File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1997/bhaskar.9710, message 151


Date: Wed, 29 Oct 1997 12:18:33 -0800 (PST)
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
From: Ralph Dumain <rdumain-AT-igc.apc.org>
Subject: BHA: PLATO ETC. (4)


Section 2 of chapter 3 of Bhaskar's reader-unfriendly PLATO ETC. is called
"The Critique of ontological monovalence and the problems of philosophy",
heaven help us, but it does introduce some intriguing if obscure notions.  I
find it curious that Bhaskar would coin the term ontological monovalence and
define it as a purely positive account of reality.  That he would trace this
fallacy back to Parmenides makes sense, for Parmenides was the arch-villain
who identifies thought and intelligibility with being, and defines being as
predicated on non-contradiction with the result that the familiar material
world of multiplicity, motion, change, and development becomes unreal.
Bhaskar concludes from this conception of being that non-being is also part
of reality, and takes the further step of claiming that absence or non-being
is ontologically prior to being.  I find this rather difficult to swallow
without clarification, but I must say I am first of all reminded of Taoism,
whose whole history is laden with this claim about non-being, and whose
ironic mode of expression is directly contrary to the world-view of
Parmenides.  I see no references at all to Chinese philosophy in the index,
so maybe we can look forward to this in Bhaskar's forthcoming book.

This extraordinary claim about the priority of absence cries out for clear
and convincing argumentation to support it. Instead, Bhaskar supplies us
with yet another diagram, this one on concepts of negation, which as usual
do not receive adequate clarification.  Then we get the introduction of yet
further neologisms, "onts" and "de-onts".  Then, to illustrate the meaning
of absenting absences, Bhaskar cites saying "I do" at a wedding as an
example.  Not acknowledging the reality of absence implicates one in a
performative contradiction.  I can't make sense out of the 1M, 2E, 3L, and
4D perspectives on alterity (p. 58).  I also can't make sense out of
Bhaskar's argument for ontological polyvalence (p. 58ff).  The implications
of the critique of ontological monovalence for the problems of philosophy
(pp. 59-60) seem to be based on more unnecessary verbiage and jargon-ridden
gibberish.  I can't wait until Bhaskar fulfills his promise to prove his
ordering: ontological monovalence-> epistemic fallacy -> primal squeeze (p.
61).  The listing of aporiae, correlated with 1M, 2E, etc., (p. 61-62) is
similarly unhelpful. 

Section 3 is on truth, judgement, and consistency.  First, there are four
aspects of judgment listed.  After obscurely summarizing objections to the
various theories of truth, Bhaskar lays out his truth tetrapolity, and from
there we descend into a maelstrom of further jargon.  The section and
chapter ends with a call for the unity of theoretical and practical reason
in absolute reason and dialectical rationality.

So now I have read 66 pages and have nothing to show for it but a lot of
vague, puffed-up bullshit.  My conviction that Bhaskar has become little
more than a self-promoting con-man grows stronger and stronger.
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
     




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