From: "Colin Wight" <Colin.Wight-AT-aber.ac.uk>
Subject: RE: BHA: RE: adjudicating between knowledge claims
Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 11:13:28 +0100


Hi Tobin et. al.

Doug has put very nicely how I would have responded to some of the other
points, certainly those in relation to "rules of thumb", so I will
concentrate my attention on Tobin's advocacy of the devil - if I might be
allowed to put it that way post-FEW. However, a few minor points.

Ruth, I think it a little unfair to suggest that I have perhaps set up a
position where you can only be understood as saying what I say you say. You
have every opportunity to refute my reading. If you now want to reformulate
some of the things previously said so that the issue of adjudication isn't
that big a deal to you, that the criteria you were after were only rules of
thumb (i.e. what gets to be in the toolbox) etc... Then we probably have no
disagreement. Where we do have substantial disagreement is over the role of
ontological realism, because not only does it form part of the condition of
possibility for adjudication (a point I thought you had accepted) but the
commitment to it forms part of the practice of adjudication.

Tobin my old friend.

The problem I always find when I play at been Dv's advocate is that I'm not
very good at it since I can see the flaws in the argument as I advocate them
and since Tobin begins by agreeing basically with my position on some issues
I suspect this is also part of the problem for him too.

>
>
> I gravitate this way myself, but I think I need to play the
> devil's advocate
> here, because one can't always put theories into practice in a way that
> assures that result indeed comes from the practice

Now this gets it wrong way round and you are confusing being
epistemologically pragmatic with being a pragmatist; i.e. being pragmatic in
terms of which tool to use and prioritising pragmatism as the tool. We may
epistemologically not accept the theory which works best but which we think
most true and then begin to find ways to put it to work. Whether a theory
can be put into practice or not is not central to my argument. It may be one
of the criteria, but not necessarily the determining one. Many theories come
to be accepted for which there is no real indication as to what use they
might be put. Remember we are talking here about theory adjudication.


>
> > Also, I'm not (and don't think Feyerabend should be read as saying)
> > "anything goes". What I am saying is that anything might go and
> what will
> go
> > best will depend upon where we want to go if you like (so many goes...).
> The
> > point is we can't say what will go until we try it. We can't say which
> > criteria we use to choose our theories until we are presented with them.
>
> I haven't the slightest objection to the proposition that
> truth-criteria are
> context-dependent.  But what is the context?  It would be nice to say that
> it's the object, but that's a tough one for social objects, and
> in any case
> science is a social practice, which means all sorts of things get in the
> soup.

Well of course they do, that's the issue and the consideration of what
legitimately forms the "context" will be part of what goes into the
adjudication. But this only makes the point, because until we have Theory A,
Theory B and some indication of X that they are both purported theories of,
we have no way of deciding the context. Now, of course, it's not going to be
easy, but nobody has said it is, the point is only that we can't begin to
demarcate the context unless we have gone concrete. For example, is it part
of the context of deciding whether to accept my theories that I am an
England supporter (this is some admission in these troubled times I can tell
you). The easy answer is to say, of course not.  The fact I support England
should have no bearing on whether you accept my theories or not. But wait
one moment, and let's go concrete. Suppose the theory that I am advancing is
that it will be good for global football for England to host the World Cup
in 2006. Well, now it may be important, it may not be, but it may now need
to be considered.

whetherBig Brother (& Co) used torture and brainwashing to
> convince Winston
> Smith that 2+2=5.  Or 3.

Again, makes my point I think. You use this to show the absurdity of using
this particular epistemology(?) to accept a theory; does anyone want to
argue this? This is an instance of theory imposition not adjudication and
one I suspect everyone, even the torturers, know the truth of (that's why
they have resorted to torture or brainwashing).  Now the easy thing here is
to say (i) Well Winston hasn't really accepted the theory he simply says he
has to stop the torture, or he has been brainwashed; or (ii) that maybe
violence shouldn't be allowed in the toolkit. However, in some instances,
unless you are a pacifist, violence may be necessary to defend your theory.
It's not a particularly scientific criteria I think, but depending on
context theory choice may well have to be politically mediated. Look at the
debates on genetically modified food, for example. Again, however, I think
most of us wouldn't place this very high on the list of tools to use. But,
unfortunately, as I have been trying to say, this is the social world and
there are no easy answers to theory adjudication. It takes work and
dedication. The fact that some people can abuse the effort should not make
us turn to easy solutions, not least because any theory of theory choice
would itself have be subject to criteria by which IT was chosen over other
theories of theory choice; and now we are in a vicious regress.

 Hey, if it
> *works* -- if it convinces someone of the "truth" -- !

But in your own account it hasn't convinced them of the truth, quite the
reverse in fact. Your account shows us what the truth is and then uses this
truth to show the absurdity of adopting violent means to get people to
accept another thing. What they are accepting is not the truth, or else your
account wouldn't work; it only works because we already know which account
we should be accepting and the torture is getting in the way.

ed
 Okay, I realize
> that's an extreme, but it's not entirely fictive.  In a related
> example, if
> I remember right, in the 17th century the Catholic Church was prepared to
> accept the Copernican theory of heliocentrism *as a pragmatic aid* (for
> navigation), but adamantly rejected the notion that it was also *true*.

Ah yes, interesting example, and it just shows you how hard theory
adjudication is and how dangerous supposed criteria for theory choice can be
does it not? "The ultimate criteria for theory choice is the word of God as
mediated through the Catholic Church." Oh yeah, suspicious or what!
Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight we can see that the silly old
buffers should have gone with the better theory, point is for them things
probably looked very different. But anyway, you are doing exactly what I
said I was not prepared to do - prioritising one thing (use value, or
authority) over all others. However, authority sometimes can be a legitimate
tool and one we all grudgingly accept at times. I'm sure most people have
been in dreadful meetings where opposing points of view have been competing
for hours and where we would love and accept the chair to say; "OK,
ultimately, it's my responsibility and we are going to go with Prof. X's
positions." Not ideal, of course, but it happens and sometimes we recognise
the necessity of it given the evidence at our disposal.

> Truth was reserved for the Ptolemaic geocentric universe.  In this case
> reason, logic, and a healthy dollop of tradition, not to mention the
> imperative of preserving Church authority, provided the criteria for
> deciding a theory's truth.  Can CR provide nothing to counter this way of
> deciding theories?  As I think Brecht commented, the truth won't win out,
> unless we fight for it.  So what are our weapons?

They are various, the point is we don't rule many out and nor do we apriori
privilege one over the other. But look I simply think it naive to think that
CR presents us with some supposedly easy way out of these difficult issues.
It doesn't. What it does do is hold out the possibility of adjudication and
shows us how hard it is. Positivism basically says it's easy and
postmodernism says its impossible. OK, we've got the hard territory and we
may not like it. The simple solutions provided by positivism and
postmodernism do seem very attractive, even elegant. But to me they
represent a retreat and lack of engagement and in their own way represent
mirror images of each other on this issue.

>
> But in a way this begs the question.  What are appropriate criteria that
> would persuade you that you're mistaken?

Depends on the circumstances of course, I dealt with this above.

 *You* get to decide them, and
> you're quite capable of deciding beforehand that you will not be
> convinced.

No, I tell you what I think they are in relation to my theory, you tell me
what you think they are in relation to your theory and we assess their
validity in relation to the object of inquiry. Look, "anyway, you're in
theatre studies or some pipsqueak discipline like that, moreover if I
remember rightly your not even gainfully employed in academia. I mean let's
get real. What contribution can you make to this discussion? Come on, your
points simply are not appropriate to the issue at hand. Get off the list."
;-) Does anyone really want to argue that this is an appropriate set of
considerations in terms of this discussion?


> Devil's advocacy
> aside for a moment, I do think there's something, well, let's say "odd"
> about being philosophically a critical realist about theories'
> contents, but
> (again philosophically) an instrumentalist about our grounds for
> accepting a
> theory as true.

Ah but I'm not. The issue is of theory adjudication not how we arrive at the
true theory. We hope that we arrive at the true theory, but as fallibilist
and eschewing the epistemic fallacy we know that our accounts are only ever
accounts of something. And, to repeat, I am not an instrumentalist about
theories but an epistemological opportunist.

>
> So a true theory of advertising (or aesthetics for that matter) should be
> aesthetically pleasing?

No, but aesthetics should play a major role in adjudicating between theories
of objects which are themselves aesthically saturated.

Small wonder the formalists constantly "win" this
> battle.  Sociohistorical approaches are bloody messy.  Obviously
> I don't say
> that aesthetic criteria should *never* be considered (moi?!), but the
> question is, at what point and how heavily should they weigh in?

Depends on context again, surely. More to the point the formalists might
win, because they are right. I know nothing about these issues, but if you
tell me what the formalists say and what the sociohistoricists say then I
can of course put forth an opinion. But until I know what the content of the
claims are I'm afraid I couldn't take sides.

>
> The issue is not about a theory of God's word, but of the role that might
> play in a CR theory and its critiques of other theories.  We
> agree that some
> things we take on trust (e.g., I believe that it was a mug of coffee
> *because you said so*, even though I'm half inclined to think it
> was really
> a pint of your favorite ale).

Not at this time in the morning.

 I suspect we both believe in natural
> selection along Darwinian lines (more or less), largely however because we
> accept the word of others who have done the research.  But there
> are plenty
> of folks here in the U.S. who insist that it hasn't been proven, and that
> the Biblical account of creation is superior *because in God we trust*
> (irony intended).  Other than calling these people blithering idiots, what
> does CR have to say about this method of deciding among theories?

I take it we mean CR and not TDCR. In which case you of course know the
answer. They would have to come up with something better than this. Here I'm
putting epistemic criteria fairly highly on my list, alongside a high amount
of rationalism, allied to a fair amount of conventionalism. CR, I would have
thought, would be naturally very sceptical of a creationist account. But I'm
not sure what the problem is. I do think Darwin got it right and am prepared
to argue for it, however, being a realist and recognising that evolution is
a theory of origins and not the origins, I am perfectly happy for others to
advance an alternative theory. What this means is that we Darwinians have to
keep making the case. We are constantly confronted by new arguments which
make us search for novel ways to defend our theory. This we hope will
strengthen the theory, but it may not. But committed to ontological realism
we have to accept this possibility. The problem comes not in the conflicting
theories but when certain groups want to stop debate holding one theory up
as the true theory.

>
> You misread my statement, which was literal: positivism requires
> *everything* in a knowledge claim to resolve into empirical data.

Not so actually Tobin, this is a common misperception. In terms of empirical
science yes. But most positivists had no trouble accepting analytic
statements as providing valuable knowledge. In fact, in terms of truth many
positivists didn't think synthetic truths possible. Truth wasn't really much
of a concern to most positivists, who were in general much more inclined
towards an instrumentalist concern with prediction and control.


 Which poses the
> questions of what else counts, when, for what objects, in what way(s), and
> why.

Exactly. And questions which obviously can't be answered in the abstract
alone.

For example, if CR is a materialist
> philosophy (of a particular variety), then is it fair to infer that (other
> things being equal) it weighs material evidence (empiricals) more heavily
> than logical deduction?

Well yes and no. Again I would say that this depends upon context. Some
sciences won't have access to large amounts of material evidence (which is
not to say there will be none) and hence will be making rather large
deductive leaps based on what little they do have. But in general, you are
right CR does say that you put theories to the test, so the empirical is
still very important.

  To put it nother way, CR argues
> that something
> is real if it is causal; consequently, when we say that "we should believe
> Theory A because of X, Y & Z," it is incumbent upon us to explain what
> "because" means.

Because we have good ground (rational, empirical, pragmatic, etc..) for
believing it to be the case and being prepared to argue why; good ground
however are an altogether different things from theoretical guarantees.

Anyway Tobin, a lot of what you say I have no problem (which is hardly
surprising) with when located in various important enterprises such as
epistemology, the sociology of science, the sociology of knowledge, or the
history of science, and being aware of these is obviously valuable as they
provide indications as to the problematics of theory choice. They make us
aware of how the appearances can deceive, they make us aware of the limits
of rationalism, they make us aware of the problems of a purely
instrumentalist approach to theory choice, they make us aware of the role
social power plays in theory adjudication. Being aware is a good thing. It
helps us understand the limitations of certain tools in certain contexts and
how distortion can set in (for example, I'm probably prepared to defend the
argument that social power plays less (only less not no role) of a role in
theory adjudication in the natural sciences than it does in the social
sciences for all sorts of reasons many located in the object of inquiry
itself). What they don't provide is a set of general criteria for theory
choice that we can look back on to see if we have got it right.

Cheers,

=================================Dr. Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Tel: 01970 621769
http://www.aber.ac.uk/~cow
===================================>



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