Date: Fri, 3 Jul 1998 15:10:49 -0700 (PDT) From: LH Engelskirchen <lhengels-AT-igc.apc.org> Subject: BHA: bhaskar and the aristotelian scheme I collected these earlier this year, but never got around to posting them. * * * * A. SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND HUMAN EMANCIPATION, 54-55: "Now if we are to avoid the absurdity of the supposition of the production of (new and changing) knowledge ex nihilo (on which more anon) and to sustain the material continuity of the process of cognitive transformation, this process must be conceived as iteratively dependent upon the employment of antecedently existing cognitive resources, taken from the same or some other domain (Bachelard's 'scientific loans'). These resources comprise the transitive objects of knowledge; their transormation is the transitive process of knowledge-production; and its product, knowledge (of an intransitive object or topic), in turn supplies resources for further rounds of inquiry. This imparts to the cognitive process a quasi-autopoietic character, with the production of knowledges accomplished by means of (anterior) knowledges. And it immediately suggests the possibility of provisionally characterising, or modelling, science in essentially Aristotelian terms (though this was not in fact the way in which Aristotle most charcteristically viewed science). Its material causes (or transitive objects) would then consist in pre-existing cognitions used as models; its efficient causes in the theoretically-guided research activity of (wo)men; its final causes in the achievement of adequate explanations and its formal causes in knowledge of the intranstive objects of inquiry. On such a model, science is a social process, possessing material causes of its own kind, anterior and irreducible to any individual acquisition, oriented to the production, via the dynamic exploitation of whatever cognitive resources lie at its disposal, of the knowledge of the mechanisms of the production of the phenomena in nature." B. RECLAIMING REALITY, 77-78: "Now if society pre-exists the individual, objectivation takes on a very different significance. For it, conscious human activity, consists of work on given objects, and cannot be conceived as taking place in their absence. These objects may be material or ideational. And they may be regarded as the results of prior objectivations. Now this suggests a radically different conception of social activity, an essentially Aristotelian one: the paradigm being that of a sculptor at work, fashioning a product out of the material and with the tools avaialble to him or her. I shall call this the transformational model of social activity. It applies to discursive as well as to non-discursive practices; to science and politics, as much as to economics. Thus in science the raw materials used in the construction of new theories are established results, half- forgotten ideas, the stock of available paradigms and models, methods and techniques of inquiry; so that the scientific innovator comes to appear in retrospect as a kind of cognitive bricoleur. To use the Aristotelian terms, then, in every process of productive activity a material as well as an efficient cause is necessary. And social activity consists, then, at least paradigmatically in work on and the transformation of given materials." C. SRHE, 122-123. The following passage introduces the TMSA in SRHE: "The T.M.S.A., which may be motivated either by transcendental argument from intentional agency or by immanent critique of the antinomies of social theory, may be regarded as an attempt to articulate the formal conditions for substantive object- constitution in the social sciences via a definition of what must be the case for a sui generis science of social objects to be possible. It has already been displayed at work in the shape of the quasi-autopoietic conception of scientific development spelt out in Chapter 1.5. The principal historical forebears of the model, as I understand it, are Aristotle and Marx. Its central features are the definition of human intentional agency as criterial for the social, as distinct from the purely natural sphere; and the characterisation of the onto-logical structure of human activity or praxis as essentially transformative or poietic, as consisting in the tranformation of the pre-given material (natural and social) causes by efficient (intentional) human agency. The criterion for differentiating the social from the purely natural material causes is given by their property that, although necessarily pre-given to any particular agent and a condition for every intentional act, they exist and persist only in virtue of human agency. If there are social explanations for social phenomena (i.e. if a social science of social forms is to be possible), then what is designated in such explanations, the social mechanisms and structures generating social phenomena, must be social products themselves; and so, like any other social object, they must be given to and reproduced in human agency. . . . Human activity, then, is dependent upon given materials (means, media resources, rules), which it transforms." D. SRHE 119. Earlier in the same section in the course of adressing "the susceptibility of social and natural phenomena to explanation in essentially the same way": "Rather it is only in virtue of an independent analysis, such as will be aired in a moment, that a paramorphic relationship between the natural and the human sciences can be set up capable of vindicating the idea that there are (or at least may be) knowable structures at work in the human domain partly analogous but irreducible to (although dependent upon) those discovered in nature, whereupon the material causality of social forms and the efficient causality of beliefs emerge as conditions of intentional agency and discursive thought respectively." E. POSSIBILITY OF NATURALISM (1st ed. 122). (I just found a hardback copy, unmarked!, of the first edition of PON in an old bookstore for $6.95!): "Reasons, then, are beliefs. And the fact that beliefs can be specified, as it were, disinterestedly, that is in isolation from any desire, partly accounts for the systematic ambiguity in the notion of a reason as both a ground for a proposition and an explanation for an action, and for the familiar contrast between reasons for and reasons why. But this account of the matter seems to leave a problem as to why beliefs should ever become attached to desires. Now the Newtonian Revolution in psychology consists in coming to see that people do not have to be pushed, prodded or stimulated into action. They act spontaneously. Or one could say that they are active by nature. The irreducibility of intentionality means that it is not that, but rather what people do that is problematic. . . . For whereas decisions are discrete, and often lagged, in time, action or better activity occurs as a continuous stream, in which the volitional element can never be analyzed away, so that there is no more mystery about why beliefs become wants (causally efficacious) than there is about how wants issue in actions. For the desires that transform beliefs into wants (interests and needs) and so ceteris paribus into actions are generated, like the beliefs themselves, in the course of the practical business of life. Will, for its part, may best be regarded as pure or unimpeded desire; and desire as, correspondingly, will, which encountering some obstacle, requires beliefs about the manner as well as the object of its satisfaction. In this sense Aristotle was correct: the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action. "One does what one wants to (or intends) unless prevented. This is a necessary truth. And no further explanation of action as such is required. . . ." Howard Howard Engelskirchen --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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