Date: Mon, 18 Aug 1997 09:55:09 -0400 (EDT)
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
Subject: Re: BHA: Science, theology and witchcraft


In a message dated 17/08/97 20:48:20 GMT, Louis writes re Michael's earlier
message:

<< 
 In your reply you state: "I think your argument hinges around
 characterising Adorno's position as that of "symmetry" when he follows the
 implications of the experiential evidence in order to give priority to the
 object."  Let me analyze your text to show why I think you did characterize
 Adorno's position as a symmetry without giving priority to the object.
 
 "RB objects - on supposedly dialectical grounds - to Adorno's criticism of
 attempts to either reduce objectivity to subjectivity or vice-versa. RB
 retorts that subjectivity must "in some sense" be seen as "grounded" or
 "overreached" by objectivity." This passage clearly shows RB proposing an
 asymmetry between subjectivity and objectivity in contrast to Adorno's
 criticisms of reductions.

MICHAEL REPLIES - yes I agree
 
 "Adorno's consistent position ... is that reductionism is the main
 counter-tendency to dialectics, in that it represents an eradication of
 mediation whose consequences are as undialectical as undialectical thinking
 can ever get."  This passage has Adorno counterposing reductionism to
 dialectics by eradicating mediation.  I took it as read that reductionism
 involves an assymmetry between subjectivity and objectivity, the one having
 priority to the other in a reduction.  Thus it appeared you were imputing
 to Adorno a symmetry contrasting to RB's claim of asymmetry.

MICHAEL REPLIES: I don't agree with this, although I may well have been
unclear. Reductionism, to me, involves a mode of explanation characterised by
the collapse of a complex social phenomena involving say, material, cultural,
political and linguistic elements into examplifications of one "base" aspect
posited as somehow deeper, determinative etc. We are familiar with
biologistic reductionism of socially constructed categories of gender,
crudely economistic versions of "marxism", the categorisation of crime as a
genetic phenomena, the collapse of social phenomena into semiotic
structures/processes etc. In each case reductionism tends to produce claims
that, at root, X is essentially/ultimately Y and nothing but Y. The internal
contradictions caused by such reductionism, in which a part is
overgeneralised/misrepresented as the essence of the totality, are quite
independent of any position on the relative importance of each side of the
subject/object & knowledge/being relationships. On where a
"vulgar"/unmediated form of idealism attempts to collapse any material
dimensions into those of subjective or collective ideas, beleifs, values etc,
or where an equally undialectic form of materialism performs the inverse
collapse, does reductionism come into play. My understanding of the
dialectical aspect of DRC is that it problematises dualistic ways of setting
up issues in terms of either/or mutually exclusive oppositions.
 
 LOUIS

"For RB to object to Adorno's objection to reductionism - under the guide
 of being a better and more radical dialectician - is, of itself, to fall
 back into what amounts to a pre-dialectical position."  This passage claims
 that RB's objection to Adorno on the latter's rejection of reductionism is
 a pre-dialectical position.  I took a pre-dialectical position to be a
 reduction with its accompanying asymmetry.

 "Bhaskar's position does not appear to mediate between the equally
 one-sided claims of unmediated (reductionist?) versions of materialism and
 idealism in a manner which is as receptive to the half-truths of the latter
 as it is to those of the former."  This passage says RB's position does not
 mediate between subjectivity and objectivity, each of which alone are half
 truths.  This appears to me to be plumping for a symmetry between
 subjectivity and objectivity, which must be equally mediated.
 
 
MICHAEL REPLIES

well only in part. The phrase pre-dialectical only makes specific sense
within the context of the type of imm crit that I am trying - following
Bhaskar et al - to carry out here. As Ralph implied, this "pre-X" "post-X"
way of talking can, in other contexts, be dangerous insofar it evokes and
presupposes a linear evolutionary progression. What I was getting at was that
there could just be a contradiction in continuing to advocate certain forms
of materialist, defined as the polar opposite of irrealis. and idealism,
within a perspective that also purports to exemplify dialectics. I stand by
this question; and the suggestion that dialectics is irreducible to neither
(reductive) forms of  "materialism" nor idealism but embodies the
unity-within-diversity of the half-truths of both. 

Hence when Ralph says "as a materialist ...." I agree entirely with his
logic, not with the presupposition that underlies the juxtaposition of
idealism as anti-materialist; materialism as anti-idealism. If I replied "as
an idealist".... then we might not really engage with each other at all,
despite perhaps both presupposing this unity-within-diversity in our very
definitions of the differences between us. Dialectics starts where binary
"either/or-ism" stops.

LOUIS  "Adorno's line is that the priority of the object depends upon the
subject 
 recognising the truth that we can at least imagine the existence of an 
 object without the continued presence of a subjectivity to be conscious of 
 its presence, but we cannot even imagine a subjectivity which is not already

 "consciousness of an object".  This passage has Adorno stating a
 presupposition of the priority of the object, namely the subject being able
 to imagine etc.
 
 "This priority, however, exists in and for the imagination; not in the
 dense social reality which we wake up to every morning."  This passage has
 Adorno saying that the priority in question, namely that of the object over
 the subject, only exists in the imagination not in dense social reality.  I
 took this to mean that Adorno rejects the priority of the object and so
 finally plumps for symmetry.  My objection then was that his rejection
 relied on an exclusively phenomenolgical outook at odds with a critical
 realist outlook.
 
 
MICHAEL REPLIES: I think I had already suggested that in both RB and Adornian
versions of dialectic, some initially but never finally phenomenological
orientation is required, hence your term "exclusively" is misplaced. A useful
thing here would be to compare the extended introductions to "Dialectic" and
"Negative Dialectics", if only to clarify some elements of the
distinctiveness of RB's position.

LOUIS

 If Adorno really does not reject the symmetry and, as you state in your
 reply, "follows the implications of the experiential evidence in order to
 give priority to the object," then I fail to see what the dispute between
 RB and Adorno is supposed to be about (except perhaps that RB wrongly
 objected to Adorno's positon, which was identical with RB's).
 
MICHAEL REPLIES - Well I think the original dispute lies in RB's use of an
Adorno-eque position which he claims is superior to, and supersedes that of,
Adorno. This objection is not so trivial, esp given the centrality of
"non-identity", "constellationality" critique of identity-thinking in RB, all
of which originate in Adorno's neo-hegelianism. What is more, the reflexively
phenomenological dimension, which includes developing the hermeneutical
sensitivity to the texts of others that minimises interpretative distortion,
misplaced assertions of originality etc) is far better integrated in Adorno's
negative dialectics than it is into that of Bhaskar, which is perhaps merely
to indicate some unfinished business in the DRC project: one that is present
much of a newcomer to a dialectical tradition that was pretty well
established by the time of Plato. I'm encouraged in this by the comments of
Ruth and Ralph who, for perhaps different reasons, also recognise that there
is something at stake in all this.

LOUIS

1/.  In your reply you state: "A context in which one side of an opposition
is 
 seen as having (even relative/limitied) priority over the other is one of 
 "assymmetry". You have inverted the ordinary meaning of this terms; and 
 thereby misunderstood the phenomenological claim being made by A."  I hope
 the above makes it clear I do not have the stupid misunderstanding of
 "asymmetry" that you impute to me.
 

2/. You ask "what is scientific virtue to making a massive generalisation of
 Adorno's position re phenomenology from one paraphrased quote?"  I have no
 anti-Adorno axe to grind.  I was merely pointing out what appeared an
 inconsistency of a position you imputed to Adorno, whom you did not quote.
 
 3/. You raise important problems in your paragraph 3./, but your last
statement
 ("The alternative of theological reverence for any particular author and
 glib dismissal of other on the basis of cavalier misreadings is an amusing
 exemplification only of the problem.") is liable to strike one as overly
 defensive.  I have neither theological reverence for RB nor glib dismissal
 of Adorno.  To impute that to me is insult that is not called for.
 
  
MICHAEL REPLIES

re.1/.& 2  I accept that you did not intend what I took your comments to
indicate, and also that both your own sympathetic and my own
unsympathetic/critical readings could be supported textually. 

re 3/. Frankly I am pretty indifferent to subjectively intended meanings and
attitudes, esp where these depart from linguistically indicated ones
(including my own). It is the internal coherence of expressed ideas
theory/practice discrepancies in RB's vocabulary) that I seek to address and
experiment with; whilst hopefully being (partially)conscious that under
present conditions of social antagonism neither the subject nor the object of
critique is likely to be immune from latent contradictions, relative
inadequacies, gaps, aporias, blockages, unnoticed presuppositions,
exemplification of what one objects to, dialectical reversal/recoikl etc. No
personally insulting implication of stupidity is even at issue here for me,
but this lack of rude intent on my part is not so relevant. My attempts at
imm crit are open to effective counter imm criticisms, and hopefully
something somewhere is enriched, qualified and learned along the way of
mutual critical engagement, even between Adorno-eque and Bhaskarian
perspectives. Again it is the dialectics of conversation that, for me, is the
main thing; no any participant ever becoming so right as to be immune from
continued learning via the disclosure of discrepancies. My earlier objection
re "reverence" was not even directed at your contributions at all but at
certain tendencies to see conformity with the intentions behind a RB text as
sufficient proof in itself for a proposition. If nothing else this little
string of discussion does seem to have broken out of spurious hermetic
closure that resembled protestant biblical hermeneutics; and moved the form -
as well as some of the debate in a more literally dialectical direction. Any
rhetorically exagerated "closures" by my contributions are, of course
"stupid.", particularly if taken too literally, and thankfully obviously so
to others.

 
 ----------------------------------------------------------
 At 08:59 AM 8/17/97 -0400, you wrote:
 >In a message dated 16/08/97 22:29:14 GMT,:
 >
 ><< 
 > At 04:49 AM 8/16/97 -0400, Michael Salter wrote:
 > >1/. The textual details are: Bhaskar's "Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom"
 > >1993, p. 250 where RB objects - on supposedly dialectical grounds - to
 > >Adorno's criticism of attempts to either reduce objectivity to
subjectivity
 > >or vice-versa. RB retorts that subjectivity must "in some sense" be seen
as
 > >"grounded" or "overreached" by objectivity. Adorno's consistent position
in
 > >his Negative Dialectics 1973 and "Subject/Object" and elsewhere is that
 > >reductionism is the main counter-tendency to dialectics, in that it
 > >represents an eradication of mediation who consequences are as
 undialectical
 > >as undialectical thinking can ever get. Examples of reductionism include
 > >vulgar materialism, exclusively theological explanations of natural
events,
 > >positivism/empiricism and racism. For RB to object to Adorno's objection
to
 > >reductionism - under the guide of being a better and more radical
 > >dialectician - is, of itself, to fall back into what amounts to a
 > >pre-dialectical position. 
 > >
 > >2/. Bhaskar's position does not appear to mediate between the equally
 > >one-sided claims of unmediated (reductionist?) versions of materialism
and
 > >idealism in a manner which is as receptive to the half-truths of the
latter
 > >as it is to those of the former. Adorno's line is that the priority of
the
 > >object depends upon the subject recognising the truth that we can at
least
 > >imagine the existence of an object without the continued presence of a
 > >subjectivity to be conscious of its presence, but we cannot even imagine
a
 > >subjectivity which is not already "consciousness of an object". This
 > >priority, however, exists in and for the imagination; not in the dense
 > >social reality which we wake up to every morning.
 >
 >LOUIS RESPONDS 
 > [snip]
 > 
 > Adorno seems to argue for a symmetry between subjectivity and objectivity.
 
 > From the phenomenological perspective from which that claim is made, the 
 > symmetry does appear correct.  However, the phenemenological perspective
is 
 > not the only one.  From the perspective of naturalism, there were long 
 > periods in hich the world existed without subjectivity, but the converse 
 > situation is not possible.  Subjectivity evolved from a world in which
there
 > was no subjectivity.  It does appear that Adorno's position relies on
taking
 > the phenomological perspective as the sole valid point of view.  Is RB 
 > really on the verge of a reduction, or is he merely pointing to the 
 > assymmetry I just noted?  If so, is he criticizing Adorno for the reason I

 > just gave?
 > 
 > IN REPLY
 >
 >1/. I think your argument hinges around characterising Adorno's position as
 >that of "symmetry" when he follows the implications of the experiential
 >evidence in order to give priority to the object. A context in which one
side
 >of an opposition is seen as having (even relative/limitied) priority over
the
 >other is one of "assymmetry". You have inverted the ordinary meaning of
this
 >terms; and thereby misunderstood the phenomenological claim being made by
A.
 >
 >I will resist the temptation to repeat what I noted in in a previous post,
I
 >drew attention to such hermeneutical insensitivity in the "realist"
 >interpretation of even more or less complementary (i.e., because they are
 >different), traditions of dialectical thought.
 >
 >2/. A Related point: what is scientific virtue to making a massive
 >generalisation of Adorno's position re phenomenology from one paraphrased
 >quote? Other recent posts on this list have drawn attention to his
 >book-length immanent critique of an exclusive reliance upon Husserlian
 >phenomenology (still demonstrably more scientific and radical than that of
 >Heigegger's). In RB's "dialectic", (pp.22-3, 25)the author repeatedly
 >stresses that the phenomenological aspect of dialectic (reinstatedment of
the
 >lived-experience of non-idendity/qualitative differences etc); and that
this
 >aspect  is not one research method/perspective amongst others, but a
partial
 >but indispensable part of dialectical thought more generally (p.20-21). 
 >
 >
 >3/. My criticisms are not, as you imply, a false universalisation of the
 >biases of an optional external perspective upon CR. Instead, they are
 >strictly immanent to, and hence even an exemplification of, the more recent
-
 >and clearly still undigested - dialectical thrust of DCR. Such Imm Crit is
 >precisely the central (but not exclusive) mode of critique that RB
adocates,
 >and practices, in "Dialectic". The question now is how much of the
dualistic
 >baggage of either/or dichotomising associated with earlier phases of RB's
 >work (realism vs irrealism, naturalism vs deontology and idealism etc etc)
 >can the DCR phase continue to carry with it *if* its plane is keep in the
 >air? I would suggest a somewhat discontinuous trajectory, and the purchase
of
 >a safety helmet for those in the flight path!. My argument is that DRC is
 >radically unself-sufficient as a tradition and must open itself up a
process
 >of conversational dialogue with other dialectical traditions potentially to
 >their mutual enrichment. The alternative of theological reverence for any
 >particular author and glib dismissal of other on the basis of cavalier
 >misreadings is an amusing exemplification only of the problem.
 >
 >Michael
 >
 >4/. The last of your questions are, for reasons given already, beside the
 >point since they presuppose what is not the case.
 >
 > >>



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