To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 1997 11:00:07 GMT
Subject: Re: BHA: new dialectics anyone?


Ralph and Hans,
Thanks for the responses. I've added some comments to them. Such a 
shame you can't make the conference. I'll be in a position to reply 
more fully after the conference.

Ralph wrote:

> 
> At 10:54 PM 8/27/97 GMT, NURSAW wrote:
> >On reflection this means that 'forms' must, paradixically, define absolute 
> >fixed points for critical realism. CR cannot theorise transFORMation 
> >of  underlying structures and mechanisms. It cannot do so because the 
> >concepts of these structures and mechanisms are, precisely, premised 
> >upon actual 'forms'.
> 
> I don't quite get this.

My paper spends at least six pages on this. I cannot do justice to 
the point with brevity. But another attempt anyway: in the previous paragraph to 
the one you quote I argued that because the only premises are 
actual 'forms', the non-actual structures and mechanisms hypothesised 
must, at the least, necessitate the forms. Now, if non-actuality equals 
'essence' and actuality equals 'form of essence' then the above 
paragraph follows. This is because the hypothesised essence is only present 
when the its specific 'form' is instantiated. Should the specific 
'form' change then its essence must cease to exist. This must be so 
because the essence was hypothesised on the SOLE PREMISE OF THE FORM. 

But this is to invert the true meaning of 'form' and 'essence' 
because these terms imply that essence can remain in existence even if 
its form changes. That is precisely what is meant by 'transformation 
of essence'. Yet it is precisely what is impossible to rationally 
theorise if structures must necessitate the particular forms, if they 
are present only when a specific form is intantiated.


> 
> >What alternative does new dialectics provide then? 
> >It dispenses with the view that the essence and the appearance (RB's
> >actual and non-actual) are distinct ontological realms, one of 
> >which is non-observable but essential. This dispenses with the need 
> >for hypothesise in need of 'testing'. Two examples:
> 
> >(1) Tony Smith stresses that dialectical theory must be understood as 
> >a *reconstruction* in thought of a given object realm. Whereas 
> >critical realism attempts to *hypothesise* non-actual structures and 
> >mechanisms, Smith simply recontructs the totality already given at 
> >the very starting point. He can do this because of the new 
> >dialectical claim that categories have an intinsic *ordering*. It is 
> >this ordering that thought does not grasp at the starting point.
> 
> 
> I don't understand the difference between Bhaskar's distinct ontological
> realms of essence and appearance and Smith's non-distinction of same.  I
> don't understand the precise difference between hypothesis-testing and
> reconstructing the totality.

The difference is that Smith does not introduce any new categories. He 
merely reorders the ones he started with. CR, on the contrary, is 
defined by the attempt to introduce new categories, through 
hypothesis of structures and mechanisms. Because they are 
new and not (outside of expt.) actually present they must be tested.

> 
> >(2) Patrick Murray stresses that the level of essence (the 
> >counterpart of CR's structures and mechanisms) is NECESSARILY 
> >non-sensuous, therefore it could never immediately exist, or be 
> >perceived. In consequence the essence behoves to a 'Logic of 
> >Reflection' rather than a 'Logic of Being'. Bhaskar's (and Locke's, 
> >and Desacrtes') mistake is to fail to elaborate a 'Logic of 
> >Reflection' where the essence must appear as something other than 
> >itself. The crucial example is the relation of value and money. 
> >'Value' is essence. It cannot immediately exist (the labour that 
> >produces it is entirely 'abstract', utterly non-sensuous) so must 
> >appear in money.
> 
> Does Bhaskar engage in a discussion of value theory anywhere?  Does Bhaskar
> have a different value theory from Marx's, or Smith's or Murray's
> conception?  This would be the most direct test of real differences.  Is
> there something inherently different about the object of
> investigation--value theory rather than say theories in physics or
> chemistry--which could point to putative differences rather than an
> incompatibility between Bhaskar's philosophy of science and dialectical
> value theory?

I have not read Plato etc. Elsewhere I can find no extensive 
discussion of value theory in RB's work. The web page tells us that 
RB's next book is on money - something to look forward to! The most 
extensive scientific realist accounty of value I know of is found in Derek 
Sayer's book 'Marx's Method' (1979). This account was demolished in 
Patrick Murray's review, 'Marx minus Hegel' in the journal 
'Philosophy of the Social Sciences', No. 13. (1983). Sayer now fully 
accepts Murray's criticisms (which leave untouched Sayer's seminal 
'transhistorical / historical' distinction).  

This leaves the question of 'dialecticisation' of CR. I do not see 
how this can overcome the problems Murray points out in any 
'developmentally constitent' way. 

Hans wrote: 

> 
> although, my immediate concerns have taken me away from dialectics,
> i have a great interest in the topic, and like Ralph, i would very
> much be interested in a such a discussion.  i too will not be in
> England in the next few days, but would be quite pleased to discuss
> this over a beverage or two nonetheless, i will be drinking single
> malts:-)

I look forward to it. I prefer English bitter myself. 

> first, would it be possible for you to make available a copy of your
> paper?

Yes, after the conference (for which it is being revised). I am most 
grateful for your interest and would welcome your comments.

>  regardless, i have tended to give the advantage to Bhaskar over new
> dialectics, espeically of the Smith/Reuten/Williams variety.  in
> brief i would accuss new dialectics with a tendency toward
> committing the epistemic fallacy, along with the ontic fallacy.  
> 
> Especially in the case of Tony Smith, new dialectics is quite
> explicit in bringing forth Marx's relation to Hegel and Hegelian
> dialectics.  But this is different than what Bhaskar is himself up
> to ... although of course an implication of DCR.
> 
> There are of number of issues involved with new dialectics, first is
> the interpretation of Hegel.  In general, new dialectics has a much
> more sympathic interpretation of Hegel than does Bhaskar, although
> Bhaskar is sometimes quite affectionate toward Hegelian moments.

I agree with these last two paragraphs.

> 
> Now having put forth my own baises, i will say that i have given
> some thought to the Hegelian/Marxian notion of  intrinsic ordering
> categories emphasized by Smith via and in turn emphasized by the
> "non-metaphysical" (Hartmann, also Pinkard) interpreation of Hegel. 
> In short, i would maintain that Bhaskar himself has an intrinsic
> ordering of categories (most explicit in his four degree dialectic,
> i.e. 1M, 2E, 3L, 4D, 5C), but Bhaskar is much more general, or not
> so epistemologically specific as is new dialectics.  This must have
> something to do with Bhaskar commitment to "epistemological
> relativism".

As far as I can tell I think you have hit the nail on the head here. 
I would argue that the essential difference between RB and new 
dialectics is that the former sees an external relation between 
thought and its object (in the sense detailed in Andrew Sayer's 
book), hence its 'epistemological relativism' wheras new dialectics 
proposes an internal relation of thought and its object. New 
dialectics accomodates an isomorphism of thought and reality, wheras
RB does not. 

> 
> i might suggest that the new dialecticians have gotten Marx (and
> Hegel) right, but Bhaskar and DCR is a bit more critical than this. 
> Of course espeically Murray and Postone have emphasized the Marxian
> essence/appearance nexus,  i have tended to interpret this as a
> critical realist, as a distinction between non-actual and actual, i
> suppose i have a much more generous interpretaion of Bhaskar. 
> Actually i have a less pragmatic interpretation of CR and the
> "dialectic of science".  Maybe it is just i don't see your point
> about the limitation of CR.

I tried, all to briefly, to embellish the point above. Considering Marx's 'Capital' is 
the most oft cited exemplar of critical realism, I am surprised you 
cede the issue of 'what marx REALLY meant' to new dialectics so 
willingly. 

> 
> Of course all of this itself would have great implications of the
> notion of Value, which is of my immediate concerns.  in any event i
> look forward to further discussions, and will brush of the dust of
> my new dialectic lit.:-)

Yes. Value is the key. I look forward to more discussion.

Thanks,

Andy b.



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