From: "Jonathan Pratschke" <jonpr-AT-energy.it>
Subject: BHA: R: RE: RE: adjudicating between knowledge claims
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2000 19:46:55 +0200


Dear Colin

Thanks for your message, it was very helpful, as was Tobin's response. I
agree that 'explanatory power' is largely empty of content until it is
operationalised, and that the search for a universal algorithm is
misfounded. This certainly leads to a multiplicity of adjudication
strategies and a questioning of the dominance of empiricist criteria.
Obviously 'explanatory power' can be interpreted as accuracy of prediction
or classification, variance explained or 'goodness of fit', capacity to
generate new hypotheses, coherence or avoidance of ad hoc explanations,
tautologies and so on.

However it is operationalised, the notion of 'explanatory power', as it
emerges from the CR literature, is comparative and open-ended due to the
stratification of unobserved generative mechanisms. It involves an
inter-subjective and practical dimension of exposition, critique, comparison
of results etc.. This often involves a search for consensus between rival
researchers about criteria of adjudication. But I don't believe that theory
adjudication can be reduced to its inter-subjective and practical aspects.
To the extent that it also involves a systematic engagement with various
forms of 'evidence', I think that there is scope for formalisation. This
strikes me as fairly uncontentious; what matters is how we go about it.

Bhaskar's account of science implies a particular relationship between
theory (hypotheses about stratified generative mechanisms) and evidence
(observed effects of mechanisms interacting in open systems). I believe that
this imposes constraints on theory adjudication. These constraints may go no
further than specifying the properties of theories that have a bearing on
explanatory power. As Tobin indicates, to give prominence to aesthetic
attributes contradicts core assumptions of CR. I originally mentioned
Lakatos because of his emphasis on the dynamic process by which existing
research programmes confront new phenomena and generate new hypotheses. This
encourages us to assess the explanatory power of individual hypotheses in
the context of their location within an overall theoretical framework. I
understand your opposition to the search for "a set of rules which can be
applied in all situations and will always give the right answer". But I
would be interested to know whether you would place *any* constraints on
theory adjudication on a priori grounds?

Thanks,
Jonathan Pratschke




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