Date: Thu, 22 Jan 1998 16:54:49 +0000 (GMT)
From: Andrew Brown <a.brown-AT-mdx.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: rts ch3 s4


Colin wrote:

> Also it has just struck me, and I haven't read RTS for some time, but isn't
> the bare powers argument an attempt to validate the existence of some things
> simply and only in terms of a "bare power". And by this I mean that the bare
> power itself is what exists, it is not something which has a bare power?

I'm also rusty on RTS but here goes: I thought the 'bare power' 
arises from the infinite regress inherent the CR model of causation 
and so explanation. Event regularities imply causation if and only if 
they are produced by some real underlying mechanism/structure (say 
atomic structure and the theory of valency). Once scientists are 
satisfied that the structure / mechanism has been identified then off 
they go looking for explantions of this new entity (sub-atomic 
theory). This is an infinte regress; for stuctures must always have, 
in their turn, there own explanation. This regress is stopped by the 
'bare power' argument.

> 
> Anyway, besides all this. I just wondered what list memebers thought was
> RB's most telling argument against the covering law model of explanation? I
> have a course to teach on the philosophy of social science next week and I
> wanted to address the covering law model. RB just has so many arguments
> against the model (regularity determinism, actualism, implies closure,
> tendentially subjectivist and so on) and time is limited, I was wondering
> what list members thought was the killer blow. If there is one that is?
> 

I too have to quickly write something on the critique of the 
Popper-Hempel covering law theory (in connection with a critique of 
neo-classical economics). I hope to use a useful summary made by 
Reuten and Williams (1989, 'Value form and the State') of Bhaskar's 
critique. The essence of the Bhaskarian critique is, then:

-the covering law model identifies empirical regularities with laws. 
-this is wrong because it presupposes a closed system. Yet the world 
is rarely closed [easy to explain with reference to experiment]
- so [KILLER BLOW] empirical regularities are not NECESSARY to laws.

I suppose I see this as the killer blow because it is so simple to 
state, compelling and immanent (being presented as an immanent 
critique and transcendental deduction from experiment). In 
seminars one's audience are left wondering why anyone 
should ever have though that laws are empirical regularities. 
Moreover it is incredibly powerful since it applies to much 
philosophy of  science (which, of course, had in general only 
questioned the sufficiency of emp regularities, not their necessity).

Now I know you knew all this already but I hope I helped somehow,

andy b.



Andrew Brown,
School of Economics,
Middlesex University,
Queensway,
Enfield.
EN3 4SF

tel 0181 362 5512


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