Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 14:50:32 +1000 From: Brad Shipway <bshipway-AT-scu.edu.au> Subject: RE: BHA: RE: adjudicating between knowledge claims Hi, and thanks to Doug, Ruth, Colin, and Viren, >I may be unfamiliar with this or know it under a different name. First, >are you talking about an evolutionary epistemology or evolutionary theory? >If are you saying that >some theologians subscribe to Dawkins' view of evolution, i.e., the selfish >gene, etc., I am surprised to learn that. I was thinking of Evolutionary Epistemology a la Plotkin (1993) "Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge". Also Dawkins and Campbell etc. They seem to be arguing for Evolutionary Epistemology as a way of understanding human rationality as having biological roots. If knowledge is viewed as a Darwinian adaptation, just the same as an opposable thumb, this then lets things such as virtue, altruism, faith, charity, morality, sacrifice and conceptions of reality be explained in purely biological terms. In this way, I sometimes think that the proponents of E.E. might class it as a metatheory. The Hard-line E.E. takes the view that the Darwinian two-step of chance and contingency has finally eliminated God altogether, and that metaphysical beliefs are epiphenomenal features of the evolution of an inward-directed brain, whereas the Systems Theorist departs from the hard-line specifically at the point of metaphysical beliefs, and takes the view that because natural selection is driving everything, the very fact that metaphysical beliefs exist means that they are significant, i.e. they have been selected for. I think there do seem to be theologians, especially those who use the term critical realism (ThCR), that subscribe to E.E., although perhaps not to the hard-line brand that Dawkins advances. Barbour, McGrath, Peters, Polkinghorne and the like may be included here. Huyssteen (1998) "Duet or Duel: Theology and Science in a Postmodern World" seems at times (still thinking about this..) to take a very similar historical view of science as Bhaskar. They see E.E. and critical realism (ThCR) as possibly providing what they call an "epistemologically safe place" in which science and religion can dialogue. "This opens up a door, beyond the postmodern crisis of continuity, to theologize with a tradition whose continuity no longer has to be guaranteed by a foundationalist metaphysics of history. In this way we are empowered to criticize our traditions while standing in them, but also to allow a particular history to speak for itself without being subsumed under the umbrella of an all-encompassing theory, based on a series of texts and interpretations which we have endowed with a particular authority and which function then as the accepted ideology of a specific community. On this view our traditions and also our research traditions - those interpretive sets of theories that we construct to make sense of the continuities and discontinuities of our traditions - thus do not have to represent repressive consensus of authority, but can indeed rather be seen as a creative field of concerns within which both consensus and dissent, continuity and discontinuity, acquire coherence and intelligibility." (Huyssteen, 1998 pp. 19). Although they deal with western religion, I think that maybe ThCR would allow for the inclusion of something like Fritjof Capra's "Tao of Physics" to join the dialogue. >From the discussion generated by FEW (still waiting for my copy), I am wondering what others think about where/how metaphysical beliefs, and the rationality of same fits into DCR? >Although evolution does seem driven by one, central mechanism, this is >misleading. For anything concrete to happen, you have to add contextual >detail. From the mere mechanism of blind variations and selective >retention, it is not possible a priori to have predicted any -- let alone >all -- of the species that have come to exist. Even to explain that, we >need to know their environment, their competitors, ecological niche, etc. >All of these are additional, contextual mechanisms that affect evolution. >So even with that one central mechanism, the theory of evolution does not >imply a closed system. In fact, as you are probably aware, it now seems to >be opening up even further to include cosmic collisions, impact of the >moon, etc. Okay, I think I am getting it. Doug, when you speak about mechanisms here, are you alluding to those that operate in the domain of the Real, as opposed to the domains of the Actual and the Empirical? Your comments here have also got me thinking about the similarities between Bhaskar's stratification of nature, and the nested hierarchies model of E.E. Again, interesting similarities; one strata can influence the other, but is not irreducible to the other. Collier's (Intro to RB's Philosophy) explanation of stratification of Kinds of Being 9pp.108) might be seen to be similar to Plotkin's description of nested hierarchies. >Hope this helps. Yes, thank you very much Doug. Hi Ruth. Let me preface my following comments with a cowardly disclaimer, please note that I used the term "embryonic" as opposed to "infant", to emphasis the pre-birth state. In answer to your question: >I'm wondering if you, and/or others, would tell me a little bit more about >precisely how you see critical realism helping with the issue of how to >adjudicate between competing accounts -- i.e., broadly speaking, the issue >of justification. I would have said that, for example, if upon examination theory A displays that it is underpinned by the epistemic fallacy, and that theory B is not, or that theory A does not take into account the stratification of nature and theory B seems to, then DCR has enabled me to make a judgement about the fecundity of each theory. I would have said that, but the exchange between yourself and Colin shows that I have oversimplified, does it not? I must actually confess to having "that account of justification that covers all cases" that Colin spoke of - can't seem to outgrow the search for absolute certainty. Keeping that confession in mind, however, there still remains for me the question that Viren raised: how is an ontological vacuum different to relativism? Also, if I could further expose my ignorance by asking one more question. You mentioned: >Add to this the idea that intelligible DISagreement implies at least some >degree of "commensurability," and I agree with these as conditions of >possibility for adjudication. But Brad said that cr gives him the tools for >the actual adjudicating, too. And you seem in places to suggest as much >also. I'm interested in this, because I tend to see it as NOT giving much >more than the (absolutely crucial) conditions of possibility part. If CR gives us the conditions of the possibility of adjudication, then (given a specific circumstance), how, or from what quarter is the actual adjudication enabled? Isn't the possibility of adjudication existing, but the actual adjudication never happening similar to an unexercised power? Is a permanently unexercised power the same as not having the power? >More to the point, though, if >there is a *philosophical*, as opposed to a first-order scientific question, >it is: what kinds of considerations get to be part of the "why," and does cr >tell us anything new or interesting about this? My secret belief, as I've >said, is that it doesn't -- not really. I guess this is why I am excited about the conference coming up, I really would love to hear what others think CR is "good for". A couple of quickies for those interested in the coincidental similarities between CR and ThCR; do these mean anything? McGrath (1998) The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion Oxford: Blackwell p. 158 "It might indeed be argued that it is repressive and uncreative to suggest that the Compton wavelength of an electron is 2.424309X10 (-12) meters, or that DNA possesses the structure of a double helix. Each of these could be argued to be intransigent, representing the interests of the western male scientific establishment, and failing to respect creativity. The intense difficulty with such objections is that experimental research, often linked with theoretical considerations, shows that this is the way things are - and further asserts that these conclusions are independent of the gender, social status, religion, and sexual orientation of the observer" Am I mistaken, or would the Bhaskarian philosophy of science agree? "The parallel with religion is therefore not exact. The Christian doctrine of the incarnation may be taken to affirm the interaction of God with human history and culture, and thus pointing to the inevitability of the intermingling of historically and culturally conditioned elements (such as language and imagery) into the way in which God and the Christian life are conceived. Nevertheless, a critically realist theology would wish to affirm that the realities which it attempts to describe and interpret are prior to such description and interpretation, and in some manner control the nature of the description and interpretation." If we took the western conception of Christianity and replaced it with the broader term "metaphysical belief", how would this comment sit with DCR? Best regards, Brad Shipway Southern Cross University Lismore, NSW, 2480 Australia --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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