Date: Tue, 26 May 1998 08:14:08 +0100
From: Colin Wight <Colin.Wight-AT-aber.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: truth and God's eye
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Hi Ruth,<br>
<br>
Maybe I'm missing something (I seem to start all of my posts this way
these days), but I just don't see why the identification of truth with
reality/the real seems problematic in terms of critique. Nor do I see why
this would be of any service to running the Prussian (some of my best
friends are Prussian I'll have you know), or any other for that matter.
Foucault springs to mind here (I'm in eclectic mode). Not that my reading
suits the Foucaultian hordes mind you, but as I understand MF, one of the
things that worry him most is the proscribing of truth by political
regimes. An alethic concept of truth makes this impossible does it not,
since all truths can only be articulated in discourse, it is always
possible and desirable to challenge all truth claims. Moreover, RB
doesn't <b><i>only </b></i>(let me know how this word comes out please
I'm using a new email handler which lets me do italics and bold) have an
alethic concept but also the epistemic-ontic dual one which mediates the
alethic one, that is to say the alethic one can only be articulated
through the epistemic-ontic one. It seems to me that politically at
least, an alethic concept of truth puts truth beyond the pale of any one
discourse alone and I find this opens the door to critique not closes it.
For it allows me to say to the Prussion state - bullshit!<br>
<br>
<br>
This is the political ground, but on philosophical grounds, as I have
said before the alethic concept of truth is a condition of possibility
for the epistemic-ontic one.<br>
<br>
Thanks.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
4. Alethia again: in addition to my already-voiced reservations about
the<br>
way Bhaskar seems to be treating the concept of truth, I was thinking
today<br>
that the identification of truth with reality/the real seems an unlikely
and<br>
questionable move for a theorist concerned with critique. I mean,
you can<br>
see why, if you're going to say truth=reality (and presumably that<br>
reality=truth), you'd want to add that absences are real too --
but, I dont<br>
know, the whole thing seems weird to me if you're not trying to
legitimate<br>
the Prussian state.<br>
<br>
<br>
5. Anyone else think it would be cool to have a Critical Realism
conference<br>
in North America sometime? I'll be on an organizing committee if
it's in<br>
Toronto or Philadelphia!<br>
<br>
<br>
6. Gary, sure I'll do that section. I'm happy to send it to you
first, as<br>
I'm not sure how much more I can do than summarize!<br>
<br>
<br>
Goodnight,<br>
R.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
--- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
---<br>
<br>
At 15:39 25/05/98 +0000, you wrote:<br>
>Hello again,<br>
><br>
>Wallace, thanks for the citation to the Concepts piece, which, I
realize, I<br>
>have already seen, and thanks for sharing more of Devitt. I like a
lot of<br>
>what Devitt says but am skeptical about causal theories of
reference.<br>
>Still, I will now dutifully add Devitt to my shopping cart at
Amazon.com.<br>
><br>
>You ask why people like me prefer to construe correspondence as the
meaning<br>
>or, pace Colin, the definition of truth as opposed to the explanation
of<br>
>truth.=A0 Well, one reason is that before I worry about explaining
truth, I<br>
>first want to know what it is I would be explaining.<br>
><br>
>Last night, I was very pleasantly disconcerted by the RB passage you
shared<br>
>with us.=A0 This morning, thanks partially, I think, to Colin's helpful
post,<br>
>I am much less disconcerted.<br>
><br>
>In the RB passage you cite, it does seem as if Bhaskar takes back
with one<br>
>hand what he gives with the other. I think, however, that this
appearance<br>
>disappears if we distinguish correspondence as definition from<br>
>correspondence as criterion of truth. Look:<br>
><br>
>>Epistemological relativism<br>
>>insists only upon the impossibility of knowing objects except
under<br>
>>particular descriptions. And it entails the rejection of any
correspondence<br>
>>theory of truth. A proposition is true if and only if the state
of affairs<br>
>>that it expresses (describes) is real. But propositions cannot be
compared<br>
>>with states of affairs; their relationship cannot be described as
one of<br>
>>correspondence. Philosophers have wanted a theory of truth to
provide a<br>
>>criterion or stamp of knowledge. But no such stamp is possible.
For the<br>
>>judgement of the truth of a proposition is necessarily intrinsic
to the<br>
>>science concerned. There is no way in which we can look at the
world and<br>
>>then at a sentence and ask whether they fit. There is just the
expression<br>
>>(of the world) in speech (or thought)"<br>
><br>
>Clearly, RB rejects correspondence as criterion.=A0 True, he does speak
of<br>
>the rejection of _any_ correspondence theory, but let us suppose for
a<br>
>moment that he means only any criterion-correspondence theory.=A0 Then
the<br>
>rest of the passage makes sense. What RB goes on to affirm without
the<br>
>label is some form of definition-correspondence theory. Since the
passage<br>
>makes sense this way, I propose we extend the principle of charity
to<br>
>interpret it so.<br>
><br>
>One of your Devitt passagages raises a question that -- if anyone is
still<br>
>with me -- I would like help on.=A0 The passage reads:<br>
><br>
>>Theorizing about the relations between a thought or
expression<br>
>>and an object no more requires a God's Eye View than does
theorizing about<br>
>>the relation between, say, David Frost and Richard Nixon."
(_Realism and<br>
>>Truth_ 232)<br>
><br>
>My question concerns the phrase, "God's Eye View."=A0 Now it
is a basic<br>
>premise of epistemic relativism that our determinations of truth are
always<br>
>situated and, thus, never from God's vantage point.=A0 I accept
that.<br>
><br>
>My question is this:=A0 Does a truth claim itself -- as opposed to
the<br>
>methods used to verify it -- necessarily represent itself as the
"God's Eye<br>
>View" or, equivalently, as a "View from Nowhere."=A0
Here, perhaps, I truly<br>
>am succumbing to "angelism" because I am inclined to say
yes. Yes, at<br>
>least, according to the definition-correspondence theory.=A0 Is this
shocking<br>
>to everybody still reading or is this not over the top?<br>
><br>
>The context for this is a commentary I had presented on
_Feminist<br>
>Contentions_, in which all the participants were in accord in
their<br>
>rejection of a God's Eye View of truth.=A0 But, then, among other
things,<br>
>Judith Butler accuses Seyla Benhabib of misquoting her. Whereas
Butler had<br>
>used the expression, "no doer behind the deed," Benhabib
quoted her as<br>
>writing "no doer _beyond_ the deed."<br>
><br>
>Not much hangs on that misquote, but I argued that the claim of<br>
>misquotation carries force only if it is not just a claim from a
standpoint<br>
>but, rather, a claim that holds -- although is not verified -- either
from<br>
>nowhere or from God's point of view.<br>
><br>
>It was this claim of mine that evoked criticism even from
critical<br>
>realists.=A0 If I have blundered, please disabuse me, but -- notice
Howard --<br>
>for the moment, I remain committed to it.<br>
><br>
>Ruth, thanks for the clarifications on deflation and pragamatism.=A0 Do
you<br>
>ever return to Phila?<br>
><br>
>Michael, I am no more a Habermasian than I am an Andersonian, but it
may<br>
>support your point to observe that at the bi-weekly poker game I play
at, I<br>
>am the worst one there.=A0 Maybe I would do better if Booth came
along.<br>
><br>
>doug<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
>doug porpora<br>
>dept of psych and sociology<br>
>drexel university<br>
>phila pa 19104<br>
>USA<br>
><br>
>porporad-AT-duvm.ocs.drexel.edu<br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
>=A0=A0=A0=A0 --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---<br>
>
<BR>
<div>------------------------------------------------------------------------</div>
<br>
<div>Dr. Colin Wight</div>
<div>Department of International Politics</div>
<div>University of Wales</div>
<div>Aberystwyth</div>
<div>Tel: (01970) 621769</div>
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