From: HDespain-AT-aol.com Date: Sun, 3 Oct 1999 16:42:54 EDT Subject: Re: BHA: Critical Realism and Marx's Theory of Value In a message dated 99-10-03 14:36:57 EDT, you write: << The point that I want to make is that the subject matter of (scientific) knowledge is tendencies of powerful particular and as such has no internal relation to practice (it would continue to be the same even in a world without practice). It is only in the studies of societies where the practical aspect of the subject matter intersects with the practical aspect of the inquiry. >> Hi Amit, I do not agree with you here, first the portion of the sentence that Carrol highlighted if the subject matter of science is particulars, is this to suggest that universals and individuals are not the subject of science? There seems to be some very important Hegelian insights forgotten? For example, are *absences* "powerful particulars". (I prefer the Hegelian Triads to dualism and reductionism alike!). The second part of the same (first) sentence on practice seems overstated ... "no internal relation". Certainly I wouldn't disagree there is distinction to be made concerning ontology and epistemology here, however, the history of science is a history of attempting to overcome practical human problems ... scientific questions themselves are quite typically practical, quite often too are the answers ... helping to explain the dialectic of science, and necessitating a distinction between the intransitive and transitive dimensions, not only in social science, but also in physical science. Hans D. --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005