File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_1999/bhaskar.9910, message 7


From: HDespain-AT-aol.com
Date: Sun, 3 Oct 1999 16:42:54 EDT
Subject: Re: BHA: Critical Realism and Marx's Theory of Value


In a message dated 99-10-03 14:36:57 EDT, you write:

<< The point that I want to make is that the subject matter of (scientific)
 knowledge is tendencies of powerful particular and as such has no internal
 relation to practice (it would continue to be the same even in a world
 without practice).  It is only in the studies of societies where the
 practical aspect of the subject matter intersects with the practical aspect
 of the inquiry. >>

Hi Amit,

I do not agree with you here, first the portion of the sentence that Carrol 
highlighted
if the subject matter of science is particulars, is this to suggest that 
universals and individuals are not the subject of science?  There seems to be 
some very important Hegelian insights forgotten?  For example, are *absences* 
"powerful particulars".  (I prefer the Hegelian Triads to dualism and 
reductionism alike!).

The second part of the same (first) sentence on practice seems overstated ... 
"no internal relation".  Certainly I wouldn't disagree there is distinction 
to be made concerning ontology and epistemology here, however, the history of 
science is a history of attempting to overcome practical human problems ... 
scientific questions themselves are quite typically practical, quite often 
too are the answers ... helping to explain the dialectic of science, and 
necessitating a distinction between the intransitive and transitive 
dimensions, not only in social science, but also in physical science.   

Hans D.


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