File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2000/bhaskar.0003, message 60


From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus-AT-gis.net>
Subject: Re: BHA: Re: More on TD/ID
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2000 10:37:21 -0500


Andrew--

> Thirdly, the real question concerns the *degree* of uncertainty or
> doubt and, to answer that, one has to look at the precise reason for
> the doubt in the first place. For RB,  I take the reason (one of the
> reasons) to be the difference between a concept of an object and the
> object itself.
>
> I argue at length in a forthcoming paper that a position such as Colin's
> (and RB's) collapses to not merely *doubt* but to utter scepticism of
> a Humean type. The argument is simple. If there are real objects
> about which we know nothing, then how do we know they are not
> about to change all the 'known' 'laws', mechansims etc. of the universe
> (this goes back to the 'buzzing blooming confusion' discussion on this
> list some months ago)? The point is that this is not merely *doubt*. It
> is, instead, a complete lack of knowledge of the nature of the world
> (its laws, structures, mechanisms) in the immediate future.

Really, this is a perverse interpretation of RB.  He argues that we may have
incomplete, imprecise, and/or partially erroneous knowledge of objects,
hence the fallibility of current knowledge--but that nevertheless this is
still knowledge.  You seem to conclude that if a theory rejects absolute
certainty, it necessarily devolves into absolute doubt.  That's like saying
that if a cake isn't completely cooked, it must never have gotten into the
oven.  Don't be daft.

---
Tobin Nellhaus
nellhaus-AT-mail.com
"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce




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