File spoon-archives/bhaskar.archive/bhaskar_2000/bhaskar.0006, message 24


Date: Sat, 03 Jun 2000 10:42:34 +0100
From: Colin Wight <Colin.Wight-AT-aber.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: BHA: RE: RE: various queries


Hi viren,

and of course the concepts of signifier, signified and referent all
constitute intransitive objects to our transitive discussions of them. Just
as Bhaskar's concepts of transitive and intransitive objects are
intransitive to our transitive attempts to understand them.

Cheers,

At 23:01 02/06/00 -0500, you wrote:
>Hi Marsh,
>
>Your explanation of the signifier-signified-referent relationship was
>helpful.  I just wanted to clarify one point.  Using Bhaskar's terms would
>you say that both the signifier and the signified are transitive, while
>the referent is intransitive.  This causes some confusion, since when we
>can refer to the referent only by means of signifier and signifieds.  I
>suppose the key here is Bhaskar's concept of referential detachment,
>which perhaps links the signified to the intransitive realm.
>
>Best,
>
>Viren
>
>On Fri, 2 Jun 2000, Marshall Feldman wrote:
>
>> Colin,
>> 
>> >
>> > I'm not sure if I am one of the "renegades" you are referring to, but it
>> > seems to me that there is no real contradiction.
>> >
>> > the concept of the "intransitive object" of science as an object
>> > of inquiry
>> > can be taken to mean either that the object is ontological and exists
>> > independent of the inquiry of it, or that the object is as
>> > stipulated in the
>> > inquiry and has no existence other than in and through the inquiry. Much
>> > hangs on the ambiguity and vagueness of the term object. However,
>> > if like me
>> > you think "objects of inquiry" are ontological then the contrast you draw
>> > makes no sense. It is, after all, an inquiry "of" something.
>> >
>> > Let's put it this way. Scientist X wants to know about Y. In the
course of
>> > his/her inquiry it becomes clear that Y can only be explained by
>> > postulating
>> > S as a mechanism that explains Y. Both Y and S are objects of inquiry,
yet
>> > both are ontological; i.e. they are not reducible to what the
>> > scientist says
>> > they are. Heideggerian notions of ontics can be helpful here.
>> > Maybe I'm not
>> > a renegade after all.
>> 
>> It seems to me that the distinction between signifier, signified, and
>> referent -- which Sayer reintroduces -- is of considerable help here. We
>> may, for example, have the concept of magnetism (signified) and several
ways
>> of dealing with it either more empirically (e.g., observing patterns of
iron
>> filings) or more theoretically (e.g., Gauss' Law for a magnetic medium).
>> These latter are both signifiers, or more precisely acts of signification.
>> Nonetheless, they are incomprehensible without introducing a third term,
the
>> referent, which is the phenomenon outside thought and which thought
seeks to
>> grasp.
>> 
>> It seems to me that this triad is essential to CR for two reasons. First,
>> and foremost, introducing the epistemic fallacy means that knowledge is
>> necessarily fallible and "opaque" with respect to a referent outside
thought
>> (i.e., ontology). Yet within knowledge we find both "objects" and theories
>> about them. So we need to distinguish such thought objects (as signifieds)
>> from their referents outside thought. In Althusserian terms, this triad was
>> "theory" (signifier), "concrete-in-thought" (signified), and "concrete"
>> (referent). Second, and related to this first point, Quine's demonstration
>> of the theory-laden and language-dependent nature of observation implies
>> that empirical observation necessarily falls within the epistemological
>> realm (although perhaps closer to its borders than pure theoretical work
>> does). If empirical observation is the signified, one still needs to allow
>> for something "out there," and this is the "referent."
>> 
>> I think introducing this third term clears up considerable confusion and
>> ambiguity.
>> 
>> 	Regards,
>> 	Marsh
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>      --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>> 
>
>
>
>     --- from list bhaskar-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>
>
============================================

Dr. Colin Wight
Department of International Politics
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Wales
SY23 3DA
Tel: (01970) 621769 


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