Date: Sat, 31 Jul 1999 10:52:53 -0400 (EDT)
From: Ruth Groff <rgroff-AT-yorku.ca>
Subject: BHA: 2.6


Hi guys,

Here's the summary I prepared on section 6, "Dialectical Arguments and the
Unholy Trinty." Please keep in mind that I did this last November, so if it
seems disconnected to the recent discussion, that's why!


Dialectic Ch. 2, Sec. 6.  

Recall that in section 5 Bhaskar says that Marx's critique of Hegel entails
critiques of the epistemic fallacy, the speculative illusion and ontological
monovalence.  Given that the speculative illusion is involved in the "primal
squeeze on natural necessity" [just don't even get me started], Bhaskar
observes, "I will thus be essentially organizing Marx's critique (of Hegel)
around what I have dubbed the `unholy trinity' of irrealism."  Jumping ahead
to the end of section 6, we see that Bhaskar concludes by telling us that
"vindicating" the concepts of intransitive being, natural necessity and
absence -- that is, refuting the unholy trinity of irrealism -- is indeed a
"good part of (the) aim" of DPF as a whole.

So the set of ideas referred to as the unholy trinity is central to the
discussion of dialectics as Bhaskar has structured it.  The unholy trinity
is what Marx doesn't like about Hegel; the fact that this is so is
significant because Bhaskar sees himself as, in part at least, developing a
line of immanent critique of idealist dialectics begun by Marx -- and as
doing so precisely by rendering explicit and making philosophically rigorous
that which is only implicit in Marx.

So much for the why.  Now on to the what.

The unholy trinity of irrealism is comprised of ontological monovalence, the
epistemic fallacy and the "primal squeeze" on natural necessity (and
scientific inquiry).  Lengthy, albeit relatively clear definitions of each
of these concepts appear in the glossary but, where available, I'm going to
go with the shorter [dare I say pithy?] ones sprinkled here and there
throughout the text.  Ontological monovalence is defined on p. 87 as "a
purely positive account of being," while the epistemic fallacy is neatly
defined on p. 94 as the reduction of being to knowledge.  The "primal
squeeze," meanwhile, (a) describes the conceptual effects of (b) a false
opposition between subjective empiricism and objective idealism.   

Let me break this down further. [I know that it was covered in section 5,
but I don't think that it will hurt to go through it once more.]  

First the description.  Subjective empiricism, Bhaskar says, is linked, via
the ontic fallacy, to the positivistic illusion.  The ontic fallacy reduces
knowledge to being; the positivistic illusion reduces philosophy to
sense-experience.  Objective idealism, meanwhile, is linked, via the
epistemic fallacy, to the speculative illusion.  The epistemic fallacy,
again, reduces being to knowledge; the speculative illusion reduces science
and social life to philosophy.  In each case, Bhaskar says, the relevant
`illusion' supplants the concepts of (a) empirically controlled scientific
theory (in the transitive dimension of science) and (b) natural necessity
(in the intransive dimension).  These key concepts are "squeezed out," as it
were, leaving, in their place, the limited options of either positivism or
speculative metaphysics. [In a very real way, then, the task for Bhaskar is
to create a space within philosophy for science.]

Second, the sense in which the opposition is false.  Here the point is that
each side is internally related to the other.  Marx, Bhaskar begins by
reminding us, showed in substantive terms that Hegel, at least, tacitly
incorporated empiricist social `facts' into his position.  Bhaskar, however,
makes the case in formal terms: "the key moves in both cases consist in
inverses of each other," he says on p. 90.  Moreover, once we recognize that
neither side permits either the concept of scientific theory or the concept
of natural necessity, we can see that the oppositions between empiricism and
idealism, the ontic and epistemic fallacies, and the positivistic and
speculative illusions, respectively, are all flip sides of the same
(irrealist) coin.

Okay.  So the unholy trinity is made up of (1) ontological monovalence, (2)
the epistemic fallacy and (3) the primal squeeze.  And we hate it. 

But why?  [Or, as Bhaskar puts it on p. 111, "I now want to consider the
effect of the unholy trinity of irrealism."]  

In a nutshell, the problem with the unholy trinity -- apart from that each
of its precepts are false -- is that it results in the "positivization,
reification, and eternalization of current knowledge and more generally the
status quo." (p. 184)  In the passage partially cited above, Bhaskar goes on
to say that "despite my talk of an `unholy trinity', there are really only
two category mistakes involved."  The epistemic fallacy results in the
primal squeeze; ontological monovalence results in "the elimination of
absence and error, producing a purely positive account of knowledge and
being alike."

[This is a small point, but if ontological monovalence is *defined* as "a
purely positive account of knowledge and being," it seems incorrect to speak
of it "producing" this condition as an effect.  Also, I don't understand why
a presumption of positivity "eliminates," to use Bhaskar's verb, the
possibility of refering to absences or of being in error.]

But back to the effects of the unholy trinity: no absence, no error, no
change. We need to be careful here.  The level of abstraction, combined with
the reification of philosophical discourse, makes it easy to blur
categories.  One question is "What would be the case if it were the case
that the claims which comprise the unholy trinity were true?"  A second
question is "What, if anything, is the effect of our believing such claims
to be true, when in fact they are not true?"  (And here we need to know,
more specifically yet, (a) what is implied *conceptually* by an incorrect
belief in the truth of the unholy trinity and (b) what if anything is
implied *practically* by such a belief.)
  
Bhaskar's answer to the first question (viz., "What would be the case if the
unholy trinity were true?") is that if the unholy trinity were true, then
the world would have to be such that there could be no absences, no
possibility of error and no change.  [Obviously, it is not that the truth of
irrealism would *cause* the world to be this way; rather, the world's being
this way would be the condition of irrealism's validity.]

Bhaskar's answer to the first sense of question 2 (viz., "What follows
conceptually from a belief in the truth of the unholy trinity?") is that a
host of unpalatable positions flow from such a commitment, ranging from
ontological extensionalism to detotalization and fetishism.  The upshot,
however, is that if we believe the precepts of the unholy trinity to be
true, we cannot coherently *conceptualize* absence, error or change.  This
is crucial point for Bhaskar's purposes because dialectical arguments, as we
shall see, are defined by Bhaskar as being predicated on absences.  Also,
retroductive arguments in general, in so far as they are taken to involve
the postulation of real causal structures, are precluded by the "primal
sqeeze" on the concept of natural necessity. 

Finally, Bhaskar's answer to the second sense of question 2 ("What follows
*in practice* from a belief in the truth of the unholy trinity?") is, I
think, that if we accept the precepts of the unholy trinity as true, even if
(as is the case) they are not true, and act accordingly, then we cannot do
science.  And if we cannot do science, then we cannot effect either "ontic
(or) epistemic structural change."  So the unholy trinity is a causally
efficacious false belief if ever there was one.  And it follows from this
line of reasoning, one might note, that "only the absenting of ontological
monovalence can restore" the practical possibility of change. (p. 112)

So the unholy trinity sucks.  Even though it's not true, if you *believe* it
to be true, you can't do science; and if you can't do science, there can be
no significant change in consciousness or in underlying social relations.

Which brings us back to the beginning of the section, and to all of the
detail about dialectical arguments.  The basic point of pages 102 through
110 is that science [at least modern science, although exactly where and how
Bhaskar would draw this line is an interesting question -- note that he
thinks that the Aristotle's philosophy of science was at odds with his
scientific practice, and (I think) that, as a result, the dialectic of
explanation in Aristotelian science was arrested]  -- that science must be
understood to have the structure of an on-going dialectical argument.

Thus the need for definition.  Bhaskar first distinguishes between dialectic
understood as argumentation as such, and dialectic undertood as a specific
kind of argument.  Bhaskar opts for the latter.  Next, within the general
category of specifically dialectical arguments, Bhaskar distinguishes
between a "wide" and a "rigourous" sense of what is meant by dialectic.
Again he goes with the more narrow definition.  Dialectical arguments, then,
are specified as being those which "turn in an essential way upon 2E notions
of real negativity or contradiction, that is, which involve absence or
mutual exclusivity (in additon to internal relationality)." (103)

What sets dialectical arguments apart, Bhaskar says (and here I am simply
going to cite the text) is that "if sound, they ... legitimate conclusions
which are ... at once both false and necessary (or at least limited),
contradictory, incoherent or incomplete in some relevant way, yet inexorable
or indispensable.  To put this in a quasi-Kantian manner, they establish the
conditions of impossibility...of the conditions of possibility...of some
more or less transcendentally or otherwise significant result or phenomena
which has already been established or can in any event be taken for granted.
Moreover, they establish ontological conclusions; and they license negative
evaluative or practical implications." (103)  If unsound, however, "they
will generate a range of compromise formations, ad hoceries, etc. ... of
metacritical-explanatory import." (103) [I don't understand what this means,
and if/why it is specific to dialectical arguments.]

Dialectical arguments are a "species" of transcendental argument, Bhaskar
says. Within the framework of critical realism, this claim establishes a
classificatory link between dialectical argument and scientific inquiry
because transcendental arguments are themselves a type of
retroductive-explanatory argument, and retroductive-explanatory
argumentation [the R of DREI(C)] is the characteristic argument form of
scientific inquiry in closed systems.      

Having said that dialectical arguments are a kind of transcendental
argument, Bhaskar next offers a series of differentiations between his views
and those of Marx, Hegel and Kant.  I'm going to skip over these points
except to note that Bhaskar reminds us that for Kant (and Hegel?),
transcendental arguments are tied to human subjectivity; they "are designed
to establish the conditions of possibility of experience," as Bhaskar puts
it.  For Bhaskar, by contrast, transcedental arguments may be used to
establish dialectical, (transcendental?) and natural necessities which
obtain independently of human subjectivity.  

Bhaskar names the use of transcendental arguments to establish
human-independent variables `transcendental detachment' [it's interesting
how the verbs so easily become nouns, even with materialist
philosophers...], which definition leads him to review the different types
of detachment to which he makes reference throughout the text.  These are
referential detachment, defined as "for the sake of axiological need;"
transcendental detachment ("from the same"); dialectical detachment ("from
sublated conclusions"); and logical detachment ("for fully (alethically)
adequately grounded conclusions of scientific arguments").

Bhaskar next observes that his concept of dialectic argument is similar to
that of Aristotle.  Both conceive of dialectic arguments as having the
structure of a progressive narrative (understood as a "reflexively monitored
episode" in which each step is the result of immanent, auto-critique having
shown the previous position to be in some sense untrue to itself).  This
observation leads Bhaskar to review his general usage of the term `negation'
(simple absence, absenting, absence as process-in-product, absence as
product-in-process), and to add that "radical self-negation" also has its
own set of meanings (auto-subversion, self-transformation, self-realization,
self-overcoming).

Next, [Mervyn, can you see at *all* why someone might wish that this book
had been a little better edited?!:)] Bhaskar sets out to clarify (further)
what he means by the terms `ontology', `dialectical' and `transcendental'.
The first and the third terms he proceeds to addresses directly; the second
he doesn't in fact appear to follow up on explicitly.  

So, `ontology'.  The concept of "being" in general, Bhaskar says, has to be
distinguished from that of "the domain of existentially intransitive objects
or ontics of some transitive of relational process of inquiry of field of
action." [This is actually an odd formulation, when you think about it, as
it makes it sound as though even intransitive objects are, a la Heidegger,
only objects for us, ie., "of some transitive process ... or field of
action."  I don't think Bhaskar believes this, as he is clear at other times
in charging Heidegger with having committed the `anthropic fallacy'.  But
still, it's a curious formulation.]  Beyond this, Bhaskar distinguishes
further between ontology as (1) a general philosophical category, (2) a
claim, based on scientific research, about the "specific contents of the
world," (3) an existential claim about the character and /or specific
contents of a particular region or aspect of the world in relation to
another or to the whole, and (4) the application of a "specific dialectic
figure" across disciplinary boundaries. (107-8)

And `transcendental'.  In attempting to clarify his usage of the term,
Bhaskar makes two assertions loosely related to the issue of transcendental
arguments.  The first claim is that once scientists agree on the existence
of an entity that has been posited through a retroductive argument, it is to
be properly regarded as the `alethic truth' of the explanandum of which it
is the explanans.  The second claim is that scientific progress itself --
understood as the process of positing ever deeper levels of causal
structure, such that at each new level, explanans becomes explanandum -- may
be described as dialectical if we keep in mind that the "falsification and
the "elimination ... of inadequate theories" is built into the process.  The
two "distinct moments of criticism," as Bhasker puts it, in the DREI(C)
cycle of theory formation, are between D and R, and at (C).  

Bhaskar ends this section with a now-familiar, but in my view interesting --
because of how conventional it actually is -- passage: "After the regressive
correction of the facts at Si, we now have the best possible grounds for
both asserting the truth of those facts and demonstrating their natural
necessity (via their deducibility from a description at Sj).  This is what I
have called the Lockean level.  After a further elapse of time the firmly
established structure may be held to be definitional of a natural kind and
we are now at the Leibnizian level in the dialectic of science." [The
subsequent reference back to C1.9, p. 36 is worth checking.]  

Finally, let me note, by way of ending this seemingly endless post, that the
links that Bhaskar makes between science and dialectics are at two different
levels.  One point, again, is that because dialectical arguments are a form
of transcendental argument, and transcendental arguments a form of
retroductive-explanatory argument, dialectical arguments can be seen to
share some of the formal features of scientific arguments.  The other point,
no doubt the more substantial, is that science itself, in as much as it can
be seen to consist of a series of immanent self-critiques, can be said to be
dialectical in character.

And of course in either case the moral of the story is that the unholy
trinity of irrealism, if true, or even if accepted as true, precludes
science and dialectics alike. 

Ruth





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