From: "Marshall Feldman" <marsh-AT-uri.edu> Subject: BHA: RE: Re: How is New York Today- fate of [Social Science]? Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 09:36:54 -0500 Tobin, Thanks for your comments. I thought I understood the T/IT distinction before, but you gave me much more insight into it. Perhaps part of the justification for using the term "transitive" is that this term recognizes the theory-laden nature of thought, so that THOUGHT always "creates" its object IN THOUGHT (cf. Althusser's distinction between the real concrete and the concrete-in-thought or Lipietz's comments on conceptual realism in Mirages and Miracles). Marsh > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu > [mailto:owner-bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu]On Behalf Of Tobin > Nellhaus > Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2000 3:37 PM > To: bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu > Subject: BHA: Re: How is New York Today- fate of [Social Science]? > > > Hi Mervyn and Marsh-- > > Mervyn, you wrote: > > > The transitive/intransitive distinction has > > been adapted from grammar. A transitive verb changes its object > > ('expresses an action which passes over into the object' according to > > the Concise OED), an intransitive verb does not. Is not this the exact > > distinction between the two dimensions Bhaskar wishes to convey - one is > > changed by ongoing human action, the other not? > > I had considered the linguistic reference as well, but it worries me for a > couple of reasons. The first may be a triviality, but I'm troubled by > suggestions that we can understand reality or some part of it in terms of > linguistics (except of course language itself). Bhaskar himself has noted > the "linguistic fallacy" (particularly the linguistic model of > society) as a > variant of the epistemic fallacy. Now I'm not at all saying Bhaskar is > sliding into that with these terms, but at the same time I do > have to wonder > why linguistic terms seemed the most appropriate. But as I say, > this qualm > is secondary. > > The other, more serious reason is that I find it hard to describe as > "intransitive" a domain which has been specifically designated as > consisting > of real entities, possessing various powers and susceptibilities. Real > entities *do* affect things other than themselves, which is the very > opposite of "representing action confined to the agent; i.e. having no > object" (to quote the definition of intransitivity that Colin > gave us). I'm > almost tempted to say the words have gotten switched. > > Moreover, your very elucidation, which states that "A transitive verb > changes its object," implies that the transitive dimension changes the > intransitive dimension, and so thought changes reality (as the objects of > study)! This surely is not whatever RB means. So I still think the > terminological choice is problematic. > > Marsh: my comments about quasi-intransitivity were rather elliptic, my > apologies. Thoughts can and do (eventually) change society, but that is a > separate matter from the TD/ID distinction. RB makes the point clear in > PON2, p. 47, where he distinguishes between, on the one hand, "existential > intransitivity," which is a condition of an investigation of any object > (natural or social), because this is inherent in being the *object* of > analysis; and on the other hand, "causal interdependency," which is a > feature of society resulting from the fact that society is in a specific > sense concept-dependent (the sense being that the concepts involved are > principally those of the long-dead--RB incorporated Archer's > point in DPF). > This is why I pointed to the "time lag": it takes a while for ideas to > become embedded within social relations and material constructs > (say, urban > systems). Society doesn't change the instant somebody has an > idea about it. > The transformation of society by theory and culture is a question > of causal > processes, which operate through space and time--not one of conditions for > investigation, in which an object (no matter how it was produced) > becomes an > object of study (no matter if for whatever reason it later changes). The > latter is what the TD/ID distinction describes. > > To take one of your examples, then, epistemology is created, > reproduced and > transformed by human practice, just as you say. But that is a causal > process. However, the moment one undertakes the study of a particular > epistemological theory (let's say, when RB critiques positivism), that > theory is intransitive, for the fundamental reason that it is the > object of > study, and no amount of critique will ever stop it from being the > object of > study. The critique *makes* it an object. Intransitivity is positional. > The only thing that can remove the epistemology from this intransitive > position is to not think *about* it and instead think *through* > (analyze by > means of) that theory. In that situation it then becomes transitive, > because it is (so to speak) the thinking in action. > > Another example: X is talking with Y and thinks, "Hey, this > person is great, > I hope we become friends." The thought affect's X's behavior > toward Y, and > the two indeed become friends. This is a causal process, and the > friendship > is causally dependent on those thoughts. But that has no bearing on the > fact that when X thought about Y, Y became the object of thought. X could > decide that Y is a creep, but Y's position *as the object of thought* is > exactly the same, even though the social relationship between them has > altered. > > Hope that makes sense. Best, T. > > --- > Tobin Nellhaus > nellhaus-AT-mail.com > "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce > > > > > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005