Date: Sun, 17 Aug 1997 08:59:10 -0400 (EDT)
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
Subject: Re: BHA: Science, theology and witchcraft


In a message dated 16/08/97 22:29:14 GMT,:

<< 
 At 04:49 AM 8/16/97 -0400, Michael Salter wrote:
 >1/. The textual details are: Bhaskar's "Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom"
 >1993, p. 250 where RB objects - on supposedly dialectical grounds - to
 >Adorno's criticism of attempts to either reduce objectivity to subjectivity
 >or vice-versa. RB retorts that subjectivity must "in some sense" be seen as
 >"grounded" or "overreached" by objectivity. Adorno's consistent position in
 >his Negative Dialectics 1973 and "Subject/Object" and elsewhere is that
 >reductionism is the main counter-tendency to dialectics, in that it
 >represents an eradication of mediation who consequences are as
undialectical
 >as undialectical thinking can ever get. Examples of reductionism include
 >vulgar materialism, exclusively theological explanations of natural events,
 >positivism/empiricism and racism. For RB to object to Adorno's objection to
 >reductionism - under the guide of being a better and more radical
 >dialectician - is, of itself, to fall back into what amounts to a
 >pre-dialectical position. 
 >
 >2/. Bhaskar's position does not appear to mediate between the equally
 >one-sided claims of unmediated (reductionist?) versions of materialism and
 >idealism in a manner which is as receptive to the half-truths of the latter
 >as it is to those of the former. Adorno's line is that the priority of the
 >object depends upon the subject recognising the truth that we can at least
 >imagine the existence of an object without the continued presence of a
 >subjectivity to be conscious of its presence, but we cannot even imagine a
 >subjectivity which is not already "consciousness of an object". This
 >priority, however, exists in and for the imagination; not in the dense
social
 >reality which we wake up to every morning.

LOUIS RESPONDS 
 [snip]
 
 Adorno seems to argue for a symmetry between subjectivity and objectivity.  
 From the phenomenological perspective from which that claim is made, the 
 symmetry does appear correct.  However, the phenemenological perspective is 
 not the only one.  From the perspective of naturalism, there were long 
 periods in hich the world existed without subjectivity, but the converse 
 situation is not possible.  Subjectivity evolved from a world in which there

 was no subjectivity.  It does appear that Adorno's position relies on taking

 the phenomological perspective as the sole valid point of view.  Is RB 
 really on the verge of a reduction, or is he merely pointing to the 
 assymmetry I just noted?  If so, is he criticizing Adorno for the reason I 
 just gave?
 
 IN REPLY

1/. I think your argument hinges around characterising Adorno's position as
that of "symmetry" when he follows the implications of the experiential
evidence in order to give priority to the object. A context in which one side
of an opposition is seen as having (even relative/limitied) priority over the
other is one of "assymmetry". You have inverted the ordinary meaning of this
terms; and thereby misunderstood the phenomenological claim being made by A.
I will resist the temptation to repeat what I noted in in a previous post, I
drew attention to such hermeneutical insensitivity in the "realist"
interpretation of even more or less complementary (i.e., because they are
different), traditions of dialectical thought.

2/. A Related point: what is scientific virtue to making a massive
generalisation of Adorno's position re phenomenology from one paraphrased
quote? Other recent posts on this list have drawn attention to his
book-length immanent critique of an exclusive reliance upon Husserlian
phenomenology (still demonstrably more scientific and radical than that of
Heigegger's). In RB's "dialectic", (pp.22-3, 25)the author repeatedly
stresses that the phenomenological aspect of dialectic (reinstatedment of the
lived-experience of non-idendity/qualitative differences etc); and that this
aspect  is not one research method/perspective amongst others, but a partial
but indispensable part of dialectical thought more generally (p.20-21). 

3/. My criticisms are not, as you imply, a false universalisation of the
biases of an optional external perspective upon CR. Instead, they are
strictly immanent to, and hence even an exemplification of, the more recent -
and clearly still undigested - dialectical thrust of DCR. Such Imm Crit is
precisely the central (but not exclusive) mode of critique that RB adocates,
and practices, in "Dialectic". The question now is how much of the dualistic
baggage of either/or dichotomising associated with earlier phases of RB's
work (realism vs irrealism, naturalism vs deontology and idealism etc etc)
can the DCR phase continue to carry with it *if* its plane is keep in the
air? I would suggest a somewhat discontinuous trajectory, and the purchase of
a safety helmet for those in the flight path!. My argument is that DRC is
radically unself-sufficient as a tradition and must open itself up a process
of conversational dialogue with other dialectical traditions potentially to
their mutual enrichment. The alternative of theological reverence for any
particular author and glib dismissal of other on the basis of cavalier
misreadings is an amusing exemplification only of the problem.

Michael

4/. The last of your questions are, for reasons given already, beside the
point since they presuppose what is not the case.


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