From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gis.net>
Subject: BHA: Yugoslavia, Arguments, Theory
Date: Sun, 25 Apr 1999 10:13:36 -0400


Hi John--

> Thanks for the measured response. Perhaps one consequence of us all
> having moral sensibilities is that we all fly off the handle
> sometimes.

I agree: I think that for most people with strong ethical or political
commitments (of whatever kind), the stakes during argument can get high
quickly because of the importance of the issues at hand.

>     One reason I became upset was that it seemed to me that
> your response to Jonathan marked a step backwards from what you had
> rightly described as the more fruitful tone of the discussion.

You are of course right, on all counts.

> I remain a little unhappy about the implication that those of us who
> did'nt agree with your position did'nt give a damn about the Kosovo
> Albanians and also the implication about dogma which seems to
> translate sometimes as "ideas one disagrees with" (stratagies of
> condensension?). My own tendency to fly off the handle during the
> discussion was partly motivated by my horror at the consequences of
> the NATO intervention for them (and my rather crude remarks about
> Kant reflected this).

There's an interesting issue here.  I knew consciously that those of you
criticizing my previous position had at least some concern for the Kosovo
Albanians, and probably quite a lot.  Yet the fact that they were almost
never mentioned (and that occasionally the Serbs were, e.g. Jonathan's
"Think about what this means for Serb workers") nevertheless had an impact
upon both what I argued and the tone in which I argued, especially toward
the end.  Basically: "Damn, aren't they going to let this aspect onto the
table at all?"  Needless to say, this contributed to my frustration; but
perhaps it also led me to raise implied questions about your (collective)
concerns, as an effort to get the problem of the Albanians into the
discussion.

I mention this for a couple of reasons.  First, I'm trying to get a grasp of
how this debate went the way it went.  The questions that I raised at the
end of my outburst, while badly overblown, nevertheless had a legitimate
point: I'm not sure any of us had a clear idea of what the goal of our
argument was, or at least each other's goals.  Once the issue had gotten
polarized, I soon felt that you who argued against my (then) position had
ceased trying to persuade me in favor of insisting on the correctness of
your position.  But had you (John, or anyone else) gone beyond stating that
we need to view the matter from a consequentialist position, to outlining
(in a reasonably specific way) the mostly likely or even demonstrable
consequences of this particular intervention, I probably would have changed
my mind in half the time.  (I mean this as a statement of fact, not a
broadside: it was by reading about and extrapolating exactly this sort of
concrete impact that I came to change my mind.)  And perhaps I misconstrued
your goals.

Another issue here is quite a bit more general: I've been troubled for some
time (well over a year) by the impression that the Bhaskar list has
gradually become brittler, more fractious.  I'm not sure why that is (for
that matter, I don't know if others agree), and possibly I couldn't know,
since surely to some extent I've contributed to that fractiousness.  I'm
doubtful that a big discussion on this matter would achieve anything; but it
may help from time to time to ask ourselves (or each other) what exactly the
goal is in any particular argument.  In any case, as someone commented to me
in another context, it's a lot easier to influence someone you treat as a
friend than one you consider an enemy.

The point about goals is also connected to the questions that have been
raised about the application or even applicability of critical realism or
any other theory to a particular contemporary event.  I have a fair amount
of sympathy with the contention that Bhaskar (or whoever) can tell us
nothing about Yugoslavia, at least not specifically.  Nevertheless CR *can*,
I think, be valuable in such discussions in some manner.  But an initial
question might concern the uses of a theory: to help one to decide what
position to take regarding an event, or instead to support a position one
has already taken?  There's nothing wrong with the latter, I hasten to add,
to the degree that one may in fact have adopted the right position in the
first place--but from at least a philosophical or (dare I say?) scientific
point of view, I think that for *analytical* purposes, one needs to hold
one's own position "in suspension" for a time, that is, one must leave open
the possibility that one may in fact be wrong.  It seems to me that since
critical realism insists on the potential fallibility of any particular
theory, such temporary suspension is obligatory--though admittedly, damned
annoying!  And simply in terms of ordinary logic, if you don't hold your own
opinion in relative limbo, you risk the circularity of assuming what has to
be proved.  From this perspective, I think you can see how someone might
have legitimate *philosophical* or *analytical* difficulties with John M's
original post, or with your own statement that "Obviously such an analysis
could only be carried out by those who agree with my, and presumably
Carrol's position."  --In saying this, I dearly hope I don't re-ignite the
entire argument.  The political disagreement has, I think, been resolved.
But if there's disagreement over my assessment of the analytical problem,
that's well worth discussing.  I want to be clear, however: in raising this
analytical point, I'm definitely *not* imputing any moral or political
failing!  Because, as a practical matter, one simply *can't* leave
absolutely everything open to question, one *has* to assume that certain
things are already settled.  But this doesn't invalidate the philosophical
point: it simply says that in practice, it has to be weighed against other
matters, and sometimes (or even *usually*) the philosophical issue will
lose.  Still, when such a question is raised, it has philosophical or
critical viability, even if it flops on any other count.

Regarding your point about Bourdieu and etiquette: this is a very
interesting suggestion, and quite pertinent to what I've been considering
here.  If I catch your drift correctly, the issue is not only a question of
how cultural capital figures in our debates, but also the functioning of
habitus.  I'm not sure if everyone here is familiar with this concept: it
refers to the way that various sorts of "capital" (social, cultural,
monetary, intellectual, etc) become embodied, and are manifested in such
things as broad or refined gestures, verbal style, tastes, degree of comfort
in various situations, and "feel for the game" in various fields.  Thus, for
example, working-class people may feel anxious about how they pronounce
words when in "educated" company, or upper-class people may "act like they
own the place" almost anyplace they go.  (This is one kind of the "politics
of everyday life" I spoke of previously.)  The idea shouldn't be taken too
rigidly--individuals and cultures do vary--but there are general tendencies.
The members of this list have various sorts of class, cultural, and
intellectual backgrounds (in fact some of us are mixes individually!), and
styles of argumentation go along with that.  So certain types of alarm and
frustration may be due to habitus and how we respond to each others' styles.
I have absolutely no idea what to *do* with this thought, but it's worth
considering I think.  Whatever the case, I concur with your recommendation
that we try to untangle objections to style or tone from objections to
concepts or analytical approaches.

On your question about the relation between Bourdieu and Bhaskar, I've seen
discussions aligning Bourdieu both with Bhaskar and with Giddens.  Since the
distinction between Bhaskar and Giddens was itself rather fuzzy until a few
years ago, perhaps this is "divergence" is understandable.  Personally I
think Bourdieu's work is (at the very least) highly amenable to CR.

One last thing: would one of you please explain what you mean by "an account
of morality based on virtue rather than rights"?  I sort of get the idea,
but I wouldn't mind some help.

Thanks, T.

---
Tobin Nellhaus
nellhaus-AT-gis.net
"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce





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