Date: Fri, 10 Oct 1997 10:45:42 -0400 (EDT)
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
From: Howie Chodos <howie-AT-magi.com>
Subject: Re: BHA: But can you prove it?


First, thanks to Colin for clarifying aspects of the position we share. Now,
a few further comments mainly in response to Ruth, though the final one asks
for further clarification of the distinction Colin made between 'absence is
real' and 'everything is real.'

1. I am not against pursuit of 'an adequate metatheory.' I am simply arguing
that such a metatheory will necessarily have limitations (as well as
particular strengths) based on its being a metatheory. (I think Ruth might
agree with this.)

2. My rejection of the possibility of defining once and for all guidelines
for knowing which theories one should prefer is linked to the fact that
epistemological relativism is a necessary precondition for exercising
rational judgement. Like all our cognitive abilities, anything that could
constitute a reason for preferring Theory A to Theory B is relative to time
and place. Epistemological relativism is, in this sense, prior to
judgemental rationality. 

3. If I understand her correctly, Ruth would appear to be resisting the idea
that reasons for preferring Theory A to Theory B are unspecifiable in
advance. This would seem to imply that she would defend the hypothesis that
we can set out guidelines in advance that will allow us to adjudicate
between competing theories. But are not any such guidelines subject to the
strictures of epistemological relativism? We cannot have knowledge of these
guidelines that is any more certain than our knowledge of anything else.
Whenever we choose between competing explanations we necessarily employ
guidelines of this type, but we get them from our historically, culturally,
personally circumscribed experience: there is no unchanging formula.

4. I can think of only three ways in which such a formula could be feasible,
each of which leads to conclusions that I find ultimately unacceptable. It
is (a form of) Platonism when we try to conceive of a universal formula
waiting to be discovered; it is (a form of) Hegelianism when we believe we
are being carried along on a quest that leads inexorably towards the
realisation of the rational and the consequent discovery of the formula; it
is (a form of) positivism when we think that the world as it is will give us
the formula.

5. This does not mean, however, that the reasons we alight on for preferring
Theory A to Theory B are invalid or purely arbitrary. We can and do reason
rationally within the bounds of a constantly evolving socio-historical
matrix. As a species we are able to do this thing called rational thinking.
We can utilise our faculty of reason in ways that can be beneficial to both
our individual and our collective survival.

6. This does not mean that it is always so used, however. Nor does it mean
there are not other aspects of our behaviour as a species that rely on
non-rational abilities. The very fact that we speak in terms of utilising
reason for specific ends implies the existence of drives other than reason
that could orient its use. There must be a will capable of directing the use
of reason and a person capable of moral reasoning.

7. The pursuit of rationality does not constitute the sole driving force in
human history. It does lead to the increase of human abilities and therefore
has an autonomous tendency to reproduce itself (to borrow a phrase from G.
A. Cohen). It is a form of ordering that is particularly powerful in
generating new capacities, which can then be mobilised for a variety of
purposes.

8. I think I agree with Bhaskar that everything is, in some sense, real
(and, equally, that nothing is unreal). I have trouble thinking of an
example of something (some thing) that is not real. I certainly agree with
Marshall that the imaginary is also real. Can someone explain what is wrong
with asserting that everything is real?

Howie Chodos



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