File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1997/bhaskar.9708, message 83


From: "NURSAW" <che5xxxn-AT-ECU-01.NOVELL.LEEDS.AC.UK>
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1997 12:20:55 GMT
Subject: BHA: new dialectics anyone?


Dear list members,

Does anybody out there have an interest in the relation of critical 
realism (dialectical or not) to 'new dialectics'?

By the term 'new dialectics' (apparently coined by Chris Arthur) I refer to work 
of authors such as Tony Smith, Patrick Murray, Geurt Reuten and 
Chris Arthur (A representative collection can be found in Fred 
Mosely (1993), ed., 'Marx's Method in Capital'). These authors 
re-examine the relation of the dialectic in Hegel and Marx in a 
manner that deserves careful comparison with Bhaskar's work, and, 
more broadly, with that of critical realists as a whole. 

It would be great to be able to disuss the issue - which, of course, 
more broadly relates to the question of the relation of the critical 
realist dialectic to alternative interpretations of (or, at least, 
orientations towards) Hegel and Marx - with anyone interested at the
forthcoming CCR conference. The organisers suggested a possible 
'spontaneous workshop' on the topic given interest. There are 
facilities for this but no time allocation, so, failing a workshop, I 
would simply be delighted to arrange to discuss the issue over a beverage 
or two at the bar!

Below I provide a copy of the abstract of my paper on the 
topic, in case anyone should be interested (the paper is a 
tentative and preliminary attempt to grasp the relation of critical 
realism and new dialectics). The abstract suffers from sounding more critical 
of critical realism, and confident of its argument, than is true, or 
intended. But that's abstracts for you!

Thanks,

Andrew Brown
(Middlesex University - I am currently away and so borrowing a 
friends email facilities)


THE HIDDEN OPPOSITION OF CTITICAL REALISM AND NEW DIALECTICS

ABSTRACT 

Critical realism and new dialectics constitute two positions within
philosophy and social theory. They *appear* to be congruent and indeed
share a common set of terms, many of which can be found in Marx and
Hegel. For example they both affirm, with Marx, that =91science would be
superfluous if the outward appearances and essences of things directly
coincided=92 (Marx (1971), p. 817) and that =91the concrete is concrete
because it is the concentration of many determinations hence unity of
the diverse=92 (Marx (1973), p. 100). This paper suggests that the
outward appearance of congruity of the two positions is illusory.
Their true relation is disclosed through an immanent critique of
critical realism conducted at the level of method in social science.
The critical realist method, =91transcendental deduction=92, requires
pre-conceptualised =91social forms=92 as its only premises so cannot
sustain significant and immanent change of these forms, or
transformation of the non-actual social structures and mechanisms
deduced from them. Thus, if accepted, the critique contradicts
critical realism=92s claim to provide a =91*transformational* model of
social activity=92 (Bhaskar (1979), Ch. 2). New dialectics overcomes
this problem of sustaining social structural transformation, and
related problems that are manifest in critical realism (and, it is
argued, in much of Western philosophy and social theory). In this
sense new dialectics constitutes the =91positive moment=92 of the critique
of critical realism. Debate between critical realists and new
dialecticians is prone to misunderstanding because shared terms are
given opposite meanings. It is hoped that, at the very least, the
paper will help to alleviate this difficulty and to encourage future
constructive debate of the issues raised.


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