File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2000/bhaskar.0006, message 12


From: "Marshall Feldman" <marsh-AT-uri.edu>
Subject: BHA: RE: RE: various queries
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2000 11:34:44 -0400


Colin,

>
> I'm not sure if I am one of the "renegades" you are referring to, but it
> seems to me that there is no real contradiction.
>
> the concept of the "intransitive object" of science as an object
> of inquiry
> can be taken to mean either that the object is ontological and exists
> independent of the inquiry of it, or that the object is as
> stipulated in the
> inquiry and has no existence other than in and through the inquiry. Much
> hangs on the ambiguity and vagueness of the term object. However,
> if like me
> you think "objects of inquiry" are ontological then the contrast you draw
> makes no sense. It is, after all, an inquiry "of" something.
>
> Let's put it this way. Scientist X wants to know about Y. In the course of
> his/her inquiry it becomes clear that Y can only be explained by
> postulating
> S as a mechanism that explains Y. Both Y and S are objects of inquiry, yet
> both are ontological; i.e. they are not reducible to what the
> scientist says
> they are. Heideggerian notions of ontics can be helpful here.
> Maybe I'm not
> a renegade after all.

It seems to me that the distinction between signifier, signified, and
referent -- which Sayer reintroduces -- is of considerable help here. We
may, for example, have the concept of magnetism (signified) and several ways
of dealing with it either more empirically (e.g., observing patterns of iron
filings) or more theoretically (e.g., Gauss' Law for a magnetic medium).
These latter are both signifiers, or more precisely acts of signification.
Nonetheless, they are incomprehensible without introducing a third term, the
referent, which is the phenomenon outside thought and which thought seeks to
grasp.

It seems to me that this triad is essential to CR for two reasons. First,
and foremost, introducing the epistemic fallacy means that knowledge is
necessarily fallible and "opaque" with respect to a referent outside thought
(i.e., ontology). Yet within knowledge we find both "objects" and theories
about them. So we need to distinguish such thought objects (as signifieds)
from their referents outside thought. In Althusserian terms, this triad was
"theory" (signifier), "concrete-in-thought" (signified), and "concrete"
(referent). Second, and related to this first point, Quine's demonstration
of the theory-laden and language-dependent nature of observation implies
that empirical observation necessarily falls within the epistemological
realm (although perhaps closer to its borders than pure theoretical work
does). If empirical observation is the signified, one still needs to allow
for something "out there," and this is the "referent."

I think introducing this third term clears up considerable confusion and
ambiguity.

	Regards,
	Marsh



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