From: cbcox-AT-rs6000.cmp.ilstu.edu (Carrol Cox)
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: Foundations of Probability
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 10:59:30 -0500 (CDT)


Folks,

	I don't get this problem. What (for you reading this) is the
probability of [put in your own guess] resting on my desk under the
front edge of my monitor?

	I would guess that whatever you used to fill in the [], the
probability of it being the case would be a decimal followed by
at least several billion zeroes. But for me the "probability" is
1.0 that two slightly used pencils and a mostly eaten sugar cookie
are resting on the back of *Achilles in Vietnam*, the cookie covering
about 3/4 of each of the lines of the first jacket blurb, the pencils
covering the blank line between the 2d and 3d blurbs and the first
two lines of the 3d blurb.

	The probability of what is is 1.0. The probability of what
is not is 0.0. Probability belongs strictly in the realm of knowledge
of the unknown, but does not affect the content of the unknown.

	What?

Carrol
> 
>  Hans,
> 
> I do not know of any formal theories, but when I learned probablity it was
> taught as a formal branch of mathematics. As such, emphasis was placed on
> its status as an axiomatic-deductive system. Now the question arises as to
> how such systems can apply to external reality, particularly varied
> ontological realms (quantum mechanics, evolution, economics, etc.).
> 
> I think a CR answer would stress the transitive-intransitive distinction
> and, borrowing a bit from pragmatism, treat probability theory as an
> instrument. Following Fig. 0.1 on p. 15 of RTS, "empirical testing"
> eventually warrants treating probabilistic mechanisms as real. This last
> move is, I think, the weakest in RTS. It's especially problematic here
> because probability comes in as part of the empirical testing as well as in
> the probabilistic (stochastic) phenomenon we're claiming is real.
> 
> Please share your thoughts and others' comments, as this issue is very
> important and interesting.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hans Ehrbar <ehrbar-AT-marx.econ.utah.edu>
> To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
> <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU>
> Date: Tuesday, September 30, 1997 8:59 AM
> Subject: BHA: Foundations of Probability
> 
> 
> 
> >
> >Do you know of any treatments of the foundations of probability
> >which do not commit the obvious errors of epistemic fallacy
> >(such as many subjective theories of probability) or
> >a flat empirical realism (such as those theories which try
> >to reduce probability to observed frequencies) or regularity
> >determinism (such as those who define probability by the
> >absence of certainty)?
> >
> >Hans Ehrbar.
> >
> >
> >     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >
> 
> 
> 
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> 



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