Date: Mon, 05 Oct 1998 23:50:28 +0100 From: Heikki Patomaki <heikki-AT-nigd.u-net.com> Subject: Re: BHA: truth again Instead of going through all the points Colin so beautifully puts forward concerning 'truth', let me just pose three questions. These questions are based on the suspicion that it might not be enough to declare that the other person presupposes the claim of his/her opponent. If A declines to be convinced by B, it is usually a call for further reasons and evidence. Strong attacks imply always the burden of proof. Thus, it must be also shown HOW and WHY is alethia presupposed: 1. Exactly in what sense is the notion of alethia presupposed by me or Ruth? And what exactly is meant by it? To me it is not enough to say that without it realism becomes thin and useless. For me, it does not. Why, and in what sense, should it? 2. It is exactly the distinction between ontological realism and truth and truth-judgments belonging to the transitive dimension that makes it possible for truth-judgments being wrong about something. We can NOT project "our truths" on them, because the world is independent of our theories of them (in the social world however, only with qualifications). Hence the endless openness to further ideas, reasons and, last but not least, EVIDENCE. A model/theory claimed to be true should not mistake truth as a predicate of the world. Would not you need to show HOW and WHY is *alethia* (truth as a predicate of world; what kind of predicate?) presupposed in any of these claims here? 3. Since many formulations seemingly support the view that 'alethia' = ontological realism, we would need to know why and how exectly are they different. To make the point as clearly as possible: I am NOT making a conventionalist argument, and the demand for ground and evidence should NEVER be to ask anybody to "shut up". I am only saying that the conventionalist does have a point. It is easy to argue against straw men, and it is easy to claim that the other persons presuppose your claim. It is more difficult to take into account nuances and qualifications, and particularly to show what exactly is presupposed and why (we are not dealing with self-evident deductive-logical relations here). More elaborated arguments are hence called for... To Ruth: She says: >"Somehow the theory you have starts to reflect the way things *really* >are...," as though this were a bad thing. I wouldn't go along with that, >but I'm not sure that Heikki meant it the way it came out. Yes, perhaps the emphasis should have been on the term "reflect". Reflection is a subject-independent relation, and thereby this (leninist) notion opens up the possibilty of thinking that *our* theory is THE true one, that is, it is beyond dispute. Models and explanations that are not beyond dispute can nonetheless be highly critical of any established truths. They claim to CORRESPOND to the way things really are. But they are quite not as "strong" and unchanging as THE truths; that is, they are non-violent. Thanks, Heikki ---------------------------------- Heikki Patom=E4ki, Network Institute of Global Democratisation (NIGD) Helsinki & Nottingham e-mail: heikki-AT-nigd.u-net.com tel: +358 -(0)40 - 558 2916 (GSM) +44 - (0)802 - 598 332 (GSM) ALSO: Department of International Studies Nottingham Trent University Clifton Lane Nottingham NG11 8NS The United Kingdom e-mail: heikki.patomaki-AT-ntu.ac.uk tel: +44 - (0)115 - 948 6610 fax: +44 - (0)115 - 948 6385 --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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