Date: Sun, 17 Oct 1999 07:51:54 +0800
From: nicola taylor <nmtaylor-AT-carmen.murdoch.edu.au>
Subject: Re: BHA: C2, s7, second post


Hello Howard, you wrote 

At 04:24  3/10/99 -0700, you wrote:
>Second post.

>As I understand it, for Hegel the universal is by nature concrete.
>Universals are embedded in things and constitute their essence, the
>thing that animates their development.   As such it is a moment of what
>Hegel calls the "notion."  The notion's three moments are universality,
>particularity and individuality.  The universal develops itself through
>the particular and the individual. 

I am very confused by this 'concrete universal'.  Chris Arthur thinks that
when 'Hegel speaks of 'the Concept' he is not talking of the concept of a
man or of a state and so on but of what they all have in common, the
concept of a concept we might say, or the concept in absolute terms.  As
such a category the Concept seems to be - in Arthur's account - a kind of
non-concrete or absolute universal in so far as it "contains the three
moments:  universality, particularity and individuality"...The Concept
"possesses its determinateness in that it differentiates itself within
itself and is the unity of these fixed and dterminate differences".  Arthur
writes that "The determinateness here is that of something fixed as a
result of the process of determination" and he notes 'the exact analogy
with Marx's account of capital as a process which is fixed in certain
moments of the circuit, that is, as money, commodity and so on.  "Since
each of its moments is posited as inseparably united with it, the Concept
is a totality" Hegel says; thus each of the moments of the Concept can only
be grasped on the basis of and together with the others"' (in Moseley,
1993, p.111-2). 

You go on to say that the universal is made concrete through judgements
(but in Arthur's account the universal is already one of the more concrete
moments of the concept??).  You write:

>In the judgment the universal (the rule of law) is realized in the
>individual case and the individual manifests the universal.  "The
>subject is invested with a universality by its predicate."    The
>universal is made concrete.  Thus the judgments which gives us the
>concrete universal are not some characteristic that different
>individuals have in common like the whiteness of horses, but instead
>some feature without which the individuals would not be individuals at
>all.  In this respect the relation between the universal and the
>individual in the judgment is necessary and the judgment is a judgment
>of necessity.   Thus "metalleity" constitutes the substantial nature of
>what gold is and without which it would not be able to subsist.  
>
>Again, the syllogism, like the judgment, is not meant discursively.  The
>syllogism is the thing that brings the judgment and the notion into one.
>In so doing it realizes the identity of the individual and the
>universal.  All metals conduct electricity.  Gold is a metal.  Gold
>conducts electricity.  Individuality gets the character of universality
>and vice versa.

Arthur says that Hegel splits the 'totality' into judgements to establish
the connections between universal, particular and individual moments.  In
the moment of judgement these moments are posited as 'indifferent to one
another', so that their unity appears as an external connection.  The
syllogism mediates these fixed extremes.  This is, according to Arthur, the
process of'concretization': in his example the syllogism connects three
moments - all men are mortal (universal), Socrates is a man (particular),
and therefore Socrates is mortal (individual).  The point is that any
single syllogism is insufficient to capture the intelligibility of the
Concept as a whole, so 'only a system of syllogisms, in which each moment
is grounded, can adequately comprehend the rational whole that is the
Concept' (Arthur, p.112).  So with Marx, the circuit of industrial capital
is a unity of essential difference; capital cannot be identified with any
one moment of the circuit. 

As I interpret Arthur's account, it is mostly concerned with elaborating
the role of Hegel's logic in Marx's 'Capital'.  He does say, however, that
there is a fundamental difference between Hegel's 'Concept' as an 'ideal
abstraction' and the 'real' abstraction of'capital'.  Matter poses no
difficulty for the movement of the Concept as it freely develops itself
(since it is in a sense its own content).  For Capital in contrast, there
may be the real danger of dissolution since it must invest itself in
matter.  Marx was concerned with the material basis of the capital circuit.
 Value requires material form.

Is this what Hans E. is getting at when he suggests that a realist account
may be able to claim some superiority over a Hegelian account of Marx's
dialectic??  [see also Andrew Brown's comment on 'RB's attempt to *break*
with Hegel's alleged *overemphasis* on totality??]

I would be extremely grateful if someone could enlighten me a little
further with regards to the similarities and differences between Hegel,
Bhaskar and Marx, (1) regarding their uses of the terms abstract and
concrete in relation to their overall thinking, and (2) their theorisation
of the relationship between knowledge, practices and reality. 

Cheers, Nicky    



     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---