Date: Sat, 23 Aug 1997 12:22:07 -0400 (EDT) To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu Subject: Re: BHA: Bhaskar on Adorno Re Colin and Ruth's postings: 1/. As things have turned out, I''m not sure it was such a smart move on my part even to have mentioned Adorno's differences with Bhaskar. 2/. Ruth's point, as I read it, is that Adorno's position tackles social reality as lived experientially, or as I tried to put it "the world we wake up to every morning" - relatively to this Ruth is surely right that RB's position is to date far more metaphysical and less phenomenological, despite his correct appreciation that some form of phenomenological insight (preferably the more rationalistic/scientific Husserlian kind rather than the more metaphysical variety of Heidegger) is required by most varieties of dialectical thought to date. 3/. Anyone wishing to defend bhaskar "to the hilt" as it were, even to the point of denying that his position does indeed give priority to the object in subject/object interactions (surely part of the meaning he gives to "realism" and "emergent powers materialism"?) can only do so my constructing such a smoothly linear and self-consistent account of the evolution of DCR that we may as well forget the specifically dialectical aspect of it altogether (including its own dialectical evolution via self-criticism as RB puts it), and confine ourselves to the earlier works (which of course would then be inconsistent, discontinuous, de-totalising, ahistorical, a negation of the presence of contradictions, the immanence of theory to a historicallyu contradictory social reality etc etc etc. No problem with that?. 4/. The price paid for attempting to make RB's position internally coherent on every point and relatively superior to all alternative contributors to his current tradition, (he cannot mean X because that would contradict his commitment to Y and this, of course, is unthinkable) is more than the advantage gained. Whilst such interpretative closure might not be the result of a distinctly theological mode of interpretation, something of a "family resemblance" still troubles me here with Colin's mode of "defence to the hilt". The problem with putting any theorist up on a pedestral is the law of gravity, then tend to fall down upon us. Marx differentiated himself from the marxists, god knows what he would have made of what has been done this century in his name by those who proclaimed the infallibility of their own distortion of dialectical materialism. 5/. For what its worth, orthodox legal academics used to try to convince their students that 3 completely contradictory legal decisions (even if seperated by decades, and applied to different material situations) could each be seen as instances of a common and internally rational "general principle" if only the student could manage to grasp the underlying legal logic. In Dialectic RB, with reference to law in a more general non-legalistic sense, specifically complains about the contradictions which arise for those who implicitly deny the difference between "law and instance", nicely ironic, no? Michael --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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