Date: Thu, 7 Jan 1999 10:08:06 -0700 (MST)
From: Hans Ehrbar <ehrbar-AT-econ.utah.edu>
Subject: BHA: Dialectics in nature


Thank you for your responses.  I looked up DPF under "diffraction
of dialectic", and on p. 103 RB says the following about
dialectical argument in its more rigorous sense (b):

"What distinguishes them is that, if sound, they establish
*false necessities*, or at the very least significantly
conditioned, limited or partial necessities.  That is to
say, dialectical arguments proper [this must be a typo,
should it be "propel"?] legitimate conclusions which are
paradigmatically at once both false and necessary (or at
least limited), contradictory, *incoherent* or incomplete in
some relevant way, *yet* inexorable or *indispensable*.  To
put this in a quasi-Kantian manner, they establish *the
conditions of impossibility* ... of the *conditions of
possibility* ... of *some* more or less transcendentally or
otherwise *significant* result or *phenomena* which has
already been established or can in any event be taken for
granted.  Moreover, they establish *ontological conclusions*;
and they license *negative evaluative* or practical
implications.


Any thoughts which may throw light on this passage would be
appreciated.

Hans.


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