Date: Wed, 06 Oct 1999 22:58:24 +0800 From: nicola taylor <nmtaylor-AT-carmen.murdoch.edu.au> Subject: Re: BHA: magic and science Hello Colin I remain unconvinced by your argument that science 'works irrespective of whether you believe it or not'. Indeed, the vast lit on economic development is peppered with debates about why the same scientific techniques and technologies applied successfully in the UK do not 'work' at all in Nigeria, and 'work' with unanticipated outcomes in Bangladesh. One reason put forward for why our technologies do not 'transfer' unproblematically is that the 'outcomes' of science depend upon the way we 'use' our technologies, and that depends upon contexts of application: social practices, beliefs, values etc. Take the case of Medicine in Nigeria. The World Health Organisation has now recognised that the reason that science does not 'work' in Nigeria, is not because Nigerians are illiterate or stupid but because they do not accept our belief that we can control nature and predict outcomes with a degree of certainty (the belief that science 'works'). WHO argues that Western medical techniques and technologies will only achieve successful outcomes in Nigeria if they are adapted and incorporated within 'Nigerian socio-cultural models, and any attempt by the social system to disengage outcomes from practices will cause a disfunctioning effect' (Ataudo, 1985, 'Social science and medicine, 21(12), 1345-7). To echo Ruth, pragmatic theories of truth are not a sound way to go. Because a technology 'appears' to work for us, does not mean that others can use it, or that they need to. I don't want to be too uncharitable, but your alternative argument that 'outcomes' can be considered outside the context of 'practices' sounds to me like the same old technological determinism that everyone on this list is trying to get away from. To take your own examples: if you toss a nerve gas canister at me, all things being equal (such as the wind not blowing the wrong way), I will probably cark it - whether or not I believe that I will. In this very simple way, then, 'science works'. Behind the empirical 'observable' phenomenon, however, there are three things: (1) a technique, (2) an intention, and (3) a whole system of values. Among the values I would include your own personal beliefs (that the implement you are using will work as intended, to achieve a predetermined purpose), and the social beliefs of other people in the society of which you are a part (perhaps you come from a technologically sophisticated society where there exists a belief in the neutrality of scientific discovery - such as would allow the development of nerve gas in the first place). Your second argument is that you do not need to understand science to use it. Yes, of course, but does this in itself substantiate a claim that science can be defined soley in accordance with 'outcomes'? Imagine that genetic engineers in one society successfully isolate a gene for intelligence, and this technology is then used in another society to breed a race of highly intelligent people; would you say that this is an 'unintended consequence' - a purely objective result? I wouldn't. I'd say that it has a lot to do with the high 'value' that these two societies put on 'intelligence', itself a result of scientific practices ever since Galton began measuring heads. I think that the fact/value divide is implied by my perspective: if 'practices' and 'results' are distinct but dialectically interconnected elements of science, then you and I do have some responsibility for the effects of science, at least to the extent that we condone the practices that lead to effects, and to the extent that we advocate alternative practices and effects. Science considered as an open ended venture of intertwined practices and results, suggests a big role for judgement; and judgement depends on anticipated communication with others in a community who understand what you are saying. What I am communicating is a 'disbelief' in the efficacy of any attempt to view the elements of society/nature or practice/result in isolation. The feminist lit provides some very useful arguments in this regard. e.g. Zoe Soffia's argument that the critical-rational ideal underpinning what we call 'science' contains within it an irrational 'desire' to dominate. If her argument is accepted, the issue of the distinction between science and magic cannot, be dealt with as an issue of rational (predictable) effects and irrational (unpredictable) beliefs. Rather 'the issue is whose irrationalities are researched and developed' (1996, p142). I think this is the way to go. Re methodology, Sofia's talks about 'situated knowledges'; so does Irigaray, who argues for a new symbolic orientation to women's experience, and Kristeva, who argues for the playful subversion of the imaginary. I playfully suggest that the critique of science is not just a theoretical exercise. It is a practice of questioning dualisms, and exorcising determinisms. This requires an interrogation of what Gramsci called our 'common sense' notions of what science is. Hopefully, our investigation of tacitly accepted assumptions also occasionally has results that change things for the better. Or perhaps that is only my belief. Cheers, Nicky --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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