From: "Andrew Brown" <A.N.Brown-AT-uel.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2000 19:07:05 GMT0BST
Subject: RE: BHA: Re: More on TD/ID


Hi Colin,

You wrote:

> Careful reading would reveal that I said "RB says no general, philosophical,
> or
> transhistorical answer will be forthcoming". Still, you want to impute this
> to me. Fine, in relations to epistemology, I will happily agree with it.
> 
> But to claim this is not to claim the invalidity of ALL Transhistorical
> statements, but only the invalidity of the search for transhistorical
> epistemological criteria, through which some universal grounding, and means
> of judging how our concepts map onto the world. The claim in effect, is a
> specific rejection of a specific transhistorical claim, not a rejection of
> transhistorical claims. If you disagree with this specific claim, it is open
> for you to show why and how. I can show why I agree with RB, but since
> people can find it much more clearly articulated in RB himself, I think time
> would be better spent. However, I fully agree with you that. hence you claim
> that "We are all in the game of putting forward such positions;
> there's nothing we can do about it." is correct. But so what in relation to
> the specific claim re epistemological criteria?

The 'so what' is simply to make clear that 'dogmatism' can never lie in 
the very fact of putting forward a transhistorical epistemology, even if 
that is of the negative 'epistemic relativity' type. Any philosophy must 
make very strong claims (about human nature, and being) in this 
sense. Clearly, we agree on this. 

> 
> 
> On Hume, so much the worse, a paradigmatic case of theory-practice
> inconsistency!

Well, I still wonder why, if Hume recognised all this, he was so silly as 
to commit the epistemic fallacy as he was supposed to have done? I 
asked this question to Nick on this list some time back - he gave the 
obvious CR/DCR type answers, but they still leave Hume as a rather 
foolish philsopher imo, (as they do for most other philosophers).

> 
> On doubt, no, not only this, but of "not doubt" as well; that is, how much
> do we know.
> On your analysis of RB I agree, but doubt is not in itself the problem. The
> problem resides in the attempt to banish the doubt by transhistorical
> epistemological procedures or metaphysical systems that attempt to deny the
> non-identity between thought and its objects. Which is why I say live with
> the doubt. Learn to live with our fallibilism. We would all like to find
> that magic key that allows us to compare our conceptualisation with the
> objects independent of our conceptualisations, but as it stands it seems we
> can't. Learning to live with this reality of the situation we find ourselves
> in is a political act, the denial of which has led to all sorts of horrors,
> both philosophical and political. Remember CR is committed to
> epistemological relativism (understood in a very particular way).

I am, of course, very well aware of RB's position. And also of your 
own view on 'learning to live' with fallibilism. As for my view it is 
perfectly able to deal with the problem of error. Error occurs through 
failing to fathom the *interconnection* of objects. Indeed, I argue that 
it is the only way to uphold fallibilism truly. RBs way, and your own, 
and 'common sense' (or at least 'common sense' to academic 
discussions) collpases to Humean scepticism on my argument [this is 
indeed an *argument*, not a silly assertion, as Tobin seems to imply]

> 
> I argue at length in a forthcoming paper that a position such as Colin's
> > (and RB's) collapses to not merely *doubt* but to utter scepticism of
> > a Humean type. The argument is simple. If there are real objects
> > about which we know nothing,
> 
> You disagree that there might be real objects of which we know nothing?

Yes I do disagree. I am certain they are material; interconnected in the 
infinity of time, space, motion, etc. [RB would agree in some senses 
but would insists there are and could be other things about which we 
know nothing - and in any case he must argue that this entire 
philosophical ontology could be completely wrong, given epistemic 
relativity]. 

> Really, so we know everything?

No. Obviously.


> 
> then how do we know they are not
> > about to change all the 'known' 'laws', mechansims etc. of the universe
> > (this goes back to the 'buzzing blooming confusion' discussion on this
> > list some months ago)?
> 
> We don't, and you are claiming you do? Really? On which side is the
> fallibilism and dogmatism now? 

Here we actually reach the key point of disagreement. I am indeed 
claiming precisely the certainty, regarding a buzzing, blooming 
confusion, that you are incredulous about. But, more than that, I am 
claiming that *your* position collapses to utter uncertainty. Do you 
want to just doubt a *little* that a buzzing, blooming confusion will 
occur or do you doubt it a *lot*? I suggest that, on RBs own 
premises you *cannot say*. *Hence* [and this is my point of 
*argument*, as opposed to assertion] you are completely clueless 
about the laws, mechanisms, etc. of the world in the immediate future. 
You cannot say whether or not they will turn into a buzzing, blooming 
confusion. It is *not*, given such a philosophy, 'judgementally rational' 
to choose to believe in reality. Rather, it is an act of pure faith....or, 
should I say, dogma.

Look, I'm not one that is normally
> predisposed to appeal to Kuhn, but surely some humility in our current state
> of knowledge re the laws of nature is possible (and desirable) without
> saying we know nothing. I don't agree with much the postmoderns say, but I
> do agree that the people who say they know with certainty, are potentially
> dangerous.

I have every humility in the current state of knowledge. It has got no 
where near fathoming adequately the interconnection of the universe; 
nor, therefore, the specific objects of the universe. We do have 
knowledge of particular aspects (of the universe) for certain, and we 
do, therefore, have certain knowledge that they have necessary 
interconnections; but we do not grasp fully these necessary 
interconnections (and are very far from doing so). So we have 
objectivity (certain knowledge of aspects) but fallibility (we don't 
grasp their interconnection fully - so *in this sense* we don't grasp 
particular, real objects fully). This is an elaboration of the theory of 
error mentioned above.

> 
> The point is that this is not merely *doubt*. It
> > is, instead, a complete lack of knowledge of the nature of the world
> > (its laws, structures, mechanisms) in the immediate future.
> 
> Wrong! This can only be the case if you are working with a very foundational
> (and dare I say binary) concept of what it means to know. And I think again
> (as I have pointed out previously) you are close to confusing explantion (or
> knowledge) of the present or past with prediction.

I am not 'working with', as in *imposing*, such oppositions, I am 
following through CR and DCR premises to their conclusions. Nor am 
I confusing knowledge with prediction, because it is not just prediction 
of actual events that I have in mind in the buzzing, blooming confusion. 
Rather, it is any knowledge whatsoever of real structures and 
mechanisms in the immediate future. [This is also a reply to your 
criticism, in this regard, of my new dialectics paper]


Well, the relationship between thought and being is a pretty important 
topic! No wonder it leads to accusations regarding dogmastism, etc. I 
have just received Ruth's helpful email - thanks again to Ruth. To put 
my position in Ruth's terms, I am suggesting that RB along with the 
internal realists and most other of RBs foes *all* collapse to a 
scepticism or dogmatism. Big words, but then RB claims much the 
same except that he excludes his own work from the collapse. Thus 
my own view is very far from Ruth's as well.  (I say 'my own view': in 
fact it stems from a particular reading of Spinoza as offered by my 
favourite Russian philosopher, Ilyenkov, just to bore the list with his 
name again). And, yes, my argument is incomplete with out explaining 
the materialist identity (as well as) oppostion of thought and being that 
Ilyenkov('s interpretation of Spinoza) argues to exist. But, then, 
maybe people would be more inclined to be sympathetic to Illy's 
positive argument given the negative argument raised above [though I 
fear the opposite is true].  I can't help but feel hampered by the fact 
that I have no well known literature to refer to except the primary 
texts themselves......but now i'm whining...

Thanks,

Andy.




> >
> 
> =================================> Dr. Colin Wight
> Department of International Politics
> University of Wales, Aberystwyth
> Tel: 01970 621769
> http://www.aber.ac.uk/~cow
> ==================================> 
> >
> >
> >
> > Andy
> >
> >
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> >
> 
> 
> 
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