From: "Marshall Feldman" <marsh-AT-uri.edu>
Subject: RE: BHA: RE: various queries
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2000 12:14:54 -0400


Morteza,

I don't think this is quite right.

> Bhaskar appears to be claiming that the "pure reason" of
> philosophy can generate "synthetic a priori" and "apodeictic" knowledge of
> the objects of the  intransitive domain of science. Does this mean that
> "pure reason" can generate such knowledge by virtue of its direct
> access to
> reality (i.e., without conceptual mediation)? If the answer is a "yes",
> then such answer presupposes either (a) a transparent reality, or (b)
> rationalism (neither of which must be acceptable to Bhaskar); if it is a
> "no", that is, there is indeed a conceptual mediation between the "pure
> reason" of philosophy and reality, then what is the difference between the
> "pure reason" of philosophy and the reason of science which is by
> Bhaskar's
> definition can only operate within the transitive domain and with the
> transitive objects? That is, why the reason of philosophy has been
> priviledged over the reason of science?

Bhaskar's entire argument hinges on the practice of science. In this, the
only reality he claims to grasp is science's practice. Now of course he
could be wrong in this, so there is no priviledge of philosophy over
science. However, the aspects of science that his argument hinges on are so
fundamental and thin (e.g., laboratory experiments) that it's hard to
imagine how someone could object to them. By "fundamental," I mean that
almost anyone who talks about science would agree that science includes this
aspect or practice. By "thin" I mean that he just uses some of the most
general and obvious features of the practice to make his argument. Of
course, if science does not involve the practice (e.g., there are no
laboratory experiments), if his characterization of the practice is wrong
(e.g., experimenters do not intervene in the world), or if his analysis is
flawed (e.g., laboratory experiments still must involve "open" systems) then
Bhaskar's argument unravels.

	Marsh Feldman



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