Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1999 12:57:25 -0400 (EDT) From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca> Subject: Re: BHA: Re: Kant's realism Hi Jan, Sorry for the long delay. I saved this message, half written, and kind of forgot about it, having exhausted myself trying to get a handle on Bhaskar and Kant. For what it's worth, here's my response! Thanks again for the exchange. You wrote: >What we are looking for are "the knock down *arguments*", >and the "convincing reasons" in support of Bhaskar's TR but contra >Kant's TI. Yes. A Kantian would argue, I think, that (a) while there may indeed exist a reality that in principle cannot be experienced -- and, in the nature of the case, that we therefore can say nothing about -- and (b) while it is even the case that reference to such a (possible, but by definition un-knowable) realm is in fact required, as a negative, limiting concept, NONETHELESS: (c) to simply assert that causality as such (and here, remember, for the Kantian we are talking not about which particular x's cause which particular y's -- that is indeed a matter to be investigated empirically -- but of what is it to *be* a cause) ...simply asserting that causality is a property of mind-independent matter (i.e., that it is a matter of the real powers of generative mechanisms) is a materialist version of rationalist metaphysical dogmatism. So: how do we convince the Kantian that s/he is wrong, that Bhaskar's got the better epistemology and the better metaphysics? You suggest that Bhaskar would propose the following as evaluative criteria: >Imo Bhaskar would respond something as follows: "I prefer Ta >over Tb because it is 'capable of explaining more or more >significant phenonema in its own terms than the other does in >his'. So Ta is better because it contains a (elaborated) notion >of ontological stratification (ID-TD, R>A>E), can account for a >greater number of problems solved, can 'predict' more accurately, >generates the most relevant hypotheses, etc." But I would still want to ask this: assuming that we can mean by ontological stratification something other than "causality is a Mind-independent property of objects" (i.e., something other than "Bhaskar is right" -- for that would be to argue circularly), can't it be incorporated into Kantian trandscendental idealism fairly easily? And if we *can't*, in fact, mean by it anything other than "causality is Mind-independent," then it can't be the deciding point according to which we evaluate Bhashar's position relative to Kant -- because once again it is simply a re-assertion *of* Bhaskar's position. See what I mean? I'm just saying, the Kantian position is harder to dispense with than one would think. And if there is an important philosophical difference between Bhaskar and other dialectical thinkers, I think it has a lot to do with just this point. R. --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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