Date: Fri, 08 Oct 1999 23:11:20 +0100
From: Colin Wight <Colin.Wight-AT-aber.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: epistemic fallacy.


Hi Andrew (time to kill),

>- Bhaskar talks of  '*preconceptualised* social forms / practices' as 
>the premises of transcendental deductions. In PON at least, he 
>*never* says shortens this to 'practices/forms'; he *always* 
>adds that they are *preconceptualised*.

Well of course. Who could possibly think of practices being conducted
without concepts. Hey but what concepts? That's teh question.

 My email meant to 
>stress this obvious 'theory ladeness'. 

Theory-ladeness Andrew differs from Theoory determined, or, from nothing
but a concept. Yes?

 I take this as a premise 
>common to us and many others. (which is why I added that 'of 
>course you agree with this').
>
>The added significance of theory ladeness here is that Bhaskar is 
>attempting to deduce all of the CR ontology from a premise. 

No he is not he is deducing it from a set of practices, which are
themselves embedded within a set (NOT ONE) of concepts.

He 
>cannot, prior to this deduction, assume that a 'real world' of 
>the CR type exists, for he is to offer an argument for it.

Well, Andrew, and this is probably either where we disagree, or where you
misunderstand. He has to take the practices as real (why the, if I may us
Hegelian language here, scare quites around the real world?). But then
again I take it you take them as real, so what's the beef?

 What is 
>this premise? Well it is not just a 'real' practice, for the notion 
>of 'reality' is just what RB is trying to provide an argument for. 

No he is trying to understand what must the world be like for prcatices X
to be possible. If you deny the reality of the practices (science), then
really RB's of no interest to you. But equally, whay are you writing this
reply to me on a machine that only exists because of the practices? Well
that's difficult, and goes to Nicola's concerns, but I am very curious.


>Instead it is a *concept* of a practice.

No it is not. That is exactly what it is not. that is exactly the EF. You
are saying that science is positivism because positivism is a concept of
science. Look I am the last person in the world to turn to Wittgenstein,
but really, not only has language gone on holiday here, but you are off
with Voyager (only trekkies will get this).

 From here, RB argues that 
>there must be a real, stratified world. And his argument is, of 
>course, that the concept of a practice 'presupposes' a real practice 
>and a stratified reality. 

This is to reverse his argument. he takes the prcatice and then asks how is
it possible? you are reducing it to the one dimension - the concept, when
RB says the parctice is only possible if there is more to it than the
concept. I never had you pegged for an idealist Andrew (Just joshing as
Rorty might put it).
>
>It seems very difficult to put forward arguments concerning thought 
>and reality without being misunderstood. 

Oh agreed, which is why the EF is so useful..

I wonder what you will make 
>of the above (no doubt flawed) attempt at clarity.

What can I say!!! Perhaps Mmmmhhh?

>
>You questioned my view of RB as stressing the empirical aspect of 
>experimentation. For one thing, as far as RB is concerned, scientific 
>progress down one chain of strata stops as soon as we reach an entity 
>that cannot be empirically detected. (so 'ultimate entities' are 
>likely to be fields of potential according to RB). 

I just don't know where you have got thjis from - I think I am close to
becoming a postmodern on this  authorship meaning issue, people seem to be
ignoring what i say and constrcuting their own account of it. Oh welll!! 

Look, for RB science never stops. Of course, he does consider, from a
philosophical perspective what the ultimate elements might be and arrives
at your account, but this is a philosophical argument NOT a scientific one.

I have long 
>puzzled as to why RB says this. My interpretation is set out in 
>detail in my philosphy paper but suffice it to say that I do see a 
>relative stress on the empirical in RB.  

Look, Rb says that we will use empirical evidence in support of many
theories. So what? This is not at all the same as saying there is a stress
on the empirical. And anyway I distrust anyone who denies the validity of
empirical support as much as I distrust those that rely only on it.

>Finally, yes you think I'm looking for some 'magic key' to knowledge. 
>Yet I uphold a sharp distinction between an object and its concept, 
>and a vast role for scientific practice (a direct and inseparable 
>expression of 'thought' on my view; and vice versa). 

Well, I'm afraid you didn't above and your were very much in danger in
conflating the concept of science with the practice of it.

I'm trying to 
>argue, more or less unsuccessfully, that RB's is not the only 
>philosphy in town to do this.

I'm not even interested in this argument Andrew. i have said repeatedly on
this list that I am more in interested in arguments that where they come
from. But if you agree with RB why don't you just say so instead of
disagreeing whilst at the same time articulating CR arguments? I'm
confused. But then this is probably my own existential angst surfacing. Now
where is my copy of Heideggggggger?

Cheers,





============================================

Dr. Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Wales
SY23 3DA
Tel: (01970) 621769 


     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---