From: "Marshall Feldman" <marsh-AT-URIACC.URI.EDU>
To: <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu>
Subject: Re: BHA: theorya/theoryb
Date: Thu, 16 Oct 1997 09:46:52 -0400


Howie,

I find this confusing.

>I agree with Tobin when he writes that: "Subjective states are *already*
>both real and actual; and all actualities are also realities." I also agree
>with Marshall when he argues that: "Actual innovations are in the realm of
>D(a). But because we're talking about mental phenomena here, they're also
in
>D(s)." Basically I agree that anything that is already a subjective state
is
>necessarily also actual. That is why I proposed thinking of the two domains
>as overlapping.

We need to be careful when we say subjective states are actual. All
subjective states may be actual, but this does not imply that all actual
states are subjective. If all subjective states are actual but not all
actual states are subjective, then the subjective is a subset of the actual.

Nonetheless, there's a crucial issue as to the object of knowledge. Einstein
may have had subjective consciousness about matter and energy, and in this
sense his mental state was an actualization of potential mental states. The
triad, D(r), D(a), D(s) applies to Einstein's mental state. On the other
hand, Einstein's mental state has an altogether different relation with
matter and energy. Here we're making the familiar distinction between the
object of knowledge and knowledge itself, between intransitive and
transitive, and between ontology and epistemology. To confuse the
real-actual-subjective regarding human cognition with the
real-actual-subjective regarding the objects of that cognition is to commit
the epistemic fallacy, albeit in a very subtle way.

>
>But I think that my question remains with regard to the formula, which
>Bhaskar uses in print so that I don't think it is a matter of symbolic
>confusion, and which makes D(s) a subset of D(a), as to whether this means
>that all subjectivity is necessarily actual. My argument is that it is not.
>There are real powers associated with subjectivity which are not
necessarily
>actual.

But then by Bhaskar's scheme, these powers are in D(r). The confusion comes
because the term "subjectivity" has multiple meanings. If, instead, you used
"consciousness" to refer to the thoughts, ideas, etc. that the knowing
subject actually has and "cognitive" to refer to the entire mental apparatus
which underpins the subject's thought possibilities, then I think the
problem resolves itself. Perhaps RB should have said D(consciousness)
instead of D(s) since "subjectivity" tends to conflate cognitive and
conscious realms.

>It is in this sense that D(s) is equivalent to D(a), and I would
>argue that it is not a special case, but rather part of their overall
>equivalence. This is why I object to making D(s) a subset of D(a).
>
>Now, maths has never been my strong suit. I do wonder, though, whether it
is
>legitimate to argue, as Tobin does, that something can be a subset of
>something else and still "add" something new to its parent set? If it is,
>then there is something I don't get about the relationship between set and
>subset, and about what it means to innovate.

In a strict mathematical sense you're right. In the sense that it adds to
our understanding of the parent set, you're wrong. For example, we may have
the abstract concept "mode of production." We may also apply that concept to
some well-known examples (capitalism, feudalism, etc.). The new argument
that something (e.g. gender relations in the nuclear family) satisfies the
conditions of being considered a mode of production might lead us to
"discover" a new element, or subset, in the larger set of all possible modes
of production. Consideration of this new, patriarchal, mode of production
will undoubtedly enrich our understanding of the parent set, the set of all
modes of production.

This translates directly to math. Often the parent set is defined by some
rule, and considering specific elements that satisfy the rule adds to our
understanding of the rule itself. In fact, computer programmers are taught
to debug programs by using "boundary conditions" -- extreme elements of the
set of all conditions to which the program applies -- because such
conditions are most likely to uncover ways in which the rule (program)
applies that the author does not intend.





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