File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2000/bhaskar.0006, message 157


From: "Marshall Feldman" <marsh-AT-uri.edu>
Subject: RE: BHA: one last try
Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2000 12:58:43 -0400


Viren wrote:

<snip>
> > This seems to me to be an example of the epistemic fallacy. We
> should not
> > commit the sin of conceptual realism, but this should not stop
> us from being
> > ontological realists.
> >
> > Perhaps some examples can help us sort things out.
> >
> > Dinosaurs -- nothing we can do or think will change what they
> really were or
> > what happened to them. These things are intransitive.
>
>
> This is a classic example and it does help to some degree.  Obviously no
> one would want to say that by naming something a dinosaur, we actually
> created a material object.  However, we should not ignore the creative
> dimension to naming.  By calling something a dinosaur enforce a certain
> way of classifying the world, which definitely influences our notions of
> truth and validity.  So when we say "these things are intransitive", the
> "these" is somewhat ambiguous.  I think by "these things" we mean some x
> that we understand under the description dinosaurs, but could also be
> understood under other descriptions and classifications.

Yes, this whole discussion results from the ambiguity. That's why I
introduced the distinction between signifier, signified, and referent. The
referent exists outside thought and language. Therefore, referents can be
understood under multiple and differing descriptions. Nonetheless, not all
descriptions are equally useful. In part, the reason for this is that the
referent exists outside thought and language and therefore enforces a
certain discipline on the descriptions we use. The referent "lives" in the
intransitive dimension; the signifier and signified, in the transitive. Your
statement only applies to the latter.

>
>
> >
> > Political activism -- clearly this is influenced by human thoughts.
> > Nonetheless, for the political scientist it's intransitive (if political
> > activism really exists in the world).
>
> This is interesting.  From both you and Collin's remarks, I get the
> feeling that whether something is intransitive or not is dependent on the
> the perspective of the knower.  So something can be intransitive for the
> political scientist, but transitive for other people.

Yes. The distinction between "transitive" and "intransitive" simply refers
to whether we act on something or not. When we conceptualize dinosaurs or
pluralism, we act on CONCEPTS. This is the transitive dimension. When we use
empirical observation of fossils or New Haven's urban renewal policies to
help us theorize, we are using theory-laden observation and apprehending
things via concepts. Again, this is transitive (otherwise theorizing and
using evidence to change theory would be impossible). Nonetheless, the
creatures that lived millions of years ago (if they in fact did) and New
Haven's urban renewal policies (if they actually existed) do not change.
They are the referents of our narratives but exist outside language and are
intransitive with respect to it. This is why G. William Domhoff (in _Who
Really Rules?_) could go over Robert Dahl's data (from _Who Governs?_) and
come up with an entirely different account of political power in U.S.
communities. What happened in New Haven didn't change, our understanding of
it did. Urban renewal in New Haven happened in the 1950's and early 1960's,
and neither Dahl nor Domhoff's books influenced what happened. (Although the
latest of the two was published in the early 1970's, I also doubt they had
much influence on what happened in New Haven subsequently.)

When we act as political activists we can change some of the structures that
are the intransitive objects of scientific discourse. For instance, when I
lived in Santa Monica we worked to change city elections from city-wide to
district elections. In a certain sense, certain intransitive objects of
knowledge did not change. For instance, we believed that city-wide elections
tended to favor rich and powerful elites because of the cost of city-wide
campaigns whereas district elections tended to favor grassroots candidates
because they drew on more face-to-face contact and were less influenced by
advertising. Of course, these statements presume a certain context
reflecting U.S. political institutions. These tendencies of district and
at-large elections did not change when we won the battle to institute
district elections. So, as intransitive objects district and at-large
elections were unaffected by our actions. Their tendencies were their
tendencies irrespective of what we did. What did change was the actual
structure in place in Santa Monica.

>
>
> >
> > "Transitive" refers to the act of comprehension, not to the act
> of creation.
> > "Intransitive" does not mean uninfluenced by humans. Instead, consider a
> > real object, R, that we seek to understand with theory, T. "T"
> may contain
> > one or more concepts, t sub 1, t sub 2, etc. that it claims
> allow us to know
> > R. It may even claim that a specific concept, t*, is a complete
> and accurate
> > description of R, and hence that t* is indistinguishable from
> r, the latter
> > being a "true" apprehension of R in thought. Here T, the
> various t's, and r
> > are all transitive, since they are all thought-dependent. But
> don't let this
> > confuse you. Their thought-dependence is only in the sense that
> they are all
> > being used to help us develop knowledge of R. R itself could be
> dinosaurs or
> > political demonstrations. How we theorize such things does not
> affect the
> > things themselves, at least not in the instant we do the theorizing.
>
> The key here is "how we theorize such things does not affect the things
> themselves."  Of course, but how we theorize defines the parameters of
> inquiry and definitely affects our idea of what a "thing" is, or what
> gets "thing-status".

Sure, but so what? This is all part of the transitive dimension. Realism
distinguishes beween the "what gets 'thing-status'" and what things actually
exist (independent of our knowlege of them). Clearing up this confusion is
the whole point of the epistemic fallacy.

>
>
> On this point it, Hans's comments about the relationship between Bachelard
> and Bhaskar are relevant.  I think Bhaskar would call Bachelard an
> idealist precisely because Bachelard focuses on how our categories and
> language (in particular mathematical models) influence the way we conceive
> of objects and affect our conception of what is an object.

Probably he'd call him a "neo-Kantian" since Bhaskar tries to get beyond the
idealist/materialist opposition.

Regards,

	Marsh



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