From: "NURSAW" <che5xxxn-AT-ECU-01.NOVELL.LEEDS.AC.UK>
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1997 22:54:21 GMT
Subject: Re: BHA: new dialectics anyone?


Ralph Dumain wrote:
 
> >Their true relation is disclosed through an immanent critique of
> >critical realism conducted at the level of method in social science.
> >The critical realist method, 'transcendental deduction', requires
> >pre-conceptualised 'social forms' as its only premises so cannot
> >sustain significant and immanent change of these forms, or
> >transformation of the non-actual social structures and mechanisms
> >deduced from them. Thus, if accepted, the critique contradicts
> >critical realism's claim to provide a '*transformational* model of
> >social activity' (Bhaskar (1979), Ch. 2). New dialectics overcomes
> >this problem of sustaining social structural transformation, and
> >related problems that are manifest in critical realism (and, it is
> >argued, in much of Western philosophy and social theory). In this
> >sense new dialectics constitutes the 'positive moment' of the critique
> >of critical realism.
> 
> I can't make any sense out of this, so I hope you will explain one 
day.

Ralph,
Very glad you are interested. Sorry you can't come to the conference. 
Perturbed that my abstract is 'abstract'. I realise it doesn't give 
much content, here is some more - admittedly still too brief:

As we know the basic critical realist method moves from experiences of 'actual' 
phenomena to the non-actual 'structures and mechanisms' that 
constitute and generate actuality.

The crucial thing for my purported critique (based on new dialectics) 
is the actual / non-actual relation. In particular the fact that the 'actual' and the 
'non-actual' are considered to be distinct ontological realms, of 
which the latter is essential (causal) but not usually either 
directly experienced, or actually present. Bhaskar is very clear 
that there will always be a number of possible hypothesise as to what 
underlies a given form. So empirical testing is always necessary 
(this is general to all science for RB. of course there are big differences 
between natural and social science)

The basic critique is then straightforward. Put crudely:
how on earth could anyone rationally hypothesise non-actual structures 
and mechanisms that would negate or significantly change the actual 
forms used as premises? If one is soley basing one's hypothesis on a 
given actual form then the hypothesis must, at the least, necessitate 
the form. It would be sheer fantasy for it to do otherwise.

On reflection this means that 'forms' must, paradixically, define absolute 
fixed points for critical realism. CR cannot theorise transFORMation 
of  underlying structures and mechanisms. It cannot do so because the 
concepts of these structures and mechanisms are, precisely, premised 
upon actual 'forms'.

What alternative does new dialectics provide then? 
It dispenses with the view that the essence and the appearance (RB's
actual and non-actual) are distinct ontological realms, one of 
which is non-observable but essential. This dispenses with the need 
for hypothesise in need of 'testing'. Two examples:

(1) Tony Smith stresses that dialectical theory must be understood as 
a *reconstruction* in thought of a given object realm. Whereas 
critical realism attempts to *hypothesise* non-actual structures and 
mechanisms, Smith simply recontructs the totality already given at 
the very starting point. He can do this because of the new 
dialectical claim that categories have an intinsic *ordering*. It is 
this ordering that thought does not grasp at the starting point.

(2) Patrick Murray stresses that the level of essence (the 
counterpart of CR's structures and mechanisms) is NECESSARILY 
non-sensuous, therefore it could never immediately exist, or be 
perceived. In consequence the essence behoves to a 'Logic of 
Reflection' rather than a 'Logic of Being'. Bhaskar's (and Locke's, 
and Desacrtes') mistake is to fail to elaborate a 'Logic of 
Reflection' where the essence must appear as something other than 
itself. The crucial example is the relation of value and money. 
'Value' is essence. It cannot immediately exist (the labour that 
produces it is entirely 'abstract', utterly non-sensuous) so must 
appear in money.
  
Hope this helps. Sorry so brief. And apologies if garbled; its 
getting late in England!

Thanks,
Andrew Brown






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