Date: Sun, 12 Oct 1997 12:20:08 -0700 (PDT)
From: LH Engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.apc.org>
To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu
Subject: BHA: devitt and sterneley


Wallace --
 
As a footnote to my reference to mainstream scientific realism's
timidity regarding the unempirical, I did pick up the Devitt and
Sterelny book you mentioned, LANGUAGE AND REALITY, for which many
thanks.  As Colin suggested, the critique of the various neo-
Kantianisms we live with is very readable and very good.  But what
drove me to the book was the reference in one of your quotes from
it on the causal theory of meaning.  I haven't finished the book
and won't for now, but I thought I'd pass along that I found the
explanation of that tantalizing idea disappointing, and the reason
I think is timidity regarding the unempirical.  Devitt and Sterelny
are fiercely realist but it seems they might also be empirically
realist.  Their critique of structuralism gave me pause for the
same reason.  Here are some quotes from chapter 4, "A Causal Theory
of Reference: Names," pp55-56, that give me trouble:
 
First, they limit causal explanation to what can be perceived:
 
     "The basic idea of the causal theory of grounding is as
     follows.  The name is introduced ostensively at a formal or
     informal dubbing.  This dubbing is in the presence of the
     object that will from then on be the bearer of the name.  The
     event is perceived by the dubber and probably others.  To
     perceive something is to be causally affected by it.  As a
     result of this causal action, a witness to the dubbing, if of
     suitable linguistic sophistication, will gain an ability to
     use the name to designate the object.  Any use of the name
     exercising that ability designates the object in virtue of the
     use's causal link to the object:  ostension of the object
     prompted the thoughts which led to the use of the name.  In
     short, those present at the dubbing acquire a semantic ability
     that is causally grounded. . . . 
 
     So the picutre is this.  At a dubbing, a name is introduced by
     grounding it in an object.  There is a cuasal chain linking
     the ability gained at the dubbing to the object.  In virtue of
     that link, the reference of the name is fixed as the object. 
     Exercising the ability by using the name adds new links to the
     causal chain:  it leads to others having abilities dependent
     on the original ability.  Thus we can use 'Einstein' to
     designate Einstein because we are causally linked to him by a
     chain running through our linguistic community to someone
     present at his dubbing."
 
I think if one pieced together Bhaskar's ideas regarding a "causal
theory of meaning" (SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND HUMAN EMANCIPATION, has
some particularly good passages), they would go a good deal further
than this.  Compare Collier's discussion of meaning as a mapping
from one structure, linguistic, to another, the intransitive, in
his introduction to Bhaskar's thought at page 5.  Devit and
Sterenley are not presenting a fido-fido theory, I realize that,
but my guess is they are limited in their ability to deal with
meaning by their restricted perceptual notion of causation.
 
Many thanks again for the reference.  The book is well worth
attention.
 
 
Howard
 
Howard Engelskirchen
Western State University
 
     "What is there just now you lack"  Hakuin


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