From: "Wallace Polsom" <wallace-AT-raggedclaws.com> To: <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu> Subject: BHA: Re: An offering Date: Tue, 11 Nov 1997 20:51:53 -0600 Hi all, I haven't (yet) put up an HTML-ized version of Louis's glossary, but I have thrown together a Web page where anyone can have the document sent automatically to their email box simply by filling out a form. I call it "The Critical Realism File Distribution Page," and the URL is http://www.usask.ca/hru/criticalrealism/files/index.html Also, if, like Louis, you have a few files you would like to make available to others interested in Critical Realism, and you hold the copyright for those files, please feel free to send copies to me by email so I can add them to the list. Finally, if you have any problems with the system, please be sure to let me know ASAP so that I can take appropriate action to remedy the situation. Enjoy! Wallace -----Original Message----- From: Louis Irwin <lirwin1-AT-ix.netcom.com> To: bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu <bhaskar-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu> Date: Tuesday, November 11, 1997 1:58 AM Subject: BHA: An offering I would like to offer the list some notes I recently compiled from marginalia and notes on my readings of Bhaskar. They make up about 10 pages or 40K, which is somewhat larger than most uploads on the list. Instead of inflicting it on everyone, I decided to create a humble Web page to serve it. If you are interested, go to http://www2.netcom.com/~lirwin1/bhaskar.html and use the right mouse button, as stated there, to start the download. If you prefer me to mail it to you, send me email at lirwin1-AT-ix.netcom.com (Note that "lirwin1" starts with a letter and ends with a numeral, in case your email font is like mine and barely distinguishes the two.) Please put "send" in the subject line so I can organize the thousands of requests that will no doubt be pouring in. ("Requests for Bhaskar document brings Internet to its knees!") But do try to get it from the Web first, please. I don't have the diligence to learn html properly, otherwise I would make the text available on a Web page. I recall Wallace graciously offered to support some Web pages, in case my notes are useful. To give you the flavor, here is the beginning: "These notes are intended to acquaint those new to Bhaskar's works with some of the basic concepts Bhaskar uses to formulate his positions, not to state the positions themselves, and I hope they will be useful as an entry point for new readers. One aim is to state the concepts as clearly as possible in order to enable new readers to orient themselves, therefore many nuances are not addressed. An attempt has been made to state the point of a concept and relate it to the philosophical tradition and/or to other of Bhaskar's concepts. I cannot pretend to be completely successful in these aims. The material is not meant as a comprehensive glossary nor to cover the same ground as those which Bhaskar provides in DPF and PE, which vary in their difficulty. It is more in the nature of a primer. Finally, I should stress that these notes represent my own particular background and path into critical realism and may not be entirely congenial to those with a different background, especially those who prefer historical approaches to concepts. I welcome suggestions, corrections and criticisms regarding both accuracy, nuances, and the points of concepts. Please feel free to distribute these notes to whomever you wish, as long as they are preceded by this paragraph. This version is an incomplete draft based on my marginalia and includes page references to specific works which will be excised in later versions as I correct errors. References to PON and PIF are lacking, because the former is unavailable to me and I have not had time to read the latter. --Louis Irwin Abbreviations: RTS = "A Realist Theory of Science"; PON = "The Possibility of Naturalism"; SRHE = "Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation"; RR "Reclaiming Reality"; PIF = "Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom"; DPF "Dialectic - the Pulse of Freedom"; PE = "Plato Etc." Absence - Bhaskar argues that the world cannot be conceived without absences, to which we constantly refer and presuppose. The idea is not that we add fictional entities like Santa Claus or unicorns to the presences that we already recognize in our factual discourse, it is rather that reality even at the everyday level is inundated with absences (an empty glass, a missing wallet, the failure of a monsoon to have effect, etc.). (PE 56-7) Bhaskar does recognize fictional entities as part of fictional as opposed to factual discourse, but even in factual discourse we do not have to accord existence in the form of absence to things we talk about, such as caloric. (DPF 40-41) Generally, absences are causally efficacious, such as the absence of health, in contrast, say, to the non-existence of caloric. Bhaskar understands absences both as product (something not there) and process (making something absent, or "absenting"). He also uses iterable hybrids of these: process-in-product (for example, the causal efficacy of the past or things at a distance), product-in-process (the exercise of causal powers, as in ongoing social activity) (DPF 39; PE 55-6) Bhaskar argues that absence is a concept that is alien to the classical conception of the world which strived to ensure that all action takes place by contiguous contact, yet that conception is incoherent without absence. (PE 57) For example, the transfer of momentum from one billiard ball to another requires spaces in between them. More generally, absence is closely related to change and hence to cause. For a change in something is the absence of something that was present, or the presence of something that was absent; and to cause something is to make a change, either of the first sort, which is what Bhaskar calls "absenting" something, or of the second sort, which Bhaskar calls "absenting absence". Either way, to cause something is to make something absent (either a presence or an absence). (PE 56) Now there might appear to be a symmetry between absence and presence, so that every absence can be regarded as the presence of something else, and vice versa. The absence of hair would be regarded as the presence of baldness, etc. Even this trivial example lacks symmetry, because we understand "baldness" as meaning absence of hair, whereas we do not understand "hair" as meaning absence of baldness. Non-trivial examples, such as the absence of health, bring out deeper asymmetries. In a narrow sense the absence of health, say TB, could mean the presence of certain microbes, such as is occurring in America's inner cities, but as in the baldness example the symmetry breaks down: we do not understand the presence of those specific microbes as meaning the absence of TB (we could identify them in an independent fashion). There is a broader asymmetry as well, because the absence of health in general cannot be equated with the presence of disease. The presence of disease manifests itself in a number of ways, such as the presence of microbes, viruses, carcinogens, etc., however these presences are caused by the absence of health practices, which is in turn tied to politics. Consider another example: the absence of freedom equated to the presence of oppression. The equation breaks down, because the presence of oppression is manifested in many ways (death squads, disappearances, jails, etc.), but the underlying causes of those manifestations can only be described as an absence of freedom. Actualism (SRHE 28) - The reduction of causal laws to patterns of events, a position associated with Hume and classical empiricism. Bhaskar holds by contrast that causal laws have a real existence as tendencies which generate the phenomena (events and situations) in which patterns are detected and which are subject to empirical observation or verification. The patterns are reflections of the tendencies, but the latter cannot be reduced to the former. Bhaskar designates phenomena generated by real mechanisms and tendencies as "actual", but such mechanisms and tendencies may or may not manifest themselves in actual phenomena, depending on what else occurs (and such manifestations may or may not be empirically ascertained). The distinction between real and actual pertains to positivism, the distinction between actual and empirical pertains to subject/object identity. This is a key concept for Bhaskar and is closely related to stratification (see "Differentiation and stratification"). See also "Closed and open systems", "Strong and weak actualism", and "Facts". Change - Bhaskar uses this term in a technical, rather than everyday, sense. Underlying the everyday assertion "There has been a change in the weather" some philosophical theories see no change involved even if the statement is true. Yesterday's weather, today's weather, and tomorrow's weather are viewed as events which exist outside time and thus are "eternal." At most a statement that there has been a change in the weather involves a switch in subjective attention from one eternal event (yesterday's weather) to another (today's weather), or from one aspect of a single unchanging Parmenidean 'one' to another. Bhaskar wants to reinstate the temporal aspects of reality, and he characterizes such theories as unable to conceptualize change, which requires viewing the significant elements of reality as tensed processes comprising irreducible internal and external temporal relations. (DPF 45) The absence of change shows up in a number of ways in different theories. Token monism is the view that the world consists of unchanging tokens, each one a monad, an isolated Parmenidean 'one'. (DPF 44) For example, indexicalism (the world as a series of atomistic experiences), punctualism (the world as a set of atomistic events or facts), blockism (the world as a closed set of all past, present and future facts, all equally determinate). (DPF 252-4) Type monism is the view that the world consists of unchanging types and is hence does not admit emergence. Closed and open systems (SRHE 27) - A closed system is one restricted in such a way that laws have uniform effects. An open system is one that is not closed. Closed systems do not usually occur spontaneously in nature and generally require human intervention, such as in laboratory experiments. All sorts of intervening causes may prevent a causal mechanism or tendency from having its normal effect. The concept of closure plays an important role in refuting determinism, because a determinist case cannot be sustained without the regularity that comes with closed systems, and ultimately it is shown that the assumption of closure is an article of faith. Classical field theories in physics (gravity, electromagnetism, mechanics) assumed a pure world containing only a single field and showed how, given any initial state of the field, all subsequent states of the field were determined. The question of what happens when several of the fields are assumed to exist and interact created problems for the determinism that was irrefutable under the assumption that only a single field exists and is operative. Laplacean determinism extrapolated this narrow truth to all of reality. Closure is also closely connected to the understanding of laws other than as merely patterns of events: that identity can be sustained only so long as systems are assumed to be closed. It is important to realize that a closed system is not the same as a spatially isolated system. To achieve closure one must assure that there are no countervailing causes (of a kind pertaining to the phenomena being investigated). Being cut off from external influences is in general insufficient to rule out internal countervailing causes. For example, a system free of external influences is nevertheless open in respect to Newtonian mechanisms if it contains quantum phenomena. (RTS 69) Quantum phenomena are treated by determinists as irrelevant at some macro level. Counterexamples like a switch that is thrown and thereby causing some macro event if and only if a geiger counter shows an even number at a designated time are considered exceptions: determinism applies only in closed systems, which will by (circular) definition exclude such example situations. A potential field is deterministic, other things being equal, that is, excluding quantum phenomena, not to say other potential fields which are also deterministic! See "Differentiation and stratification" and "Strong and weak actualism." Louis Irwin --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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