Date: Sun, 17 Aug 1997 15:08:23 -0700 (PDT)
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
From: Ralph Dumain <rdumain-AT-igc.apc.org>
Subject: Re: BHA: Science, theology and witchcraft


I must say I agree with Irwin's latest response to Salter.  I do hope,
though, that clearing away the rubbish of misunderstanding may result in
moving the discussion forward and not remaining stuck in this quibble.

I am always perturbed by the academic habit of placing your "opponent"
within a context that he never asked to be part of.  Assuming somebody is
taking up a Kantian position because the position is reminiscent of a
Kantian one, that sort of thing.  This business about people reverting to a
pre-critical position, isn't that what Lenin was accused of?  What would you
think of someone who criticized the village atheist for reverting to a
pre-critical position because he has neglected to follow the latest
developments in postmodern theology or modal logic?  A materialist (or
"realist" for the timorous) may be as naive or sophisticated as you please,
but one cannot legitimately slander that position as
being fundamentally pre-critical.  There is no inherent reason why one could
not remain a stanch materialist and still recognize the phenomenological
moment, esp. given that the relationship between brain physiology and
subjective states remains obscure.  (Insofar as the Frankfurters maintained
a prejudice against natural science, they need to be called on the carpet.)

If Bhaskar, coming out of a philosophy of science perspective (which never
formally incorporated the philosophy of self-consciousness), is actually
interested in incorpating the insights of critical theory into a materialist
perspective, this is an exciting development.  I used to say on other lists,
we need somebody who knows both mathematical logic and negative dialectics
to make something new happen.

I'm particularly interested in finding ways to compare the axiomatic mode of
theoretical consciousness with other modes, and how to relate formalization
to what lies outside of formalization.  In this regard, I found an inspiring
article in the New School's GRADUATE SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL (title?) a
few years back, a translation from German, that takes a Hegelian perspective
in treating Russell's suppression of self-reference in his logic.  For a
century analytical philosophy has succeeded in sweeping everything it could
not deal with under the rug, and this article exceeds my wildest dreams in
addressing my interest in the formal viz. the extra-formal.

So we should get back to issues at hand.  Don't know if the Heidegger vs.
Husserl antecedents are relevant here.  Something exciting is afoot.

Got to run now, but I hope we can continue.

At 03:58 PM 8/17/97, Louis Irwin wrote:
>Let me analyze your text to show why I think you did characterize
>Adorno's position as a symmetry without giving priority to the object.



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