Date: Sun, 17 Aug 1997 15:58:16
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Subject: Re: BHA: Science, theology and witchcraft


Michael,

In your reply you state: "I think your argument hinges around
characterising Adorno's position as that of "symmetry" when he follows the
implications of the experiential evidence in order to give priority to the
object."  Let me analyze your text to show why I think you did characterize
Adorno's position as a symmetry without giving priority to the object.

"RB objects - on supposedly dialectical grounds - to Adorno's criticism of
attempts to either reduce objectivity to subjectivity or vice-versa. RB
retorts that subjectivity must "in some sense" be seen as "grounded" or
"overreached" by objectivity." This passage clearly shows RB proposing an
asymmetry between subjectivity and objectivity in contrast to Adorno's
criticisms of reductions.

"Adorno's consistent position ... is that reductionism is the main
counter-tendency to dialectics, in that it represents an eradication of
mediation whose consequences are as undialectical as undialectical thinking
can ever get."  This passage has Adorno counterposing reductionism to
dialectics by eradicating mediation.  I took it as read that reductionism
involves an assymmetry between subjectivity and objectivity, the one having
priority to the other in a reduction.  Thus it appeared you were imputing
to Adorno a symmetry contrasting to RB's claim of asymmetry.

"For RB to object to Adorno's objection to reductionism - under the guide
of being a better and more radical dialectician - is, of itself, to fall
back into what amounts to a pre-dialectical position."  This passage claims
that RB's objection to Adorno on the latter's rejection of reductionism is
a pre-dialectical position.  I took a pre-dialectical position to be a
reduction with its accompanying asymmetry.

"Bhaskar's position does not appear to mediate between the equally
one-sided claims of unmediated (reductionist?) versions of materialism and
idealism in a manner which is as receptive to the half-truths of the latter
as it is to those of the former."  This passage says RB's position does not
mediate between subjectivity and objectivity, each of which alone are half
truths.  This appears to me to be plumping for a symmetry between
subjectivity and objectivity, which must be equally mediated.

"Adorno's line is that the priority of the object depends upon the subject 
recognising the truth that we can at least imagine the existence of an 
object without the continued presence of a subjectivity to be conscious of 
its presence, but we cannot even imagine a subjectivity which is not already 
"consciousness of an object".  This passage has Adorno stating a
presupposition of the priority of the object, namely the subject being able
to imagine etc.

"This priority, however, exists in and for the imagination; not in the
dense social reality which we wake up to every morning."  This passage has
Adorno saying that the priority in question, namely that of the object over
the subject, only exists in the imagination not in dense social reality.  I
took this to mean that Adorno rejects the priority of the object and so
finally plumps for symmetry.  My objection then was that his rejection
relied on an exclusively phenomenolgical outook at odds with a critical
realist outlook.

If Adorno really does not reject the symmetry and, as you state in your
reply, "follows the implications of the experiential evidence in order to
give priority to the object," then I fail to see what the dispute between
RB and Adorno is supposed to be about (except perhaps that RB wrongly
objected to Adorno's positon, which was identical with RB's).

In your reply you state: "A context in which one side of an opposition is 
seen as having (even relative/limitied) priority over the other is one of 
"assymmetry". You have inverted the ordinary meaning of this terms; and 
thereby misunderstood the phenomenological claim being made by A."  I hope
the above makes it clear I do not have the stupid misunderstanding of
"asymmetry" that you impute to me.

You ask "what is scientific virtue to making a massive generalisation of
Adorno's position re phenomenology from one paraphrased quote?"  I have no
anti-Adorno axe to grind.  I was merely pointing out what appeared an
inconsistency of a position you imputed to Adorno, whom you did not quote.

You raise important problems in your paragraph 3./, but your last statement
("The alternative of theological reverence for any particular author and
glib dismissal of other on the basis of cavalier misreadings is an amusing
exemplification only of the problem.") is liable to strike one as overly
defensive.  I have neither theological reverence for RB nor glib dismissal
of Adorno.  To impute that to me is insult that is not called for.

louis Irwin

----------------------------------------------------------
At 08:59 AM 8/17/97 -0400, you wrote:
>In a message dated 16/08/97 22:29:14 GMT,:
>
><< 
> At 04:49 AM 8/16/97 -0400, Michael Salter wrote:
> >1/. The textual details are: Bhaskar's "Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom"
> >1993, p. 250 where RB objects - on supposedly dialectical grounds - to
> >Adorno's criticism of attempts to either reduce objectivity to subjectivity
> >or vice-versa. RB retorts that subjectivity must "in some sense" be seen as
> >"grounded" or "overreached" by objectivity. Adorno's consistent position in
> >his Negative Dialectics 1973 and "Subject/Object" and elsewhere is that
> >reductionism is the main counter-tendency to dialectics, in that it
> >represents an eradication of mediation who consequences are as
undialectical
> >as undialectical thinking can ever get. Examples of reductionism include
> >vulgar materialism, exclusively theological explanations of natural events,
> >positivism/empiricism and racism. For RB to object to Adorno's objection to
> >reductionism - under the guide of being a better and more radical
> >dialectician - is, of itself, to fall back into what amounts to a
> >pre-dialectical position. 
> >
> >2/. Bhaskar's position does not appear to mediate between the equally
> >one-sided claims of unmediated (reductionist?) versions of materialism and
> >idealism in a manner which is as receptive to the half-truths of the latter
> >as it is to those of the former. Adorno's line is that the priority of the
> >object depends upon the subject recognising the truth that we can at least
> >imagine the existence of an object without the continued presence of a
> >subjectivity to be conscious of its presence, but we cannot even imagine a
> >subjectivity which is not already "consciousness of an object". This
> >priority, however, exists in and for the imagination; not in the dense
> >social reality which we wake up to every morning.
>
>LOUIS RESPONDS 
> [snip]
> 
> Adorno seems to argue for a symmetry between subjectivity and objectivity.  
> From the phenomenological perspective from which that claim is made, the 
> symmetry does appear correct.  However, the phenemenological perspective is 
> not the only one.  From the perspective of naturalism, there were long 
> periods in hich the world existed without subjectivity, but the converse 
> situation is not possible.  Subjectivity evolved from a world in which there
> was no subjectivity.  It does appear that Adorno's position relies on taking
> the phenomological perspective as the sole valid point of view.  Is RB 
> really on the verge of a reduction, or is he merely pointing to the 
> assymmetry I just noted?  If so, is he criticizing Adorno for the reason I 
> just gave?
> 
> IN REPLY
>
>1/. I think your argument hinges around characterising Adorno's position as
>that of "symmetry" when he follows the implications of the experiential
>evidence in order to give priority to the object. A context in which one side
>of an opposition is seen as having (even relative/limitied) priority over the
>other is one of "assymmetry". You have inverted the ordinary meaning of this
>terms; and thereby misunderstood the phenomenological claim being made by A.
>
>I will resist the temptation to repeat what I noted in in a previous post, I
>drew attention to such hermeneutical insensitivity in the "realist"
>interpretation of even more or less complementary (i.e., because they are
>different), traditions of dialectical thought.
>
>2/. A Related point: what is scientific virtue to making a massive
>generalisation of Adorno's position re phenomenology from one paraphrased
>quote? Other recent posts on this list have drawn attention to his
>book-length immanent critique of an exclusive reliance upon Husserlian
>phenomenology (still demonstrably more scientific and radical than that of
>Heigegger's). In RB's "dialectic", (pp.22-3, 25)the author repeatedly
>stresses that the phenomenological aspect of dialectic (reinstatedment of the
>lived-experience of non-idendity/qualitative differences etc); and that this
>aspect  is not one research method/perspective amongst others, but a partial
>but indispensable part of dialectical thought more generally (p.20-21). 
>
>
>3/. My criticisms are not, as you imply, a false universalisation of the
>biases of an optional external perspective upon CR. Instead, they are
>strictly immanent to, and hence even an exemplification of, the more recent -
>and clearly still undigested - dialectical thrust of DCR. Such Imm Crit is
>precisely the central (but not exclusive) mode of critique that RB adocates,
>and practices, in "Dialectic". The question now is how much of the dualistic
>baggage of either/or dichotomising associated with earlier phases of RB's
>work (realism vs irrealism, naturalism vs deontology and idealism etc etc)
>can the DCR phase continue to carry with it *if* its plane is keep in the
>air? I would suggest a somewhat discontinuous trajectory, and the purchase of
>a safety helmet for those in the flight path!. My argument is that DRC is
>radically unself-sufficient as a tradition and must open itself up a process
>of conversational dialogue with other dialectical traditions potentially to
>their mutual enrichment. The alternative of theological reverence for any
>particular author and glib dismissal of other on the basis of cavalier
>misreadings is an amusing exemplification only of the problem.
>
>Michael
>
>4/. The last of your questions are, for reasons given already, beside the
>point since they presuppose what is not the case.
>
>
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