Date: Tue, 20 Jul 1999 07:20:53 -0400 (EDT) From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca> Subject: BHA: logical norms Hi all, Thanks Gary for the inspired review of this section! I wondered if you, Gary, or if any others, might have anything further helpful to say about the relationship between dialectical thinking and the "logical norm of non-contradiction." I've probably just been reading too much straight philosophy recently (a real possibility), but I don't think I get it. It seems to me that in Gary's example (thank you Gary!) what is being described is a reality in which there are (at a minimum) two different things going on, two different, and in some sense opposite, forces at play -- one tending in one way, one tending the other way. I don't understand how or why this is a problem for the norm of logical non-contradiction. Why should the rule of p or not-p, in relation to propositions, foreclose the identification (no pun intended) of real complexity in the world? Perplexed in Toronto, r. [Gary's helpful example: >It is only epistemological dialectics that 'typically' violate the logical norm >of non-contradiction. > >An example would be helpful here. Alas there is none within the text. If >anyone can supply one I will be grateful. Let me have a very tentative go >myself, first. I have a student friend investigating cultural reproduction >with the Vietnamese diaspora here in Brisbane. This community seems to be >marked by the successful reproduction of the Vietnamese culture, above all >through the mediation of the discourse of anti-communism. However the >student is working on the heuristic that at the same time, there are >cultural sites which are eroding the reproduction of the master discourse - >anti-communism. So the assumption is that it is both raining and not >raining. In other words she is proceeding with a logical contradiction as a >heuristic.] --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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