8/14/97 -0400, you wrote:
>Hi all,
>
>Lewis wrote, with respect to "science" and "witchcraft":  "We refute it, 
>[witchcraft] NOT by showing that its presupposed ontology is somehow 
>inferior or unsophisticated, rather by showing that it is wanting in 
>various explanatory respects."
>
>As I understand Colm's complaint, it is precisely that the criteria for 
>deciding whether a theory is "wanting in various explanatory respects," 
>relative to another, are in some sense under-theorized by Bhaskar.  Have 
>I put words in your mouth Colm?  I'm sympathetic to this position.
>
>As a side, I would want to add that there is a need to be careful about 
>falling into an easy pragmatism, which does not, in my view, provide an 
>adequate conception of truth.  
>
>Also, isn't it, in part at least, just by showing the implicit ontology 
>to be flawed that Bhaskar rejects certain contending *philosophical* 
>claims?  I think I agree that it's not the best way to go after 
>competing causal accounts, but I'm not sure.  Would the grounds for such 
>a differentiation here (between philosophical and causal arguments), in 
>what we might call `protocol at the level of judgement' -- would the 
>grounds simply be the difference in type of explanation?  the level 
>of abstraction?  How would you work this up theoretically?
>
>
>R.
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
>


     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---