Date: Sun, 04 Oct 1998 18:52:28 +0100
From: Heikki Patomaki <heikki-AT-nigd.u-net.com>
Subject: Re: BHA: truth again


DEFENDING THE CLAIM THAT ONTOLOGISED TRUTH IS
EITHER NON-SENSICAL OR SUSCEPTIBLE TO DOGMATISM
AND VIOLENCE.

-----------------------------------------

Howard Engelskirchen wrote:

>To me Colin=92s explanations of alethia have been excellent.  I want to
>support particularly the point about violence because this is the nub
>of the political issue.  I=92ve always thought this was one of Bhaskar=92s
>most powerful contributions.  To the distinction realisms generally
>make between things and our thinking about them, critical realism
>adds the insistence:  therefore we must be fallibilist.  No dogmatism
>follows from a commitment to the truth of things. 

Not necessarily. There are, it seems to me, two possibilities
here: (i) either *nothing* follows from the idea that 'truth is not
only a relational and epistemic concept but also designates
a predicate of things themselves'; or (ii) *dogmatism* follows.
The first possibility occurs when the idea of alethia is read
as synonumous to ontological realism. The second possibility
occurs when 'truth as a predicate of relational entities' is
allowed to mix up with the relational and epistemic dimensions
of the theory of truth. That is, when you start to think that
any truth-judgement designates a predicate of things themselves;
then the truth-judgment could not be anymore otherwise, could it?
Somehow the theory you have starts to reflect the way
things *really* are...

As far as the possibility (i) is concerned, my intuition is
the following: in the nature, there are no truths, however
hard we try to observe and experimentate with it. There
are relational and structured entities with real causal
powers but no things, entities or relations that we
should describe by calling them true. That is, 'truth' is not
a predicate of any entity, relation or mechanism, but of
our conceptions (theories, models) of these entities,
relations, mechanisms etc. These conceptions, theories,
models etc. REFER to reality, and truth is about the
consequent CORRESPONDENCE (which must be understood to
be a metaphor drawn from physical correspondence between
things (or measures), but no less important or real
as such). So there can be no consistent truth-judgment
without ontological realism.

Consider the following two claims:

	Atom consists of x,y,z and they are related to each
	by laws a,b,c. This forms a system that is in some
	respects like the solar system.

	Atom consists of... system. Atom is also true.

Do you really think the additional part in the latter
formulation does make sense?

>Because we have
>recourse to the truth of things we can resolve differences between us
>by appeal to them rather than to violence. 

Where does this follow from? A conventionalist would argue
that since we know that all truths are intersubjective and
socio-historically formed, we must resolve differences
between us by appeal to argumentation and conversation
rather than violence. He would go on to argue that the
trouble starts when one participant thinks that he knows
what the truth really is, that he is talking about the
world itself (alethia?), not about surface appearances
and irrealisr (mis)conceptions only... (or as Lenin would
have said, truths as "reflections" of reality...). The
conventionalist does have a point; and, in my view, you
have therefore the burden of proof here.

> If we stop with epistemic relativism, then there, in the face
>of our inevitable differences, force decides.  At least the
>commitment that how things are does not depend on our views of
>them opens the possibility of judgmental rationalism:  we can appeal
>to the truth of things.  We can put litmus paper in liquid to resolve
>our dispute.

Firstly, none in this debate is stopping with epistemic
relativism (certainly I do not and Ruth does not). Secondly,
I agree that is is ALSO true that a Nietzschean nihilism
/relativism is very susceptble to very violent interpretations
and applications. It is a non sequiter to think that
this is the only problem.

Many thanks,


			Heikki



----------------------------------
Heikki Patom=E4ki,
Network Institute of Global Democratisation (NIGD)
Helsinki & Nottingham
e-mail: heikki-AT-nigd.u-net.com
tel: 	+358 -(0)40  - 558 2916 (GSM)
	+44 - (0)802 - 598 332  (GSM)

ALSO:

Department of International Studies
Nottingham Trent University
Clifton Lane
Nottingham NG11 8NS
The United Kingdom
e-mail: heikki.patomaki-AT-ntu.ac.uk
tel:	+44 - (0)115 - 948 6610
fax: 	+44 - (0)115 - 948 6385





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