From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gis.net> Subject: Re: BHA: Adorno on style Date: Sat, 15 Jan 2000 18:47:23 -0500 Hi Mervyn-- > No, I don't believe that hallucination doesn't involve thoughts. But > Adorno makes it clear that he is talking about genuinely original > thinking in philosophy, science etc, and this doesn't proceed by > hallucination, so far as I know; even the 'non-rational', 'transcendent' > moment - the 'flash of inspiration' etc - seems to me the opposite of > hallucinatory. I.e. hallucinatory thinking is not to be *identified* > with the critical thinking Adorno has in mind. > > There is no relevant 'snippet' or 'Intro' that I know of. Hallucination? Actually I'd like to question this a bit--not to be flip! It's just a specific aspect: I'm thinking about the role of imagination--of imagery itself--in science and theory. Although RB doesn't expand upon the point, on several occasions he (rightly, in my view) states that images, metaphors, icons etc lie at the heart of scientific theories, and cannot be wished away (as empiricism tries to do) as a mere psychological aid. (Those of you who know my affection for Peirce will hear that drumbeat in the background....) With this in mind, I'm not sure it's terribly important where the images come from. For example, I remember once hearing how the scientist who proposed that benzene consisted of a chemical ring came up with that notion through a dream he had while dozing in front of his fireplace. Something like, six little dancing sparks joining into a circle. Who knows, maybe hallucination *can* be a font of insight. But it may be that the "non-rational" flash of inspiration consists in the introduction of such images, such that innovative thinking (even in philosophy and science) proceeds not logically, not illogically, but analogically. But I don't think this entails "a distance from the continuity of the familiar," or if it does, the manner in which it does so must be specified much more, er, clearly--because the process of analogy is one of understanding the unfamiliar by means of something more *familiar*. Thus it is very far from being opposed to and negating the familiar. One might even wonder if Adorno's notion of "the familiar" is an unstratified, monovalent one. (Of course there is never a "perfect" analogy, since after all the two objects are not the same thing; sometimes two or more analogies are needed, as in the old "light consists of particles" and "light consists of waves" problem.) On the other hand, there is no question that "thought is always thickly mediated by experience," a point that DCR fully accepts (as you know). The idea that there can be "a pure, clear thought," a value- or theory-neutral language, belongs to positivism. But the mediation of thought by experience should again drive us toward understanding thought, including philosophical thought, as inherently and necessarily enmeshed with the familiar. From this perspective, the notion that thought can negate/oppose the familiar sounds positivist. So in rebuttal to Adorno, I'm tempted to say, "Dream on!" (Sorry, I couldn't resist. ;-g ) Anyway, I don't think anyone in this discussion has proposed that RB produce "pure, clear thought" in the positivist sense. Or at least that hasn't been my intention. Actually I'm not sure what "pure, clear thought" would look like--since it cannot exist, even in principle, it's hard to think it! But the imagistic leaps seem thin, not adequately fleshed out (so to speak). Which is *not* to say that they aren't there. In addition, the "gaps" to which you referred originally are sometimes rather serious. For example, RB speaks in various places of the "social cube," but he does a very poor job (in my humble opinion) of explaining why that image is appropriate and viable, why the faces that he proposes are the correct ones, what dynamics it illuminates, or where the heck the ideology "intersection" fits in. (Frankly I've never been able to make head or tale of that diagram.) In this situation, RB simply fails not only to be persuasive, but I think fails to even *try* to persuade. He doesn't give an argument, simply a bunch of assertions. As a result I've never been persuaded by this particular analysis. (I've offered a different CR conceptualization of the social in an article, but I won't get into that.) Creative leaps are wonderful but still have to be defended. I think that to expect explanations of such key matters (and telling "why this makes sense" is not the same as "explicitly showing all the steps") is scarcely to succumb to a liberal notion of universal communicability, nor does it in any way sabotage thought--quite the contrary, since it assumes that the reader will exercise critical intelligence (rather than expecting the reader to "believe it because I say it!", which is anti-critical). But this is now old ground. As for the "intro" that I referred to, I don't recall, maybe it was a book review you wrote for Alethia that you later posted here. Whatever it was, I remember thinking the style was very good. Hey, take the compliment and run. Cheers, T. --- Tobin Nellhaus nellhaus-AT-mail.com "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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